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Abstract
Religion in the widest sense is acknowledged to be a 
fundamental element in Hofmannsthal’s writings, but an 
account of the nature of the beliefs underlying his works as 
a whole is still needed. Chapter 1 concentrates on his 
essays, letters and notes and examines his usage of certain 
religious words and concepts: faith; Christianity, the Bible 
and the Church; revelation; the concept of an "other 
reality"; myth; religion; God; and spirit. The central 
concept discovered is that of a spiritual dimension both 
underlying and transcending the phenomenal reality of 
everyday experience. The nature of this dimension and the 
ways in which it can be apprehended are explored.
Chapter 11 seeks to establish a definition of mysticism 
and to show that Hofmannsthal’s emphasis on the unity of all 
things has its roots in personal experience of a mystical 
nature, expressed in his early poetic works and in the 
essays of the succeeding decade. His later, more socially 
oriented works express the desire for a realisation in the 
external world of the truths intuited. His eclecticism in 
seeking illumination of his experience in a wide variety of 
religious, mystical and psychological writings is examined, 
together with the absence of any specific framework of 
interpretation, and the implications of this are explored 
through an analysis of Per Turm.
Chapter 111 deals with Hofmannsthal’s search for 
lasting values and for an understanding of the problem of 
evil, and explores the ideas of the highest good as a full 
involvement in life, with its constant process of
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interrelation and renewal; and evil as the obstruction of 
this process, through blindness to the true nature of 
reality, or as a flaw in the overall harmony. The co­
existence of Hofmannsthal’s concern for moral issues and 
his mystical belief in the unity of all things is discussed,
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Abbreviation
1. Hofmannsthal’s Works (See Bibliography, p.l63)
Gesammelte Werke in Einzelausgaben: •
Dram en I, II, III, IV DI, II, III, IV
Lustsoiele I, II, III, IV LI, II, III, IV
Gedichte und Lyrische Dramen GLD
Erzâhlungen S
Prosa I, II, III, IV PI, II, III, IV
Aufzeichnungen A
Sâmtliehe Werke, Kritis.che Ausgabe KHA
2. Hofmannsthal’s Correspondence (See Bibliography, p.l63-l6l) 
Briefe 1890-1901 and Briefe. 1900-1909 BI and BII 
Correspondence with: Leopold von Andrian Andrian BW
Sberhard von Bodenhausen Bodenhausen BW
Carl J. Burckhardt Burckhardt B¥
Stefan George George BW
Edgar Karg von Bebenburg Karg BW
Harry Graf Kessler Kessler BW
Arthur Schnitzler Schnitzler BW
Richard Strauss Strauss BW
3. Other
H.A. Fiechtner (editor), Hugo von Hofmannsthal: Per 
Pichter im Spiegel der Freunde (See Bibliography, p.l67)
1st and 2nd editions Fiechtner^ ^
1. Periodicals
Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift PVJS
Hofmannsthal-Blâtter HB
Pie Neue Rundschau NR
Wirkendes Wort WW
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Introduction
In considering the religious element in Hofmannsthal’s
works, I am using the term ’’religious’ in its widest sense.
A fair definition is that given by William James, who
describes the religious attitude as ’’the belief that there
is an unseen order, and that our supreme good lies in .
harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto.’  ^ This kind of
religious attitude is fundamental to Hofmannsthal’s works,
and prominent in the memories of many who knew him.
R.A. Schrôder, for example, writes of "das Wirklichste ...
was uns Nachbleibenden die Gestalt des abgeschiedenen
Freundes, was sein unter uns verbliebenes Werk am hellsten
2und seelenhaftesten verklârt ... : Frümmigkeit." He is
clearly not referring only to Hofmannsthal’s specifically 
religious works, which make up a very small proportion of 
his writings, but to something which characterises and 
illumines the whole body of his work. My aim is therefore 
to explore what kind of "Frttmmigkeit" this could be.
For Schrëder this quality was predominant in his 
memories of Hofmannsthal as a person as well as in his 
works. It is necessary, however, to make a distinction 
between his personal attitude or convictions and the 
religious content of his works: these cannot be assumed to 
be identical. Lernet-Holenia comments that "die dichterisch- 
religiose Bekenntnis fehlt so gut wie ganz bei
3
Hofmannsthal," and, while this may seem to be an over­
statement in view of the strong religious core in his works.
1. The Varieties of Religious Experience, p.53
2. ’In memoriam Hugo von Hofmannsthal’, p.593 p
3. H.A. Fiechtner, (ed.), Hugo von Hofmannsthal , p.271
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it is certainly true that they cannot be treated as a 
confession of faith. Andrian recounts how Hofmannsthal 
himself said, in reply to a remark about his religious plays, 
that "die Elemente seiner Dichtung, auf die ich anspiele, 
seien nur als dichterische Requisiten und keineswegs als 
Beweise persOnlicher Ifberzeugung zu werten."^ Our primary 
concern must be with the religious content of his works and 
its function and consequences within them, but clearly 
insights into his personal attitude, as it emerges from 
letters and notes and to an extent from his essays, can be 
of considerable help in reaching an understanding of this.
It is necessary also to ask why Hofmannsthal should 
choose to make use of such "dichterische Requisiten" and of 
the religious language and symbolism that occur with 
increasing frequency in his later works. Dorothee Sëlle, 
in her analysis of the use of religious language in secular 
literature, has pointed out that the effect of this is not, 
as one might expect, to empty the words of their religious 
content, but rather to add a "sacred" or spiritual dimension 
where it would otherwise be lacking: "was genetisch 
Sâkularisierung heisst, müsste funktional als Sakralisation 
beschrieben werden."^ It will become clear that the 
uncovering of such a spiritual dimension within the realm 
of everyday experience is certainly a part of Hofmannsthal’s 
purpose.
He rarely uses religious vocabulary in its traditional 
sense, and is indeed often hesitant to use terms that are
1. Fiechtner^, p.63
5. Realisation, p.85
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too specific.. For Erika Brecht this was characteristic of
his attitude: "am bedeutendsten und unaufhttrlich im Hinter-
grunde spürbar war ihm eines: ’Das Hëhere’ nannte er es
vorsichtig und ein wenig abschwâchend."  ^ Some reasons for
this caution will become apparent later when I consider
Hofmannsthal’s attitude both to religious tradition and to
abstract thought in general. One consequence is that
reminiscences such as Erika Brecht’s, or that by Schrëder
quoted above, tend also to be rather vague on this point,
stressing the importance of the spiritual element but giving
no indication of specific beliefs. Walther Brecht does
attempt a description of. the spiritual intuition underlying
Hofmannsthal's works: "eine gewisse Ahnung der mütterlichen
Einheit allés Lebens. Ein dem religiësen eng verwandten
7
Grundgefühl, fast ein mystisches Grundwissen." Although 
he has identified one important factor in the mystical 
awareness of the unity of all things, he still gives the 
impression that he is groping for an adequate definition.
Hofmannsthal was of -course living in a period and a 
culture where religious, and in particular Christian belief 
was very much taken for granted, rather than being a matter
g
for discussion. Much of the religious element in 
Hofmannsthal’s writings can no doubt be attributed to such 
cultural presuppositions, either to their influence on him 
or to his awareness of their presence in the audience for 
whom he was writing. I shall, however, show that there is 
in his attitude to spiritual things a deliberate
6. Erinnerungen an Hugo von Hofmannsthal, p.16
7. Grundlinien im Werke Hugo von Hofmannsthals, g.l70
8. A point stressed by Lernet-Holenia (Fiechtner , p.274-)
eclecticism of approach that reaches far beyond his own 
culture. In his later works there is also a clear desire, 
arising out of his continuing concern with moral issues, to 
direct attention to the existence of spiritual reality and 
spiritual values.
This basic religious element in Hofmannsthal’s works 
has been discussed by many critics. Perhaps in recognition 
of the importance to him of Austrian culture and tradition, 
the assumption has often been made that it is fundamentally 
Christian. E.R. Curtius, for instance, claims that in 
Hofmannsthal’s search for ’gültige Bindungen’’, "die Weisheit 
Asiens Qconnt^ eine Station und ein Sinnbild sein - aber 
nicht Heimat und Lôsung. Sie konnten nur in der Offenbarung 
gefunden werden, die an Abend- und Morgenland ergangen war: 
im Christentum. Dahin weisen Hofmannsthal die Uberlieferung 
von Volk und Boden; dahin seine neuplatonische Geistesform;
9
dahin ein geheimer Ruf, dem er folgen musste." Others who 
share this view are Grete Schaeder, Walther Brecht, Hederer 
and Hestermann.^^ Me shall see that this assumption does 
not do justice to the complexity of Hofmannsthal’s ideas, 
and most later critics take a wider view.^^ There can.
9. ’George, Hofmannsthal und Calderon’, p.199
10.e.g. G. Schaeder, Hugo von Hofmannsthal und Goethe, p.170 
W.,Brecht,’Hugo von Hofmannsthals Ad me ipsum und
seine Eedeutung’,p . 34-1
E. Hederer, Hugo von Hofmannsthal, p.56
0. Hestermann, Das mystische Element im Werke Hugo 
von Hofmannsthals, pp. 4-» 14-7, 157 
All see Hofmannsthal’s later works as increasingly 
Christian in outlook. Hederer and Hestermann consider 
that the religious plays and other later works are 
evidence of Christian conviction - Hederer even while 
acknowledging that Hofmannsthal himself states that 
Christianity appears in his works as "eine(r) Ordnung 
unter anderen."
11.e.g. G. Erken, Hofmannsthals dramatischer Stil, p.l66
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however, still be a danger that as the relationship of
elements in his works to other religious or philosophic
ideas is explored, the work is apparently reduced to the
level of an expression, not of Christianity, but of the
particular idea under consideration. An example of such a
restricted interpretation is Ernst’s discussion of Karma in 
12Der Turm. I shall therefore attempt to uncover the 
concept of spiritual reality which underlies Hofmannsthal’s 
works as a body, rather than concentrate on the particular 
systems and symbols of which he makes use in individual 
works or groups of works.
We cannot expect ’das Religiôse" to be expressed
plainly and directly'when it is, as Hofmannsthal put it,
13"geformt zum verhüllenden stummen Dichtwerk.’’ I shall 
therefore give initial consideration to his essays, 
together with notes and letters, in order to clarify the 
religious outlook which underlies his writings at different 
times during his life. I shall examine his usage of
S. Ernst, Studien zum religiësen Problem, pp.21f, 
89f, 98, 125ff 
’ ’ ’Hugo von Hofmannsthal und der ’Begriff
Asi en’ ’ , p .267 
P.C. Kern, Zur Gedankenwelt des spâten 
Hofmannsthals, p.91
F. Mistry, ’Towards Buddhahood’, p.337 
’ ’ ’Die beiden Gëtter’, p.9
H. Zelinsky, ’Hugo von Hofmannsthal und Asien’,
p. 531
Erken and Ernst draw attention to the inadequacy of 
assuming a Christian context in Hofmannsthal’s writings, 
even in Das Salzburger Grosse Welttheater. While Kern 
relates his ideas to "Lebensphilosophie" and contemp­
orary irrationalism, Ernst, Mistry and Zelinsky 
concentrate on parallels to Eastern thought, both Ernst 
and Mistry stressing the importance to Hofmannsthal of 
analogies and interrelationships between different 
religious systems.
12. In Studien zum religiësen Problem and ’Das Karma-Thema 
und der "Turm"-Stoff’. See pp.Slf below.
13. Letter to Pannwitz, in Mesa, No.5, p.35
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certain words and concepts from the religious sphere and his 
attitude to certain traditional aspects of religion, 
exploring references to faith; Christianity, the Bible and 
the Church; revelation; the concept of an "other reality"; 
myth; religion; the Divine; and spirit. In spite of the 
difficulty, indeed impossibility of constructing any fixed 
framework of belief from such references, I believe that it 
is possible to build up a useful overall picture, and that 
the very vagueness and fluidity of definition that will be 
discovered is an essential element in this.
The picture which emerges then becomes the basis for a 
wider consideration of Hofmannsthal’s works, among which, in 
addition to the specifically religious Jedermann and Das 
Salzburger Crosse Welttheater, Der Turm will be seen to be 
particularly important, as the fullest unfolding of his 
ideas in dramatic form and the clearest demonstration of 
their implicit problems. Two features of his outlook will 
come to stand out clearly, though their interrelationship is 
complex: the essentially mystical nature of his concept of 
spiritual reality, and its essential role in coming to terms 
with the moral issues that so deeply concerned him.
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I. Religious Language and Reality
1. Faith: its sources and object
The concept of "Glaube" is one that has an increasing
importance for Hofmannsthal. He uses the word very little
in his early writings, and the reference is then to a
traditional Christian belief which the society of his day
has for the most part left behind, as in the statement, "Uns
pflegt Glaube und Bildung, die den Glauben ersetzt, gleich-
mâssig zu fehlen,"^ One of the earliest significant
instances of the word occurs unexpectedly in the play Silvia
im Stern (1907) where, although without specifically
religious reference, it is used in a way which prefigures
ideas later developed by Hofmannsthal. The Adjunkt, unable
to trust or be certain of anything, says "Ein Mann hâtte
ich sein müssenJ ein ganzer Mann ... Glauben das ist es J
... Glauben das springt aus der tiefsten Seele hervor, wie
2
der Mord, wie die tiefste Lust." The implication is that 
what counts is the depth of conviction with which a belief 
is held, rather than its truth.
In J edermann, too, Hofmannsthal has chosen to give a
significant role to "Glaube", rather than following the more
3
traditionally Catholic model of Everyman, but the concept 
does not seem to become important to him till the war years. 
Then we read, for instance, that "Wer glaubt, dem wird die
1. PI, p.43 (1891) 2. p.100, N39 (1907)
3. The figure of "Glaube" and her role in Jedermann’s
salvation has been taken over from Hans Sachs’ Hecastus. 
For a detailed examination of the relationship of 
J edermann to Hofmannsthal’s sources and the implications 
of this, see J.J. Parker, The development of the Everyman 
drama from Elkerlyc to Hofmannsthal’s Jedermann, Ch. 10
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Welt anders,"^ and "Ohne Glauben an die Ewigkeit ist kein 
wahrhaftes Leben môglich." There are many references in 
the Buch der Freunde, where we again find the idea that 
"Durch Glauben wird Leben erst zum Leben, auch in seinen 
zartesten Gliedern."^ This is the kind of faith that issues 
in spontaneous action and has the power to transform life. 
The Adjunkt's words also suggest a link between belief and 
wholeness, and this idea is also developed later. We find 
that faith both demands and creates wholeness: "Der Glaube 
hat nur einen Gegenstand, ebenso der Unglaube. Beide gehen
7
auf das Ganze," and "Erleuchtung: das ohne geglaubte 
Ganzheit zu leben unmÔglich ist - dass im halben Glauben
g
kein Leben ist." The central importance of faith is again 
clear, but so far there is little indication of what its 
inspiration might be.
At about the same time as Silvia im Stern, the word 
"glauben" makes another significant appearance in the essay 
’Der Dichter und diese Zeit’ (1906). Hofmannsthal seeks to 
define it "in seiner vollen religiësen Bedeutung", but 
nevertheless expresses the same underlying attitude as did 
the Adjunkt’s words (quoted above) in a secular context.
He describes it as "ein Fürwahrhalten über alien Schein der 
Wirklichkeit, ein Eingreifen und Ergriffensein in tiefster
Q
Seele, ein Ausruhen im Wirbel des Daseins." It is some­
thing irrational which, though issuing in outward action, 
depends solely on inner experience and conviction, not
i. A, p.173 (1915) 7. A. p.i6 (1922)
5. A, p.228 (1916?) 8. PIV, p.All (1927)
6. A, p.49 (1922) 9. PII. p.29Af (1906)
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external "reality", and this remains characteristic of the
concept throughout Hofmannsthal’s writings. In 1916 he
writes in "Osterreich im Spiegel seiner Dichtung", "In den
Naturtiefen, in denen das Volk west, gleichwie in jenen
dunklen Tiefen des Individuums, wo zwischen Geistigem und
Leiblichem eine fliessende Grenze aufgerichtet ist, dort ist
nicht Reflexion und Hrkenntnis, dort sind Wollen und Glauben
zu Hause."^^ In addition to the dissociation of belief
from reflective thought, this statement also indicates a
close connection between "Glauben" and "Wollen", which is
confirmed elsewhere in Hofmannsthal’s later writings. We
are told in the Buch der Freunde that "Glaubenskraft
abniramt bei geminderter Willensst&rke,"^^ and a character in
Das Theater des Heuen even claims that "Die Begriffe
12Glauben und Wollen sind vertauschbar. " Belief is an
affirmation of what we will to be true, rather than of what
we find to be true, and itself affects our perception of
reality. Such statements as "Allés Geglaubte besteht, und 
13nur dieses," suggest that the power of faith may go even 
beyond the subjective sphere to determine objective reality. 
There is certainly one realm where it is indispensable, and 
Hofmannsthal affirms that "allés Geistige lebt nur kraft des 
Glaubens."^^ The fact of belief is of great importance, and 
it is associated with the ideas of wholeness, eternity and 
non-rational intuition. Beyond this, its basis and the 
nature of its object appear to be unimportant, or at least 
unspecified.
10. PHI, p.349 (1916)
11. A, p.16 (1922)
12. LIV, p.411 (1926)
13. A, p.37 (1922)
14. PIV, p.307 (1925)
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There is certainly nothing in Hofmannsthal’s references
to the Christian heritage of his own culture to suggest that
this faith should be equated with Christian belief. In
three essays written in 1891, ’’Maurice Barres’, ’’Das Tage-
buch eines Willenskranken’ and ’Zur Physiologie der modernen
Liebe’’, Christianity is presented as something which modern
society needs to leave behind, in spite of a nostalgic
fascination. It is related to asceticism and ’Kloster-
sehnsucht’’, to ’’Sehnsucht nach der Heimat’^^ and
17’verlorene (n ) Naîvetât’; things which imply an unwilling­
ness to face up to change and the realities of modern life. 
After this date Christianity, like the general concept of 
’Glaube’, appears in an increasingly positive light. It is 
not, however, the uniquely Christian elements that 
Hofmannsthal affirms; rather he continually relates 
Christian belief to other religions and mythologies and to 
ancient Greek culture.. He refers, for example, to ’eine
Welt, die gleichzeitig antik, j a mythisch und doch durch und
18durch christlich, j a englisch anmutete.’ This quotation
from an essay of 1894 indicates that the view of
Christianity as one among many expressions of spiritual
truth is present from a very early stage in the development
of Hofmannsthal’s thought, even though it is elaborated more
in later writings. He stresses that even a work such as
Jedermann is simply making use of this traditional story as
one possible vehicle of expression, writing of it, ’Habe
19mich der christlichen Mythe wie einer anderen bedient.’’
15. PI, p.10 (1891) 18. PI, p.194 (1894)
16. PI, p.22 " 19. HB 2, p.81 (1905)
17. PI, p.22 "
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Christianity has, however, a special value as the basis of
the European culture which is founded equally on "die
Antike". In a letter to Strauss, Hofmannsthal states that
"das Christentum zusammen mit der Antike ist’s, worauf wir 
20alle ruhen." These are in fact not two distinct elements 
but inextricably bound up together, for "der Geist der 
Antike" is "die eine Grundfeste der Kirche und aus dem zur
21Weltreligion gewordenen Christentume nicht auszuscheiden."
Hofmannsthal saw the younger generation of 1924 as 
caught up in:
zwei Strëmungen des Denkens und Fühlens ...: einer 
mehr christlichen oder mystischen, das-Zusammenstrëmen 
aller Dinge in Gott erkennenden, sozusagen über dem 
Rationaleh schwebenden, und einer mehr antik, j a 
orientalisch heidnischen, welche von der grandiosen 
Erfassung des sinnlichen Lebens her zum Begriff des 
Schicksalhaften gelangt, und die gleichs.am unterhalb 
des Rationalen in dunklem Bett dahinstrëmt. Nicht aber 
so, als ob beide Richtungen einander ausgesc^^ossen 
hâtten: vielmehr gingen sie ineinander über.
There is no firm division between the Christian and oriental
currents of thought, and the "Christian" current is
characterised as supra-rational and recognising the unity
of all things in God. Hofmannsthal's concern is always with
aspects which Christianity shares with other religions,
rather than with the specific teachings of the Christian
Church. It is also worthy of note that while his references
2 3 24.to faith, religion and God increase significantly during 
the war years, specific references to Christianity actually 
disappear almost completely during this period. The 
spiritual sources of hope to which Hofmannsthal is seeking
20. Strauss BW, p.468 (1922) 23. See section 2(b) below
21. PIV, p.316 (1926) 24. See section 3 below
22. A, p.311
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to draw attention are never directly related to the 
Christian faith.
His references to the Bible itself reveal a very
similar attitude, for it is always mentioned in conjunction
with other books which are given the same importance.
Apart from one or two early negative references, for
example to the gospel stories which, like all "Mythologie
und Legende und erstarrte Symbolik", must be brought to
2 5life by the artist, the symbolism of such books is seen
as conveying deep meaning. Goethe's West-0stlicher Divan,
for instance, is compared to- the Bible because it is "eines
von den Büchern, die unergründlich sind, weil sie wahre
Wesen sind, und worin jegliches auf jegliches deutet, so
2 6dass des inneren Lebens kein Ende ist:" their signifi­
cance comes from the richness of their symbolism and their 
power continually to unlock new levels and aspects of 
truth. Hofmannsthal refers to the timeless quality of 
such books: "etwas Urewiges ..., eine Urerinnerung - 
Griechenland und Rom und das arabische Mârchenbuch und die
Bibel." 27 Like Homer, the Bible is "ausserhalb der zeit-
lichen Bestimmtheit und ... der nationellen Beschrânkung"
2 8and has a special relationship to European culture. In
accordance with his view that the classical and the 
Christian heritage are closely intertwined within that 
culture, Hofmannsthal freely fuses together allusions to 
the Bible and to Greek mythology, for example: "Wie der 
gehetzte Hirsch ins Wasser, sehnte ich mich hinein in
25. PI, p.130 (1893)
26. PHI, p.159 (1911)
27. PIV, p.251 (1925)
28. PHI, p.87f (1912)
-17-
diese nackten, glânzenden Leiber, in diese Sirenen und
Dryaden, diesen Narcissus und Proteus, Perseus und Aktâon:
verschwinden wollte ich in ihnen und aus ihnen heraus mit 
29Zungen reden." On 18.6.1895 Hofmannsthal wrote to Edgar 
Karg, "Es gibt nichts geschriebenes, das man glauben darf. 
Alle grossen Bûcher, die grossen Gedichte, die Bibel und 
die anderen sind solche Traumwelten, mit der wirklichen 
Welt und auch untereinander nur gleichnishaft verwandt."^^ 
The Bible appears as one of many books whose separate 
worlds are not to be taken at face value, but point 
symbolically to a timeless reality. Actual references to 
it are few and scattered throughout his works, with no 
indication of a development in his understanding.
Hofmannsthal's view of the Church remains similarly 
static, though references to it do increase with his 
growing awareness of its importance as a cultural influ­
ence. It is valued as an ancient institution, "das
einzige grossartige Altertum, das uns im Abendland 
31geblieben ist." This reference is specifically to the
Catholic Church, which is often presented positively in
contrast to Protestantism, and is associated with balance
and humanity as opposed to legalism and coldness. The
atmosphere of a "katholischer, nachtridentinischer
32menschlicher Christlichkeit," the catholic desire for
33"das heitere Gleichgewicht der Seele," are set against
3 kthe "Druck des protestantischen unfreien Weltbildes" and
29. PII, p.10 (1902): cf Psalm 42, v.l; I Corinthians 14
30. Karg BW, p.83 32. PIV, p.417 (1927)
31. Burckhardt BW, p.227 33. Burckhardt BU, p.220 (1926)
(1926) 34. A, p.258 (1928)
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"eine nordisch-protestantische Steifigkeit und Ungesellig- 
3 5keit." (Hofmannsthal was, after all, "katholisch
g /
geboren." ) The Church influences culture, literature and
national character, and like the State it is one of the
37"realen Mâchte des Lebens." But the idea of "die Kirche
38als das Reich Gottes auf Erden" is "ideology", and
Hofmannsthal even warns Ria Schmujlow-Classen, "Hüten Sie
sich vor allem, was eine Form hat, ob.es der Katholizismus
39ist Oder die sozialistischen Ideen," a warning consistent 
with the distrust of rigidly formulated dogma discussed 
b e l o w . T h e r e  is no suggestion of looking to the Church 
as a source of divine revelation.
Where then does revelation come from? It does come,
for it is the material out of which the traditional forms
of religion have been created: "alle Frômmigkeitsformen
stammen aus Offenbarung, alle Konventionen aus dem geis-
tigen Erlebnis von Individuen."^^ Once the insight has
become a fixed concept, however, the result is the worship
of a lifeless image, "Anbetung eines eidolon, Sinnbildes,
das einmal für einen Menschen lebendig war, ... durch-
flammende Offenbarung des gëttlichen Geheimnisses der Welt 
42gewesen ist." The meaning of such a revelation cannot be 
preserved in words or external forms, but can only be 
grasped in the immediacy of the individual's living exper­
ience: "das allein Wissenswerte, das Sinn des Daseins, ist 
aus jeder einzelnen tiefsinnig erfassten Erscheinung des
35. A, p.63 (1922)
36. Fiechtner , p.297
37. PI. p.338 (1901)
38. PI, p.338 (1901)
39. BI, p.243 (1898)
40. See section 2(c) below
41. PHI, p.369 (1916)
42. A, p.105 (1893)
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Lebens zu verstehen, d.h. in einer blitzartigen Offenbarung
L 3für den Moment zu erhaschen." Here the revelation is the
product of a deep personal response to an individual
external phenomenon, and it seems that these experiences
can arise only out of such an interaction between inner and
outer reality. Hofmannsthal quotes from Goethe:
Allés was wir Erfinden, Entdecken im hëhern Sinne 
nennen, ist eine aus dem Innern am Aussern sich ent- 
wickelnde Offenbarung, die den Menschen seine 
Gottâhnlichkeit vorahnen lâsst. Es ist eine Synthèse 
von Welt und Geist, welche von der ewigen Harmonie des 
Daseins die seligste Versicherung gibt.
There is, however, also a. link between revelation and art,
perhaps as the means through which its insights can be
communicated in a living way. We read, "dass in Bildern,
wie in den wundervollen Werken der Musik, Offenbarung und
L 5Erlebnis enthalten ist," and in his "Ad me ipsum" 
Hofmannsthal refers to "die Offenbarungen durch die Aus- 
übung der Dichtkunst empfangen."
In the passage from Goethe quoted above it is the
harmony of all existence and man's "Gottâhnlichkeit" that
are revealed. Elsewhere we read of a recognition "der
Alleinheit der Dinge, der Weitenharmonie, wie eine Offen­
vy
barung, nicht der Wissenschaften, sondern der Religion." 
That which is revealed has none of the specific nature of 
religious dogma (which may, however, be a later, fossilised 
form of it). It is "Harmonie", "Alleinheit", "Gottâhnlich­
keit", "der Sinn des Daseins." These are the ideas that 
emerge from an attempt to identify the object of faith and
43. Karg BW, p.58 (1894) 46. A, p.238 (1926)
44. PI, p.220 (1894) 47. PI, p.26 (1891)
45. PI, p.168 (1893)
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revelation.
Hofmannsthal makes few other direct references to 
revelation, and it is of note that almost all. are very 
early in date, though the first quotation above, from "Die 
Idee Europa" (1916), shows that he continued to see such 
moments of intuition as the basis of religious belief. As 
the focus of his concern shifts in his later writings from 
immediate experience to a broader understanding of the 
worldview which springs out of it, we find that the things 
that are revealed: unity, harmony and symbolic meaning, 
retain their central importance.
These ideas are all embraced by the concept of an 
"other reality", which is described by Peter Berger as a 
fundamental category of religion. This other reality is 
"one of ultimate significance for man, which transcends the
I Q
reality within which our everyday experience unfolds."
Such a concept is in fact found throughout Hofmannsthal’s 
works, and though the language which expresses it is 
religious by implication, rather than directly so like the 
terms already considered, the concept will be found to be 
central to an understanding of his religious outlook. In 
writings of widely differing date we find the world of our 
everyday reality presented as essentially symbolic of 
something beyond: "Allés was ist, ist. Sein und Bedeuten 
ist eins, folglich ist allés Seiende Symbol" (1893).^*^ 
Perceived in the right way, everything in life is a symbol, 
and we become aware of this in moments, "wenn wir das
48. A Rumour of Angels, p.14 49. A, p.106 (1893)
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Seiende so gross anschauen, dass sich uns dahinter der
Abgrund des wahrhaft Seienden entschleiert" (1925).^^ It
is this response to surrounding reality which enables it to
51become the vehicle of revelation.
Direct references to this "other reality" are,
however, fairly few in Hofmannsthal’s earliest writings,
and tend merely to stress the symbolic nature of the world,
as grasped in such moments of revelatory understanding,
rather than to specify in any way what lies behind it.
Writing of his early experiences in "Ad me ipsum", he
describes the "pre-existential" sense of being "AngehOriger
52einer hOchsten Welt", and then the state of separation
which follows:
Der Dichter, aus jener hbchsten Welt, deren Bote der 
Tod, herausgefallen:
(Er, der Liebhaber der hëchsten Schënheit, hielt 
was er schon gesehen hatte nur für ein Abbild 
dessen, was er noch nicht gesehen hatte und 
begehrte dieses selbst, das Urbild, zu geniessen.
Greg. V. Nyssa)
This quotation from Gregory of Nyssa also appears as a
motto at the beginning of "Ad me ipsum"^^, which implies
that it does not only apply to "der ambivalente Zustand
55zwischen Prae-existenz und Leben," but is relevant to the 
whole, and that the search for the "Urbild" is a continuing 
one. At the point in Hofmannsthal’s development where the 
moments of intuitive vision seem to cease, the symbolic 
understanding of reality becomes a conspicuous theme in 
some of the essays of the early 1900s, a pattern we shall
50. PIV, p.281 (1925) 53. A, p.214
51. cf quotation from Karg 54. A, p.213
BW above, p.l9f 55. A, p.2l6
52. A, p.213 (1916?)
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find again when considering his attitude to mysticism. 
Because the exploration of this theme is part of 
Hofmannsthal’s attempt to reach an understanding of his own 
experience, it acquires importance at an earlier date than 
the other more directly religious concepts examined above 
and in the next section, which do not occur with signifi­
cant frequency until the war years, when his primary aim is 
to communicate his understanding of reality to others.
In the essays of this transitional period, we find
that three categories of people are united in their view
that the world around them is a symbol, not reality: ’’Dem
Kind ist allés ein Symbol, dem Frommen ist Symbol das
einzig Wirkliche und der Dichter vermag nichts anderes zu 
57erblicken.’ Children are still in close relationship ’’zu
der Unendli chkeit, aus der sie herzustammen scheinen,
the realm of a higher reality they have only recently left
behind. As we shall see, symbolic understanding is
59fundamental to the poet’s art, while "der Fromme" sees 
that the meaning to which the symbols point is essentially 
a religious one. For those who perceive things in this 
way, a pair of swans can become messengers of the divine, 
"die eigentliche Hieroglyphen, ... die lebendige geheimnis- 
volle Chiffern, mit denen Gott unaussprechliche Dinge in 
die Welt geschrieben h a t . I n  later years Hofmannsthal 
still sees such an outlook as the essence of religion: "es 
sieht j a nur der ohne Schrecken die Fülle des Lebens, der 
in allem und jedem das Gleichnis begriffen hat; hier ist
56. See Chap. II. section 2 59. Below, p.26
57. PII, p.102 (1904) 60. PII, p.102 (1904)
58. PI, p.354 (1901)
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Religion, und nicht im masslosen Hëher- und Tiefer-
Wollen."^^ To view the world like this is to discover that
"hinter allem ist ein Hëheres, noch geheimer aber auch 
6 2lichter," ■ and that this hidden higher reality is active, 
the ultimate basis of everything that happens: "ein Etwas 
..., auf dem allés Geschehen ruht und das geheimer ist als
/ g
Kausalitât." Indeed, one has not only transcended 
causality, but, like the Beggar in Das Salzburger Grosse 
Welttheater, has reached "eine Ebene, wo die Verteilung 
der Macht und der Glücksgüter ihm als eine gleichgiltige 
Sache erscheint. " In fact the solution to all human 
problems lies in this realm so far beyond our everyday 
concerns, "jenseits des Menschenlebens, immer im Bereich 
der die Welt über dem Abgrund des Nichts haltenden leben- 
digen Krâfte."^^
It is this realm into which Hofmannsthal is escaping 
in his early poems, "in Adlersluft und abgestorbner Ruh." 
Yet although he emphasizes throughout his writings that 
"die wahrhafte Wirklichkeit im Nicht-Da, in der Feme, im 
Ungreifbaren sich auswirke,"^^ the realisation soon comes 
that this reality, however intangible, cannot be isolated 
from the material world. It is rather another dimension 
which gives that world a new meaning and is only discovered 
through deep involvement with it. The soul "erlëst sich 
... vom Stofflichen, nicht indem sie es verschmâht, sondern
61. PIV, p.185 (1923) 65. Quoted bypBurckhardt,
62. Bodenhausen BW, p.118 Fiechtner , p.140 (1920)
(1910) 66. GLD, p.80 (1896)
63. A, p.79 (1922) 67. PIV, p.185 (1923)
64. A, p.298 (1923?)
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indera sie es mit solcher Intensitât erfasst, dass sie
hindurchdringt.” Hofmannsthal wrote to W. Brecht that
even during the "visionâre Vorgânge” of his youth, the
transformed object was ”nicht ausserhalb der Natur, sondern
ganz natürlich, aber in einer schwer zu beschreibende Weise
69erhëht und verherrlicht.” In the Chandos letter similar
experiences are described, which fill "irgeneine Erschei-
nung meiner alltâglichen Umgebung mit einer überschwellen-
70den Flut hüheren Lebens wie ein Gefâss," and through this 
transformed perception make him aware of the presence of an 
infinite reality.
Indeed, it seems to be impossible to apprehend "das
wahrhaft Seiende" in itself, apart from the material
phenomena which, rightly perceived, point us to it: ”’Am
farbigen Abglanz haben wir das Leben’, nur in Symbolen, nie
72
eigentlich kënnen wir das Leben fassen." The inter­
relation of this world and the world beyond can be seen 
from two of Hofmannsthal’s statements about Ariadne auf
Naxos. Ariadne finds that Bacchus ’’zaubert ihr in dieser
73Welt das Jenseits hervor:” for those who experience the 
power of love, ”es zaubert sich selber die Welt hervor als
7 /
ein Diesseits und Jenseits zugleich.”  ^ There is nothing
that cannot be the vehicle of this kind of revelation, for
nothing is merely the product of material causality: ”es
liegt allem Geschehen, auch dem scheinbar materiellsten,
75ein geistig Bewegendes zugrunde.”
68. PII, p.294 (1906) 72. DII, p.515 (1903)
69. George BW, p.234 (1929) 73. Strauss BW, p.130 (1911)
70. PII. p.15 (1902) 74. PHI. p.139 (1912)
71. PII, p.17 (1902) 75. PHI, p.236 (1915)
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But because a symbolic understanding of the world is 
necessary to grasp this, the vital task of poetry, and of 
all art, which functions through symbols, is to point to 
this higher reality. "Die Poesie auf ihrer' hëchsten Stufe 
zeigt auf ein Etwas hin, auf dem allés Geschehen ruht und 
das geheimer 1st als Kausalitât."^^ The poem "woven unsere 
Seele sich nâhrt" is the one in which we find this com­
bination of present reality and awareness of the
transcendent, "ein Jetzt, ein Hier und zugleich ein
77Jenseits, ein ungeheueres Jenseits." Hofmannsthal wrote
to Burckhart about his own aim in Der Turm: "es handelt
sich in diesem Stück immer darum, das ein Vorderes,
Greifbares da sei, eine Action, fasslicher, concreter Act
- und zugleich, dass hinter dieser sich ein HOheres,
Geistiges, Allgemeines, schwer Sagbares, gleichermassen
78
von Schritt zu Schritt enthülle und beglaubige." This 
higher reality can never be expressed directly, in art or 
in life; "Was der Dichter in seinen unaufhërlichen 
Gleichnissen sage, das lâsst sich niemals auf irgendeine 
andere Weise (ohne Gleichnisse) sagen: nur das Leben 
vermag das gleiche auszudrücken, aber in seinem Stoff, 
wortlos.
The symbolic is the eternal: Hofmannsthal writes of
8 0"einem ewigen, d.h. zeitlosen, symbolischen Stoff," and
81he also links "das Symbolische und Metaphysische", for 
the symbol expresses all that is beyond our earthly
76. A, p.79 (1922) 79. PI, p.286 (1897)
77. PII, p.110 (1904) 80. Strauss BW, p.421 (1919)
78. Burokhardt BW, p.l40 81. Strauss BW, p.444 (1920)
(1923)
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experience. When something has been given symbolic form,
o p
"das lebt ewig: Kunstwerk, Symbol, Mythos, Religion."
Myth and religion are placed alongside art and thé general 
"symbol", which is also an essential element in the other 
three. In fact, by examining the concepts of myth and 
religion introduced here, as I shall in the next section, 
we find that all four forms of expression are closely 
interrelated as the vehicles of revelation of another 
reality.
2. Eternally living form 
a) Myth
Hofmannsthal sees the artist as both reviving and
creating myth; for example, Swinburne’s "Atalanta in
Kalydon" is praised for its "wunderbare(r) Verlebendigung
8 3des erstarrten Mythos." While, however, "der Mythos 1st,
81
was die schaffende Phantasie niemals entbehren kann," 
it is not only ancient mythology which has this vital role; 
this statement refers in fact specifically to "das Volk", 
a concept seen as so powerful that a worldview based on it 
becomes "gross, einheitlich, mythisch." The myth gives 
meaning to the chaos of human experience, and the artist 
participates in this: "Indem der Klinstler so die Formen 
ihres banalen Sinnes entkleidet, steht er wieder in seiner 
eigentlichen Lebensluft, ein Mythenbildner inmitten der 
chaotischen, namenlosen, furchtbaren, leuchtenden
Q C
Wirklichkeit.’’ Ancient mythology is therefore only one
82. PII, p.28 (1902) 84. PI, p.342 (1901)
83. PI, p.117 (1893) 85. PI, p.170 (1894)
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possible source of the artist's material, and Hofmannsthal 
writes of the "Gleichgültigkeit des Stoffes: eigenes 
Inneres oder Mythen und Sagen, Novellen und Historien wie 
bei Shakespeare."^^ As an expression of timeless truth it 
is, however, something to be taken seriously. Referring to 
his plans for an opera about the exiled Greek gods, 
Hofmannsthal wrote that it would be "meilenweit von Meilhac
o n
und Halevy, denn es sind GOtter und ich glaube an sie."
European culture has its own mythology:
Es gibt eine gewisse zeitlose europâische Mythologie: 
Namen, Begriffe, Gestalten, mit denen ein hôherer Sinn 
verbunden wird, personifizierte Krâfte der moralischen 
Oder mythischen Ordnung. Dieser mythologisch- 
historische Stggnenhimmel spannt sich über das gesamte 
âltere Europa.
Hofmannsthal himself indicates some of the concepts and
figures of this mythology. The basic metaphor of Das
Salzburger Grosse Welttheater, for instance, the idea of
the world as a stage on which each person has a divinely
ordained role to play, "gehbrt zu den Schatz von Mythen und
Allegorien, den das dreizehnte und vierzehnte Jahrhundert
89ausgebildet und der spâteren Zeit Ubermacht haben." The
modern generation expresses itself through new mythological
figures and events: "Unsere wahren heroischen Mythen, an
denen unser Gemüt tiefer und gespannter wird, wie anderen
Geschlechtern ihres an ihrem Homer und Plutarch," are such
things as Schiller’s death, Goethe’s old age, Kleist’s
90collapse, Hëlderlin’s madness. Modern man also relates
91to Napoleon as "einer aktiven mythischen Gestalt," while
86. PHI, p.353 (1916) 89. PIV, p.145 (1922)
87. Kessler BW, p.244 (1909) 90. PIV, p.116 (1922)
88. PIV, p.193 (1923) 91. PIV, p.59 (1921)
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Brecht's Baal is said to be "der Mythos unserer Existenz,
die elementare Erfàssung unseres Daseins. Der Mensch von
heute geht durch allés durch, er saugt allés Lebendige in
92sich, urn schliesslich zur Erde zurückzukehren." These 
figures and situations express modern man's experience of 
the force of destiny and his understanding of the nature of 
human existence.
Looking back at Shakespeare, Rembrandt and Homer,
Hofmannsthal defines the deepest need of the present age:
"zu schaffen ihrem Da-Sein Atmosphâre; ihren Gestalten den
hellen und dunklen Raum des Lebens; ihrem Atmen das 
9 3Mythos," and so to create a sphere within which life is
perceived to unfold in a meaningful way. The process of
creating myth must continue, so that modern society as a
whole can be understood and experienced in this way: "Das
Gesellschaftliche kann und darf man nur allegorisch nehmen.
Hier lâsst sich das ganze Gesellschaftliche der neueren
9 LZeit ... als eine grosse Mythologie zusammenfassen."
Riches and poverty, for instance, can be seen as "die
beiden grossen mythischen Potenzen welche unsere Zeit
9 5beherrschen, Vorratsbecken ungeheuerer Metaphern."
The reference to actual experience is essential, for
"mythisch ist allés Erdichtete, woran du als Lebender 
9 6Anteil hast." Poetry alone does not create myths, which 
must be rooted in living experience. "Die Taten" are the 
other element "in welchen der innerste Gehalt einer 
Gemeinschaft sich auswirkt," and "nicht ohne diese beiden
92. LTV, p.112 (1926) 95. Germanic Review, 36 (1961)
93. PII, p.174 (1905) p. 55 (1907)
94. A, p.27 (1922) 96. A, 34f (1922)
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Genien Qîoetry and actioiQ entsteht ein nationaler 
97Mythos." In "Ad me ipsum" Hofmannsthal writes, "ohne
Taten und Leiden der Individuen entsteht kein Mythos:
daher bedürfte es der Vorgânge seit 1911, damit die Mâchte
98sich zum Mythos gestalten." Amid the terrible events of
war, the encounter with reality had the depth and power
which can give birth to myth. Hofmannsthal's visit to
Greece made him realise that the ancient myths, too, were
not only true as "Erzeugnisse der harmonischsten Ein-
bildungskraft," but arose out of real human experience: "es
ist mehr, als wir wussten, von der Magie in ihnen, die
unmittelbar aus dem Wirklichen auf den Menschen ein- 
99dringt." In this way true myth speaks very powerfully, 
"zugleich mit der Gewalt der Wahrheit und der Zaubermacht 
der erfundenen Fabel."^^^
The myth then opens up a realm of deeper meaning, 
supra-individual and timeless, behind these events and 
experiences. It is the myths, sagas and "Mârchen" "worin 
sich das Yerhâltnis des Volksgemütes zu den ewigen Mâchten 
ausspricht. Lord Chandos describes them as "die
102Hieroglyphen einer geheimen, unerschôpflichen Weisheit."
The power to create myth and to reveal this hidden truth 
flows from a view of the world for which "allés lebendig, 
allés zum Sinnblide wird."^^^ Although Hofmannsthal 
sometimes refers to "Mythen und Allegorien",the 
symbolism of myth does not function in the same way as 
allegory and the image presented cannot be simply
97. PIII, p.343 (1916) 101. PDf, p.376 (1926)
98. A, p.233 (1921) 102. PII, p.9f (1902)
99. PIV, p.158 (1922) 103. PI, p.406 (1901)
100.PI, p.325 (1901) 104. e.g. PIV, p.145 (1922)
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translated into conceptual language. "Mythos ist Gestalt,
nicht Allegorie der das Spruchband aus dem Munde hângt."^^^
In the letter to Alfred Roller from which this statement
comes, Hofmannsthal makes the central importance of
"Gestalt", communicating directly rather than through
analytical concepts, very clear: "das Gestalt da sein, und
dass nichts ungestaltet. Chaos, dahinter bleibe, das ist
der Sinn allés M y t h o s , a n d  "das Vieles in ihnen
inbegriffen sei, nichts aber begrifflich aufgefâdelt, das
107ist das a und o mythischer Gestalten."
The comprehensive nature of expression through
mythical figures also emerges very clearly from these
statements. In an early note, Hofmannsthal presents the
desire for completeness and unity as fundamental: "Der
tragische Grundmythos: die in Individuen zerstückelte Welt
sehnt sich nach Einheit. Dionysos Zagreus will wieder-
108geboren werden." The myth creates unity from chaos, and
is able to embrace all apparent duality and conflict. "Im 
Mythischen ist jedes Ding durch einen Doppelsinn, der sein 
Gegensinn ist, getragen: Tod = Leben, Schlangenkampf = 
Liebesumarmung. Darum ist im Mythischen allés im Gleich- 
gewi cht.
It is human experience that is expressed through myth; 
for those who have the necessary insight, "wird das eigene 
Dasein mythisch: Sinnbild des menschlichen Lebens. 
Hofmannsthal told Carl Burckhardt, however, that he had 
given up the psychological approach to mythology: "Auch
105. HB 3, p.186 (1922) 108. A, p.106 (1893)
106. " " 109. A, p.35 (1922)
107. " p.187 110. PIV, p.310 (1926)
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ich habe einst versucht, auf dem Wege der Psychologie in 
die Mythen einzudringen. Das lag in den Jahren, die ich 
damais miterlebte. Den Weg bin ich spâter nicht mehr 
gegangen."^^^ The myth adds a further dimension to human 
experience, going beyond the sphere of psychology.
Another indication of a development in Hofmannsthal's
attitude to myth can be found in his references to mythical
figures in his own works, for example, "Das Mythische. Der
Abenteurer ein mythische Figur. Desgleichen Ariadne. Das
112Mythische in hdherer Sphâre realisiert in Helena." In
a conversation with Walther Brecht about Die âgyptische
Helena, Sigismund, the Byzantine Emperor, Elektra and
113Odipus are added to the list, and part of the meaning of 
"in hëherer Sphâre" is explained: "Was vorschwebte in der 
Elektra und im Odious, war dies! Damais war ich noch zu 
burckhardtisch, historisch-philologisch ... Was im 
Abenteurer vorschwebte, die Verbindung eines tieferen 
Sinnes mit dem Bühnenmâssigen, habe ich hier erreicht."^^^ 
Thus Hofmannsthal sees himself as participating in the 
artist's continuing concern with the creation and renewal 
of myth, so that through the figures on the stage a greater 
reality is communicated, unifying and transcending normal 
human experience.
The belief in the power of myth to express powerfully 
just such a transcendent reality remains constant through­
out his writings. In addition, however, to the development 
traced here by Hofmannsthal himself in his ability to
111. NR, 1954, p.356f (1923) 113. FieohtneJ, p.341 (1927?)
112. A, p.240 (1926) • 114. " p.342
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understand the nature of myth and to make effective use of 
it, there is also a noticeable increase in references to 
the topic in his essays and letters in later years. By far 
the greatest number of such references occur in the 
writings of the 1920s, a period when Hofmannsthal was 
urgently seeking means of uncovering unity and meaning 
within a disintegrating society.
b) Religion
In 1892 Hofmannsthal told Marie Herzfeld that up to
then, "alle Religionen ihm nichts gewesen als schüne 
115Mythologien," which does not seem to put too high a
value on either. His early references, though they may be
positive, are always in the context of discussing other
people: he writes of Barres' hero, torn between
"Goethescher Religion der Harmonie mit der gesunden Natur
und indisch-christlichem Kult des Leidens,"^^^ or of the
"tiefen und bedeutungsvollen geistigen, das heisst auf
englisch: religiës-moralischen Hintergrund" to Laurence
117Oliphant's life. His comments on Lafcadio Hearn's
chapter "Die Macht des Karma" help to clarify his attitude:
Das ist Philosophie, wenn ich nicht irre. Aber es 
lâsst uns nicht kalt, es zieht uns nicht in die Ode 
der Begriffe. So ist es wohl Religion. Aber es droht 
nicht, es will nicht allein auf der Welt sein, es 
lastet nicht auf der Seele. Ich mëchte es Botschaft 
nennen,nfreundliche Botschaft einer Seele an andere 
Seelen.
Religion, while better than the cold abstractions of 
philosophy, clearly conveys the idea of rigid and burden­
some dogma, and so Hofmannsthal prefers not to use the 
term.
115. Fiechtner , p.57
116. PI, p.51 (1891)
117. PI, p.53 (1891)
118. PII, p.124 (1904)
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The word comes to acquire a wider meaning, however,
and Hofmannsthal develops a concept of non-organised, non-
dogmatic religion which is itself a "freundliche Botschaft"
to the soul of modern man. In 1915 he wrote to the Svenska
Dagbladet, "Es kommt darauf an, dass eine neue Autoritât
erstehe, dass diese Autoritât nicht in administrativen
Formen verkërpert werde, sondern in rein geistigen, in.
Ifbereinstimmung mit dem Wiedererwachen des religiësen
Empfindens und dem latenten Bedürfnis der Massen nach 
119Verehrung;" but although religion took on a special
significance in the war-time context, Hofmannsthal's
concern with it in fact continued to grow throughout his
life. He found among the younger generation an increasing
number who were filled with "einer neuen und nicht
dogmatisierten, aber bebenden und pulsierenden Religiosi- 
120tât," as they attempted to find some kind of order and 
meaning in the midst of political and spiritual catastrophe
A religious understanding must still be sought, even
though the traditional forms have been found wanting, for
religion meets a fundamental need. It is "die tiefere
Schicht der menschlichen Seelen, die nach neuen - es muss
121das Wort gesagt werden - religiOsen Bindungen begehrt,"
something which will break through "ins Absolute, ins 
122Religiëse." Hofmannsthal has an explanation for the
exclusive claims of particular religions:
Jede wahrhaft grosse geistige Erscheinung ist über- 
menschlich und macht für den, der sich ihr hingibt, 
allés übrige entbehrlich, bis ans Ende der Zeiten: das 
ist die Wurzel der durch ein Individuum geoffenbarten
119. A, p.365f (1915) 121. PIV, p.76 (1921)
120. A, p.312 (1924) 122. PIV, p.77 (1921)
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12 3Religionen und ihres Anspruches auf Orthodoxie.
The original revelation, however, as we have seen above, 
is reduced to a formula by succeeding generations and loses 
its force, so that new forms of expression must be sought 
for religious truth.
Hofmannsthal often uses the term "religious" in a way
which seems to equate it with another concept, for example,
"die Einheit der Welt, das ReligiOse";^^^ "mit einem
mythenschaffenden oder religiësen Auge";^^^ "diesem
127religiô-sen oder allegorischen Spiel"; "einer im Tiefsten
128transzendenten, also religiësen Nation"; "meine Antwort
129war ... dichterisch oder religitts"; "das Gebiet der 
Religion (der hohen S i t t l i c h k e i t W i t h  the exception 
of "Sittlichkeit", these are all concepts which we have 
already considered - myth, allegory, poetry, unity, the 
transcendental - and they are clearly all closely inter­
related.
Religious belief is not dependent on external 
131phenomena nor bound by their laws: "Auf eine Uberwindung
des Kausalreiches lâuft diese wie jede religiëse Auffassung 
132hinaus." ■ Yet it is in harmony with those laws, for
"ohne anthropomorphische Bildlichkeit sprechen die Gesetze
der Erhaltung der Energie die gleiche Ahnung aus, die den
geheimnisvollsten Ahnungen der Religion nicht wider- 
13 3spricht." This "Ahnung" refers to Robert Lieben’s
123. A. p.34 (1922) 129. A, p.297 (1923?)
124. p.19 130. A, p.257 (1928)
125. A, p.234 (1922) 131. See above, pp.l3f
126. A, p.314 (1924) 132. PIII, p.365 (1916)
127. A, p.299 (1923?) 133. PIII, p.152 (1913)
128. PIV, p.26 (1920)
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perception, as he touches the infinite, of "sein Selbst
13 Z...., auf einem unzerstërbaren Thron sitzend." This is
not a concept of religion which views man as the humble
recipient of grace from above: rather, "alle Himmel und
Unterwelten aller Religionen ^sincQ a.us dem menschlichen 
135Innern erbaut." Religion is the product of human
culture, so that Hofmannsthal can refer to "unserer 
geistigen Welt (ohne welche die religiOse nicht sein 
kann).
It is because of this that religion and poetry are so
closely linked. Poets must believe, in the fullest
religious sense, in that to which they give form: I’ihre
Visionen sind die Punkte, die ihnen das Weltgebâude 
137tragen." At about the same time Hofmannsthal noted that
"Die Dichter sind die einzig Religibsen unserer Epoche: sie
13 8
halten sich an das, woran sie zu glauben vermôgen."
While he might not make such sweeping statements in later
years, he still asserts that "den hOchsten dichterischen
Produkten wird eine Art von religiOser Funktion zuge- 
139billigt," for great literature reveals the sphere of 
transcendent meaning behind our daily reality. So Goethe 
can be a "Stiller auch des religibsen Bedürfnisses, and 
the contemporary interest in Httlderlin such that "man ... 
fast eher von einem religiôsen Phânomen sprechen mëchte als 
von einem bloss l i t e r a r i s c h e n . I t  is in fact with 
reference to Das Salzburger Grosse Welttheater, where the
134. Pin, p.152 (1913) 138. A, p.141 (1905?)
135. A, p.36 (1922) 139. A, p.61 (1922)
136. PIV, p.316 (1926) 140. PIV, p.77 (1921)
137. PII, p.295 (1906) 141. A, p.312 (1924)
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solution to society's problems is presented within a very
traditional religious framework, that Hofmannsthal wrote,
"Meine Antwort war nicht optimistisch, aber auch nicht
1 Z.2pessimistisch, sondern dichterisch oder religiOs."
The answer can be neither pessimistic nor optimistic 
because both poetry and religion are concerned with some­
thing outside the sphere of life in which such categories 
have meaning. "Der Innerste Kern ist Verherrlichung jenes 
Hohen in uns, der inneren Freiheit, die gleichbedeutend
ist dem Schëpferischen und Abglanz des hëchsten Schëpfers,"
143and this provides "die Antwort auf der hëheren Ebene," 
the plane which the Beggar reaches, where power and money 
no longer matter. Freedom from this aspect of society is 
important: "Hinter den Rücken des Geldwesens zu gelangen, 
ist vielleicht der Sinn der moralischen und sogar religi- 
ësen Revolution, in der wir zu stehen scheinen."^^^
Here we enter the sphere of moral values, such as are 
represented in Das Salzburger Grosse Welttheater by 
"Weisheit", who unites "allés ..., was wir an Hohem, 
Unselbstischem, Gott-Gleichem in uns tragen, sei es nun 
aus religiëser oder aus profaner T r a d i t i o n . I n  "Die 
Idee Europa", Hofmannsthal links Europe's religion with the 
European concept of "Humanitât". But religion for 
Hofmannsthal is far from being a code of ethics, which must 
always relate to the phenomenal, individuated world of 
human society. He speaks of "wahrhaft religiëser Ver-
147antwortung" in the context of universal synthesis and
142. A, p.297 (1923?) 145. A, p .297 (1923?)
143. Strauss BW, p.468 (1922)146. PIII, p.375 (1916)
144. A, p.59 (1922) 147. PIV, p.412 (1927)
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148"kosmischen Bindungen", which can only be experienced as
the realm of spiritual reality is glimpsed beyond the
everyday world. And it is not Europe but Asia, with its
emphasis on mysticism, which is the "Urquell der Reli-
gionen".^^^ Hofmannsthal wrote of Goethe that "seine
Sittlichkeit ist aus religiës erfasstem Natursinn 
150abgeleitet." Morality, like religion as a whole, is
not something to be expressed in narrowly defined concepts.
c) Form and Reason
Hofmannsthal declares his own lack of interest in
abstract thought in some early letters, describing himself
as "nach der abstrakt philosophischen ^ e i t ^  zumindestens
nicht geweckt und ausgebildet. He is not particularly
concerned with "das abstrakte Erkennen des Daseins," which
152he sees as the province of theology. Thirty years
later, too, he tells Andrian that he is unable to appre-
15 3ciate his book on the Catholic world-view, based on the
development of an abstract argument.
It is not just that he finds the abstractions of 
theology uncongenial, however; there is also a value 
judgement involved, as we have found expressed in his 
comments on the fate of original revelation. He criticises 
Tolstoy, for instance, because in his works, "traten die 
Formeln des vorhandenen Christentums an Stelle einer 
letzten geheimnisvollen Eigenwahrheit, einer visionâren 
Wahrheit, die zu geben einem Dostojewski verliehen war."^^^
148. PIV, p.397 (1927) 152. BI, p.l68 (1895)
149. PIII, p.365 (1916) 153. Andrian BW, p.385 (1926)
150. PIII, p.363 (1916) 154. PIII, p.490 (1908)
151. BI, p.154 (1895)
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The old concepts cannot convey this "Eigenwahrheit", and 
so there is a continual need for new means of expression: 
"Sich loswinden aus den Banden der Begriffe ... Und dann 
das Bilden neuer Begriffe, mâchtiger vielbeschwôrender 
Zauberworte, deren letztes, einfachstes, Gott weiss, Gott 
ist."155
This attack on ready-made formulae and "Begriffe", 
which can never convey the essence of reality, runs 
throughout Hofmannsthal's works. D'Annunzio is praised 
because "nicht dUrre Begriffe sind in ihm die Korrelate der 
aüsseren Dinge, sondern etwas vom Hauch und Wesen der
-j ^ X
Wesen;" amid the confusion of modern life, contemporary
journalists are only able, "mit Begriffe zu hantieren, hier
157das Zerklüftete noch mehr zu zerklUften;" the poet who
gives pride of place to "den abgezogenen Begriffen des
Verstandes" finds that, "seine Arbeit entfernt sich auf
158immer von der Arbeitsweise der Natur."
"Das Begreifen des Lebens" involves a quite different
kind of understanding, a perception of the interrelation of
all things which is unattainable by reason: "Dass aber alle,
alle Dinge im Dasein ... wesensgleich sind, jeder Ein-
wirkung auf einander fâhig, und in einem gewissen,
geheimnisvollen moralischen Zusammenhang stehend, ... das
mit der Seele zu spüren, nicht mit dem Verstand, das nenn
159ich ungefâhr das Begreifen des Lebens." Rationalistic,
analytical thought is the wrong kind of thought, but to 
reject this is not to reject "das eigene denkende
155. A, p.104 (1893) 158. PIV, p.lVlf (1922)
156. PI, p.211 (1894) 159. Karg BW, p.58f (1894)
157. PIII, p.67 (1911)
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S e l b s t " , for, "an unseren Gedanken hat der Wille weit 
mehr Anteil als der V e r s t a n d . S o  the freedom of one's 
thoughts must be guarded and the danger avoided, "das 
Denken vôllig unter den Begriffen zu e r s t i c k e n , f o r  
such concepts are "Trâger der gedanklichen Mechanisie-
1 / Q
rung." Thought must be linked to action, not tied to
formulae: "Es gibt keine anderen Gedanken als notwendige 
Oder schâdliche. Die notwendigen sind die, welche mit 
Betâtigung in einem nâheren oder ferneren ... Zusammenhang 
stehen ... Man kann auf keine Formel hin leben.
Hofmannsthal warns that, "Wir sind immer in Gefahr,
das Leben an die Institutionen zu verlieren, an die
Abstraktionen, an die Worte (auch die sind Formen).
Yet although here abstract forms are the threat to life,
Hofmannsthal elsewhere rejects abstraction because it is
without form, referring to an "Urtrieb, 'der das Uber-
menschliche greifbar vor sich sehen will und tiefen Abscheu
hegt vor jeder formlosen Abstraktion' . The need is for
something concrete, and the solution to this apparent
contradiction is to be found in the living "Gestalt" which
figured so prominently in Hofmannsthal's conception of 
1 6 7myth. In the Neue deutsche Beitrâge Hofmannsthal
declared the aim:
so wollen wir allés dessen enthalten, worin mehr der 
ungezügelte Hang zur Abstraktion und eine begrifflich 
überzüchtete Sprache wirksam wird als ein tâtiges 
Vermëgen. Wir wollen uns durchaus an die Gestalt 
halten ... Wir vermOgen nur die Gestalt zu lieben, und 
wer die Idee zu lieben vorgibt, der liebt sie immer 
als Gestalt. Die Gestalt erledigt das Problem, sie
160. PIV, p.315 (1926) 164. BI, p.242f (1894)
161. A, p.38 (1922) 165. PIV, p.519 (1929)
162. PI, p.228 (1895) 166. PIII, p.449 (1921?).
163. PIII, p.360 (1916) 167. See p.31 above
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beantwortet das Unbeantwortbare.
He writes of those who fail to find this solution: "Wer 
nicht gestalten kann, schleppt den Prozess der Begriffe von
einer Instanz zur andern. In der Gestalt erst ist das
169Problem erledigt." "Gestalt" as living form is con­
trasted with the fixed concept which imposes the form of a 
particular viewpoint on any idea or situation to which it 
is applied.
Speculative, abstract thinking appears to be 
unnatural; for instance, the "Fundierung der Sittlichkeit 
in der hëchsten Abstraction, die schliesslich in Kant
wurzelt" is contrasted with the natural and spontaneous
170Austrian morality. As already quoted, reflection has no
place in the innermost depths of being where "Wollen und
171Glauben" are to be found. Even where abstract thoughts
do have a positive role, they are only the secondary
products of the creative processes which take place in
these depths:
Zuweilen gehen einem abstrakte Gedanken über die 
eigene Arbeit, ihre inneren Zusammenhânge und die 
Fâden auf, die zwischen der Arbeit und dem Ganzen der 
Welt laufen, - und erleuchten die Gestalten so uner- 
wartet von oben, dass sie aus flachen schattenhaften 
zu plastischen Gebilden werden: dieser erhellende 
Gedankenblitz ist aber vielleicht nur die Begleit- 
erscheinung eines tieferen Vorgangs; in der Tiefe des 
Gemüts organisieren sich die Gestalten und die 
Handlung, ziehen Lebenselemente und Krâfte in sich und 
dieser Vorgang wirft nach oben hin ein Wetter- 
leuchten."
Ultimately the effect is to devalue all the insights 
of reason, not only thought which is rationalistic and too
168. PIV, p.144 (1922) 171. Above, p.14
169. PIV, p.126 (1922) 172. Silvia im Stern, p.113,
170. PIII, p.341f (1916) N81 (1907)
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rigid or abstract. A straightforward statement, for
instance that "die Seele des Künstlers sich in symbolischen,
den begrifflichen Ausdruck entzogenen Ideen zu âussern 
173strebt," can take on deeper implications when the
meaning of "symbol" is defined as "das sinnliche Bild für
174geistige Wahrheit, die der ratio unerreichbar ist."  ^ A
symbol obviously cannot be grasped by reason, but now it
seems that this applies to "geistige Wahrheit" too. We are
also told that, "Wer das Gesellschaftliche anders als
175symbolisch nimmt, geht fehl," and in general that,
"Situationen sind symbolisch; es ist die Schwâche der
jetzigen Menschen, dass sie sie analytisch behandeln und
1 7bdadurch das Zauberische auflôsen." There does not seem
to be much scope left for reason. This has consequences 
for Hofmannsthal's attitude to religion, as will be seen, 
but in the meantime we know that we cannot expect to find 
his religious beliefs fitting any theological or philo­
sophical system. These can never express a "geistige 
Wahrheit" which depends on an inner illumination in the 
depths to which the symbol speaks. Dogmatic pronounce­
ments are out: "C'est la profonde ignorance qui inspire le
177ton dogmatique."
This attitude is in tune with contemporary currents 
of thought and related to the ideas of "Lebensphilosophie". 
The emphasis is on living experience, while systematic 
thought is mistrusted in religion as in other spheres. 
William James writes that, "What keeps religion going is
173. PI, p.202 (1894) 176. A, p.14 (1922)
174. PIV, p.49 (1921) 177. A, p.17 (1922)
175. A, p.21 (1922)
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something else than abstract definitions and systems of
concatenated adjectives, and something different from
faculties of theology and their professors. All these
things are after-effects, secondary accretions upon those
178phenomena of vital conversation with the unseen divine."
Lafcadio Hearn states, "That as mere doctrine religion will
ultimately pass away is a conclusion to which the study of
evolution leads; but that religion, as feeling, or even as
faith in the unknown power shaping equally a brain or a
constellation, can ever utterly die, is not at present 
179conceivable." Such statements reflect what Francis
Schaeffer, in his analysis of modern thought, has called a
180"divided view of truth", whereby the rational and
logical have become completely separated from the sphere of
faith and meaning. Hofmannsthal himself describes such a
dichotomy: "dem ewigen-Gegensatz in der Menschenwelt
zwischen dem, was auf dem Triebhaften und der ahnenden
Srkenntnis ruht - worunter allés gehërt, was mit Kunst und
Geschmack zu tun hat, auch die Schënheit der Lebensformen
und das Geziemende - und dem, was allein in Fassungen, die
der Verstand anordnet, bestehen kann. und zu uns spricht:
die ganze auf Begriffen ruhende Bildung, Wissenschaft,
1 0 -|
Schule und Staat."
The old structures of knowledge have been revealed as 
hollow by the relativising process of contemporary thought, 
and have no bearing on the universal religious impulse 
which Hofmannsthal feels to be the result of this very
178. The Varieties of Religious Experience, p.437
179. Kokoro, p.243
180. The God who is there, p.53
181. PIV, p.210 (1924)
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predicament of modern man. Form, in its positive sense, 
does have a role to play in this "religiousness", but not 
formula :
Eben well allés überwunden ist, und ein angstvolles 
Fühlen des Abgrundes, der unter den Dingen ist und 
unter den Theoremen und unter den Erkenntnissen, uns 
durchzieht wie ein bestândiger Schwindel, eben darum 
ist allem unserm Tun eine latente Religiositât bei- 
gemischt, ein Drang nach dem Form-Gebenden, Leben- 
Verleihenden, nach dem, was nirgends an der Materie, 
auch nicht an der geistigen Materie, an der Formel, 
haftet: nach Gott."
3. The Divine
Since theology, abstract thought and formalised
religious systems cannot help, how is the "Drang nach Gott"
to attain its end and how can the "unseen divine" and the
"unknown power" to which James and Hearn refer be known?
Vie have already seen that when earthly phenomena are
viewed as symbolic a "higher reality" is revealed which
underlies them, the "Urbild" behind the beautiful images of
this world, and that this way of viewing life is for
18 3
Hofmannsthal the essence of religion. "Das Gesprâch
über Gedichte" expresses the view that "wir lOsen uns auf
in den Symbolen", becoming aware of our essential unity
with the rest of the world, and that this experience is of
the same nature as the act of symbolic identification
18/
involved in ritual sacrifice.  ^ Gregory of Nyssa,
18 5however, in the passage quoted by Hofmannsthal, implies 
that it is possible "das Urbild zu geniessen", to arrive at 
a direct knowledge not dependent on symbols. In 
Hofmannsthal's own writings there is no indication of such
182. PIV, p.29f (1920) 184. PII, pp. 103ff (1904)
183. See pp. 21ff above 185. A, p.213. See p.22 above
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a knowledge, but a number of other ways of knowing the 
divine are suggested.
At the beginning of the "Vorspiel für ein Puppen-
I
theater", the poet undergoes some kind of mystical
experience of oneness with the plants and animals he sees,
and even with the stars, and through this he becomes aware
of "ein unsichtbares Du".^^^ Through his meeting with the
old woman, however, he receives a new understanding:
"MeinesgleichenJ Das sind die Boten, die du an mich 
18 7sendest," and a new resolution to enter into "Menschen-
188welt und -leben", so that human involvement appears as 
another, by implication deeper, way of knowing the unseen 
"Du". But, "Du selbst bleibst mir ewig stumm."^^^
Although these words are not addressed to God in the normal 
sense, the old woman interprets them as a prayer. Here, 
then, there is no direct communication. "Der Priester- 
zëgling" is also told, in the words of the Koran, "Mich 
kannst du nicht sehen; aber schau gegen den Berg, wenn du 
ihn wirst sehen unbeweglich an seinem Ort, wirst du mich 
s e h e n . T h i s  is, however, the true way of perceiving 
the mountain, and indeed all natural phenomena; for the 
initiated it is at the same time also a perception of God.
Oneness and involvement are the key to knowledge, 
whether with animals and natural objects or with one's 
fellow men. One way to involvement is suffering. "Der 
Schmerz ist die wahre Einführung ins Dasein," because it
186. DII, p.492 (1906) 189. DII, p.495
187. DII, p.495 190. Dili, p.493 (1919)
188. DII, p.496
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makes us aware of the connections that exist between
191people, of the effect that each has on others. 
Hofmannsthal looks for a redeeming feature even in the 
intense sufferings of the war years, writing for example 
of "Leiden als gbttliches Prinzip", described by Meister 
Eckhart as "das schnellste Tier, das zur Vollkommenheit
192trâgt." He always presents suffering in a positive
light. In the Buch der Freunde he quotes Georg Büchner's
words, "Wir haben nicht zu viel, wir haben ihrer zu wenig,
19 3denn durch den Schmerz gehen wir zu Gott ein." The
religious significance of suffering is clear here, and the 
importance of this idea for Hofmannsthal is confirmed by 
the fact that these words are also quoted in Der Turm^^^
19 5and in his notes for Das Salzburger Grosse Welttheater. 
Sufferings, like the artist's colours, can draw us into the
196 197eternal realm and reveal something infinite.
What then is this eternal and infinite reality which 
is known through symbols and suffering, and how far is the 
use of the word "God" appropriate in referring to it? It 
has been pointed out that Hofmannsthal usually avoids 
direct reference to God, and Erika Brecht attributes this 
to the distrust of ready-made concepts we have already 
noted, which she sees as rooted in the contemporary climate 
of thought: "Kaum jemals hat er dieses Wort 'Gott' aus- 
gesprochen oder geschrieben, das lag nicht im Sprach- 
gebrauch seiner Generation mit ihrem tiefen Misstrauen
191. PI, p .361 (1901) 195. KHA X, pp.135, 154 (1919
192. PIII, p.381 (1916) and 1921)
193. A. p.33 (1922) 196. PII, p.357 (1908
194. DIV, p.99 197. PIII, p.170 (1914)
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gegen fertige Begriffe und Ausdrücke. She nevertheless 
considers that the "Mittelpunkt seines Wesens ... war 
nichts als Hinstreben zu Gott, Ruhen in Gott."^^^ Inge 
Schiller also refers to Hofmannsthal's avoidance of the 
word "Gott" and his preference for expressions such as 
"das Httchste", "das Tiefste"; "das Unendliche", "Absolute", 
"Wortlose", "Namenlose"; "das Sein", "die Wirkli chkeit.
It is certainly true that he favours such terms and can be 
hesitant about the word "Gott". He writes to Strauss about 
"ein dort Gesuchtes, Gefundenes an Aufschwung, Empor-
pni
klettern zu ? --- nun zu 'Gott'," and to Schnitzler, "In
solchen Stunden ... allés drângt sich in eine letzte
Ahnung hinein: ich nenne sie Gott - und Sie vielleicht
202nennen sie anders." However, although in such cases
Hofmannsthal is clearly anxious not to use the word "God" 
in a facile way which will be assumed to refer simply to 
the traditional Christian concept, he sometimes finds that 
it is the only word which has the power to convey his 
meaning, and in fact it occurs quite often in his writings. 
An examination of his usage does help to clarify this 
rather nebulous concept.
The word is naturally used in Hofmannsthal's plays 
where it is appropriate to the character who is speaking, 
and reference to God is clearly essential to the specific­
ally Christian Jedermann and Das Salzburger Grosse Welt­
theater and also in the historical context of Der Turm.
In addition it plays a striking role in some of the
198. Erinnerungen an Hugo von Hofmannsthal, p.SCf
199. Ibid., p.8C
2CC. Art und Bedeutung des ReligiOsen, pp.l5ff
2C1. Strauss BW, p.194 (1912) 202. Schnitzler BW, p.311(1928)
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comedies. For Cristina and for the Marschallin in
Rosenkavalier everything happens "in Gottes Namen", and
for Mandryka, "vor Gott und vor, den Menschen", so that the
presence of divine power behind human life is continually
implied. The early Der Kaiser und die Hexe, too, ends with
20 3a prayer to the Lord who gives life to all.
But it is of course in the letters, notes and essays
that the clearest indication is to be found of the meaning
Hofmannsthal wishes to attach to the word "Gott". The
idea of oneness is central here too: oneness with the
world, with life, with oneself. Hofmannsthal writes in an
early note, "Auf der hëchsten Terrasse eritis sicut Deus,
fâhig aus allem etwas zu machen, denn für Gott, der die
Welt ist, ist keine Bildung schlechter S t o f f , a n d  even
"'In sich selber verliebt', ich mein halt ins Leben, oder
20 5wohl auch in Gott, wie man will." The concept is
highly fluid, defined only by its association with ideas 
such as creativity and life.
During the war years he begins to use the word more
frequently than before. He describes wartime experiences
as "ein dunkler Traum, durch dessen Finsternisse doch
Gottes Licht hinzuckte, Gottes Atem hinwehte, and as a
207continual "Nâher, mein Gott, zu dir.'" Such references
are clearly an attempt to point people to a spiritual 
reality behind the situation as a source of encouragement 
and hope. But although the word may be used because of 
its effect on ordinary people, for whom it has such
203. KHA III, p.207f (1897) 206. PIII, p.176 (1914)
204. A, p.125 (1895) 207. PIII, p.265 (1915)
205. Karg BW, p.83 (1895)
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powerful traditional connotations, it should not be
assumed that it had acquired a more traditionally
"Christian" meaning for Hofmannsthal himself. In "Die
Idee Europa" he writes, "Der Gottesgedanke hat sein
tieferes Wesen darin, dass alle Mannigfaltigkeit und
Gegensâtze der Welt in ihm zur Einheit gelangen ... daher
umschwebt ihn Friede, Sicherheit, allumfassender Reich- 
208tum." The essential element is still unity and the
overcoming of distinctions, even the distinction between 
opposites. Hofmannsthal's concept of the divine is no 
closer to that of orthodox theology than in his earlier 
years, and has the same all-embracing character as then.
The supreme expression of this theme of oneness with
and in God is found in "Die Statuen", with its final
question, "Wenn das Unerreichliche sich speist aus meinem
Innern und das Ewige aus mir seine Ewigkeit sich aufbaut,
209was ist dann noch zwischen der Gottheit und mir?" Man
and God seem to have exchanged their traditional roles, so
that God has become dependent on man. Elsewhere,
Hofmannsthal asks, "Wer umgrenzt einen Menschen? ... Ein
210Mensch und ein Gott, wo ist die Grenze?" The fluidity
of the concept, the fact that it merges continually with 
others, is an essential part of it, and clear distinctions 
are impossible.
In an experience such as that described in "Die 
Statuen", it is the reality encountered which matters, and 
the words used in the attempt to communicate it may seem
208. PIII, p.378 (1916) 210. PII, p.143 (1905)
209. PIII, p.42 (?)
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unimportant. People may, like Balzac’s characters,
’ suchen und finden Gott, ob sie ihn beim Namen nennen oder 
211
nicht.” But from the beginning Hofmannsthal is very
much aware of the power of the word itself, referring to 
the creation of ’mâchtiger vielbeschwôrender Zauberworte, 
deren letztes, einfachstes Gott weiss, Gott ist."^^^ From 
this results not only its suitability for wartime exhorta­
tions, but also his own need to make use of it. The word 
is powerful but vague, one among a number of "fast
grenzenlose Begriffe" and "ungeheuren aber vagen Worten"
213to which a writer may give life. For Hofmannsthal, in
fact, the concept would surely lose its power if it 
acquired a specific and rigid definition.
The passage from the study of Hugo to which reference
has just been made suggests that the artist has a special
insight into the divine nature and a special function.
There are paintings, too, in which one sees "wie Gottes
grosse wesenlose Natur einem tiefsinnigen Künstler vor- 
21 /
kommt." But the poet in particular has as his medium
215the words which are "Engel und Boten Gottes" and 
"versiegelte Gefângnisse des gbttlichen Pneuma, der 
Wahrheit, and he is able to revive their former 
symbolic power. The clearest expression of the artist’s 
special relationship to the divine is, however, 
Hofmannsthal’s Beethoven speech, where the references to 
God are remarkably frequent, reflecting his desire to 
convey the depth and power of Beethoven’s music. Beethoven
211. PII, p.394 (1908) 214. PI, p.212 (1894)
212. A, p.104 (1893) 215. A, p.126 (1895)
213. PI, p.336 (1901) 216. A. p.105 (1893)
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is "Stellvertreter des Menschengeschlechtes", and his 
function "dass er hinaufgehe vor Gott, wie Moses, und Gott
21 7
von Angesicht zu Angesicht sehe." Schiller’s aim is
described as, "den Prozess der Menschen führen vor Gott,"^^^
and both he and Beethoven are taking over the role of the
old prophets. The artist is also called to express the
divine reality in a human medium, whether music or words,
bringing back from God’s presence "das Wort des Lebens ...
das Wort, das selber Gott ist: die unmittelbare Magie"^^^
220and striving for "ein Aussagen von Gott." He thus acts
as mediator between God and man, in both directions.
All this, however, tells us little of what God is
like, being mainly concerned with the relationship of the
divine to man and the world. Even this is problematic,
for the "relationship" sometimes appears to be in fact
identity. We are told that "das Gôttliche sich unmittel-
221bar in unserer Nâhe offenbart," and that God wants to 
222be known. Yet he (if one can use the term for some­
thing so impersonal) is known only indirectly, symbolically, 
or through involvement in life and its sufferings, in which 
he is present as some kind of ordering and uniting power.
Even in Das Salzburger Grosse Welttheater we find the 
same picture, of which unity is a central element. This 
does not only emerge from the words of the Beggar, who 
finds himself "bei Gott in aller Dinge Mitt, 
heit" also addresses her prayer to:
m223 »wei8-
217. PIV, p.16 (1920)
218. PIV, p.18
219. PIV, p.19
220. PIV, p.22
221. A, p.13 (1922)
222. A, p.34 (1922)
223. KHA X, p.50 (1922)
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Du aber, Leben über allem Leben, .
Du wunderbar Gericht, das in den Dingen ruht" ^
and 0 du, des Namen ich vor^Zittern jetzt nicht nenne 
Du, der du Ailes bist.
She even hesitates to use the name "God". Hofmannsthal
himself admits that this God is quite different from the
traditional figure of the Prologue. Writing to Fritz
Viehweg to explain why the "Meister" did not appear in a
later version, he says, "Jener Gott, zu dem sich im HOhe-
punkt des Spiels jenes Gebet der Weisheit aufschwingt,
kann nicht als eine naive Gestalt im Vorspiel sichtbar
226gemacht werden." In trying here to express the deepest
spiritual truths, Hofmannsthal inevitably depicts the 
divine reality as he himself sees it, something which 
cannot be represented by a figure on stage any more than by 
an abstract theological concept.
In the first section of this chapter the object of
227Hofmannsthal’s faith was described as an "other reality",
and there is a close'connection between this spiritual
dimension and the idea of the divine explored here. The
fundamental idea of oneness with all life and universal
immanence is found in both concepts. The spiritual element
both unites external phenomena and overcomes personal
isolation. Hofmannsthal discovers during his visit to
Greece that everything around is "so gesondert und so
228verbunden ... durch den Geist selbst," and on another
occasion he experiences "Einsamkeit, Angst des Individuums
229- und die vôllige Uberwindung beider durch den Geist."
221. KHA X, p.17 227. See pp. 21ff above
225. KHA X, p.58 228. PIV, p.151 (1922)
226. Quoted in: Nehring. Die 229. PIV, p.259 (1925)
Tat bei Hofmannsthal, p.115 (1926)
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The divine ordering power behind wordly events can equally
well be described as "das Geistige, Mâchtige, welches des
230Allgemeinen 1ebenerhaltend innewohnt." Not only do the
two spheres have much in common, but an awareness of the
spiritual realm is a prerequisite of religion.
Hofmannsthal refers to "unserer geistigen Welt (ohne
2 31welche die religiëse nicht sein kann)."
Like the divine reality itself, the spiritual dimen­
sion cannot be known through reason. The "Hôheres, 
Geistiges, Allgemeines" which is behind the action of Der
Turm cannot be perceived rationally, but only through the 
232imagination. Dogmatism has no place in.this realm, but
233rather seeking and questioning. In fact the spiritual
in man involves him in a continuous quest for reality, and
will not be satisfied with anything less; "Der Geist sucht
das Wirkliche, der Ungeist haftet am U n w i r k l i c h e n . I n
another sense it must pass beyond reality, for "Geist ist
überwundene Wirklichkeit. Was sich von der Wirklichkeit
2 3 5absentiert ist nicht Geist." This same statement
stresses, however, that without this confrontation with 
reality the spiritual cannot exist. Finally we are told 
that reality is itself "geistige Schëpfung". Some of 
this apparent contradiction is due to the fact that 
"reality" has two meanings. While it normally refers to 
the world of everyday life, it can also signify a higher 
spiritual reality, in comparison with which the everyday 
world appears unreal, merely a symbol of the other. Yet it
230. PI, p.384 (1901) 233. A, p.43 (1922)
231. PIV, p.316 (1926) 234. A, p.35 (1922)
232. Burckhardt 3W, p.l40 235. A, p.44 (1922)
(1923) 236. PIV, p.315 (1926)
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is clear that the relationship between the two must be a
close one, and the necessary involvement of the spiritual
in the world is borne out by the fact that, like the 
237
divine, it is known through suffering. "Was Geist ist,
2 38erfasst nur der Bedrângte."
Closely connected is the question of the relationship
between the spiritual and the material. On the one hand
there is a situation of conflict, for the spiritual "gérât
in einen Streit mit der Materie" wherever it is estab- 
239
lished. On the other hand it cannot survive in
isolation: "Im Hëchstvergeistigten noch ist es die Naivetât,
das irrational Kërperhafte, wodurch das Geistige Bestand
hat."^^^ We are told that "in Wahrheit ist Geist das dem
Leben unbedingt Verantwortliche, so hoch er sich auch über
2 41das Leben erhebe."  ^ It is hard, however, to reconcile
this responsibility to life with the claim that not only
"kann das Geistige seiner Natur nach in das alltâgliche
Dasein nicht einbezogen werden", but "es will und soil ja
2 42dieses Dasein aufheben." The superiority of the
spiritual certainly stands out from these statements, 
whether its relationship to the material world appears as 
interpenetration, transcendence, or conflict. This same 
problem has also emerged in our consideration of the divine, 
and it will become even more acute when Hofmannsthal’s 
outlook is examined from the point of view of mysticism.
Vagueness of definition is of course as much a 
potential source of confusion for the words "Geist" and
237. See pp.45f above 240. A, p.43 (1922)
238. A, p.37 (1922) 241. PIV. p.143 (1922)
239. PII. p.416 (1910) 242. PHI, p.329 (1916)
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"geistig" as it is for "Gott", not only in Hofmannsthal’s
writings, but in much of contemporary German literature.
Michael Hamburger has described it as one of^the "estab-
243lished phantom words" and attempted to pinpoint some of
its shifting meanings, ranging from plain intelligence to
244the numinously spiritual. It is clearly another word
which has great evocative power, and which invariably
conveys something above the level of ordinary life.
Hofmannsthal also seeks, however, to give it religious
associations, for instance by the subtle transformation of
a Bible verse, "Wo aber der Geist der Herr ist, da ist die 
245Freiheit." In Hofmannsthal’s view of the nature of
reality there is no distinction between the realm of the 
spiritual in general and that of religion, and the word 
"Geist", which recurs so frequently as part of his ideal of 
human culture, in fact expresses much the same ideas as 
more specifically religious terms. "God" and "spiritual 
reality" often seem to be interchangeable, expressing the 
same basic concept even though the terminology varies in 
different contexts.
I have therefore shown how the central concept of 
Hofmannsthal’s religious outlook is that of a spiritual 
dimension underlying and at the same time transcending the 
phenomenal reality of everyday experience, a dimension 
characterised by unity, harmony, timelessness and freedom 
from material causality. It is experienced through deep 
involvement with the world around, which expresses it in
243. From Prophecy to Exorcism, p.22
244. Ibid., p.85
245. PIV, p.44 (1921). cf. II Corinthians 3, v.l7, "Wo 
aber der Geist des Herrn ist, da ist Freiheit."
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symbolic form, but cannot be grasped by reason or precisely 
defined. This conviction about the nature of reality, 
arising initially out of moments of intuitive vision, is 
present throughout Hofmannsthal’s works, but it is from the 
turn of the century onwards that specifically religious 
language begins to play a significant role in his ex­
pression of it. There is a very marked increase in the use 
of such language during and after the war years, when he is 
consciously seeking the means to awaken an awareness of the 
spiritual realm in others.
The unity of all things is one of the most important 
elements in this concept of reality, and this points to the 
connection between Hofmannsthal’s outlook and that of 
mysticism. When his ideas are considered in the context of 
mysticism, the complex relationship of the divine and the 
human, and of spiritual and material reality, does become 
clearer, as does also the nature of the implicit problems. 
This is therefore the purpose of the next chapter.
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II. Hofmannsthal and Mysticism
1. What is mysticism?
Much has been written about Hofmannsthal’s mysticism,
and many critics have seen it as fundamental to his
writings. Hestermann considers that Hofmannsthal’s ’’Welt-
verstehen sich auf die Versëhnung der Gegensâtze und die
immanente Einheit allés Seienden richtet," and that his
experience of this unity was of an essentially mystical
nature,^ while Metzeler claims that, ’mit Mystik ist letzt-
lich allés und jedes in seinem Werk in Beziehung zu 
2
bringen.’ Mysticism can be seen as an essential element 
in every category of Hofmannsthal’s work. Borchardt, for 
example, describes his lyric poems as ’’aus der gëttlichen
3
Entzückung in das Herz der Dinge entstanden,’ whereas 
Exner is concerned with the essays when he writes, ’Der 
sogenannte mystische Moment harmonisiert und orchestriert 
das karge prosaische Grundschema.’’^  Hofmannsthal himself 
asks, ’’Kann uns die KomSdie schmackhaft sein ohne ein Hauch
5
von Mystizismus?’’
Both Hestermann and Metzeler emphasize the need for a 
wide definition of mysticism, and Hestermann considers that 
the basic definition is that given by Evelyn Underhill:
’the expression of the innate tendency of the human spirit 
towards complete harmony with the transcendental order, 
whatever be the theological formula under which that order
1. Das mystische Element im Werke Hugo von Hofmannsthals, p.l
2. Ursorung und Krise von Hofmannsthals Mystik, p.24
3. Prosa I, p.152
4. Schweizer Monatshefte, 41» p.192
5. A, p.77
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is understood."^ We have certainly found this tendency in 
Hofmannsthal’s works, and a wide definition is clearly ' 
needed in view of the undefined nature of his religious 
concepts and his distrust of any systematic theology.
Indeed, since mystical experience by all accounts defies 
verbal expression, it seems wise to be rather wary of all 
definitions. But a closer examination of what mysticism 
actually is can avoid some of the confusion often found in 
discussions of its relevance to Hofmannsthal.
Basic to any concept of mysticism is the experience 
known as "unio mystica". Analyses of this tend to concen­
trate either on the subject, the mystic himself, and offer 
some kind of psychological interpretation; or on the object, 
that with which he is united, whatever it may be - a 
division which seems singularly inappropriate when describ­
ing a state in which all dualities are overcome. For a 
full account it is obviously necessary to consider both: 
that is, in the present case, to discover both the nature 
of Hofmannsthal’s mystical experience and the identity of 
the object which comes to be known. One fundamental 
question in considering these aspects is that of the 
relationship of Hofmannsthal’s mysticism to aesthetic and 
religious experience.
Mystical writers use many devices in their attempt to 
express the inexpressible. Symbolism, allegory and realism 
are mingled together, and paradox and tautology abound. To 
the writer’s problems of expression must be added the 
reader’s problems of interpretation: for instance, the
D. Mysticism, p.x
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religious beliefs of the interpreter will often determine 
whether a particular passage is taken allegorically or 
literally. It is therefore important not to look at a 
piece of mystical literature in isolation from its back­
ground, when it can easily become distorted. The 
difficulty where Hofmannsthal is concerned is that his 
mysticism is not presented within the framework of any 
single system of belief; in fact he draws on the widest 
variety of religious, philosophical and psychological 
material in his attempts to express and elucidate both his 
experience and the convictions arising from it. Somehow 
these diverse elements must be reconciled in a way con­
sistent with his development as revealed in his works.
Seyppel in his article draws a distinction between 
the absolute and the relative mystic: "Der absolute 
Mystiker inspiriert sich am Mystischen, wird Heiliger und 
verschwindet aus unserem Blickfeld; der relative Mystiker 
inspiriert sich an Mystik, wird nicht Heiliger, aber
7
schëpferischer Schriftsteller." If the definition of an
"absolute mystic" involves his disappearance behind a veil 
of silence, we may well ask how we would know that one had 
ever existed. Certainly those who are generally considered 
the greatest mystics seem to have found no difficulty in 
combining their sainthood with the literary expression of 
their experience: one need only think of St. Teresa of 
Avila or St. John of the Cross. In fact in most cases 
mysticism is combined not only with literary but also with 
practical activity: the mystic seeks to communicate to
7.DVJS, 35, p.164
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others the love of God which he has experienced in union 
with him. Tauler even claims that the state of mystical 
contemplation should fill up no more than an hour of the 
mystic's day, and is critical of those whose desire is only 
to enjoy permanently the delights of union with God. Nor 
is this combination of mysticism and involvement in the 
world confined to Christianity, with its traditional 
emphasis on social concern; it is found even in eastern 
religions, with their fatalistic attitude to the evils of 
earthly life. The ideal of Mahayana Buddhism, for example, 
is not the attainment of Nirvana, but its renunciation 
after attainment in order to return to the world and lead 
one's fellow men to salvation.
In spite of this, one finds many references to "der 
absolute", "reine" or "echte Mystiker", and to the "true 
mystic", as Evelyn Underhill calls him. They are partic­
ularly frequent in Metzeler's Ursprung und Krise von 
Hofmannsthals Mystik and Hederer's Mystik und Lyrik, and 
also in Hestermann, although he does point out the link 
between the "vita activa" and the "vita meditativa", and 
relates this to the way Hofmannsthal's "Der Zurückgekehrte" 
finds through mysticism a new strength for practical
o
affairs. The danger of such terms is their implication 
that the mysticism of lesser mortals, who do not rise to 
the heights of sainthood, is not "genuine". There is of 
course a difference between the man who is primarily a 
mystic, devoted to the religious life, and who writes 
merely in order to communicate to others the insights he
. Op. cit., pp.97ff
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has gained, and the man who is primarily a writer, for whom 
mystical insights are simply one aspect, however important 
an aspect, of the personal outlook expressed in his 
writings. But this difference is grossly exaggerated when 
such a writer, or indeed any other secular mystic, is 
contrasted with some ideal "absolute" mystic, totally 
removed from the sphere of earthly activity. Such a state 
would seem from the point of view of most mystics to be not 
only impossible to attain in this life, but even undesir­
able, unless for the sake of purely selfish emjoyment. But 
the mystic claims to have received a vision of the ultimate 
foundation and meaning of life, something in which selfish­
ness has no part: the experience is rather that of the loss 
of self in any ordinary sense.
Such generalised statements are clearly inadequate 
when dealing with such a complex subject, but the fact that 
they can be made at all presupposes a considerable common 
element in mysticism's many and varied manifestations. All 
writers agree on the fundamental nature of the "unio 
mystica", in which Underhill's harmony with the transcend­
ental order is experienced to the point of identity. It 
is, however, begging the question to say that this union is 
with God. Mystical experience is independent of the 
dogmatic context within which it is presented, and demands 
no specific religious or intellectual framework. In order 
to give expression to his experience and be able to 
communicate it, or in order to come to a rational under­
standing of it himself, the mystic makes use of the
terminology in which his own beliefs, or those of the
community in which he finds himself, are normally expressed
- 61-
Alternatively, he may choose a poetic form of expression, 
preserving the irrationality of the experience. But this 
is incidental to the fundamental experience of the absorp­
tion of one’s individuality into a wider reality.
It should, however, be borne in mind that this wider 
reality with which the mystic is united is not necessarily 
the same reality in every case. There is a distinction 
between experiences which are described primarily as union 
with the totality of nature, and those which are seen as 
union with a personal God, or with an impersonal absolute, 
during which the natural world is- left behind. It is of 
course possible that a religious person who has a "natural" 
mystical experience of this first kind may find the exper­
ience so overwhelming that he concludes it must be an 
experience of God, and in such ways the mystic’s choice of 
terminology may help to obscure real differences. If the 
common element in mystical experience is the loss of the 
self as it becomes united with something greater, other 
elements, including the nature of that something, may 
differ. R.C. Zaehner, who seems to be alone in pointing 
this out, comments:
This conquest of the ego by another unconscious 
"centre" was formerly rightly called possession ... 
Now, if we grant that this state is one of possession 
either by an external agency (angel, devil, etc.) or 
by an internal "autonomous complex", there is no 
reason to believe that this agency must in all cases 
be the same ... The differing nature of the agency 
would account forgthe distressingly various "fruits" 
of the ecstatics.
Since this agency, which I have earlier described from a
different viewpoint as the object of the experience, may
9. Mysticism, sacred and profane, p.102
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vary, its nature clearly cannot determine the validity of a 
particular mystical experience or the degree to which it is 
typical. The common characteristics of mystical experience 
leave the question of its object wide open, though certain 
very general beliefs are implied.
One is the claim that, for such union to be possible, 
man in his innermost self must be of the same nature as the 
transcendental reality with which he is united. His aim 
then becomes the discovery of this true inner self and 
identification with it. (This is sometimes linked with a 
belief in a pre-existential state of union with the 
divine.) Even Christian mystics seem to share this belief 
in the "divine spark of the soul", as Eckhart called it. 
Where mysticism is of a pantheistic nature, man is seen as 
essentially one with the whole universe. The implication 
is also there, however, that as the true reality is this 
underlying unity, there is something unreal about the 
phenomena of the world themselves.
William James lists four characteristics of mystical
, , 10 states :
1. Ineffability.
2. Noetic quality. The mystic has gained not just an 
enriching experience, but new insights and under­
standing.
3. Transiency.
4. Passivity. The mystic has a sense of being 
"grasped and held by a superior power", or even of 
"the abdication of the ego to another centre", as
10. The Varieties of Religious Experience, pp.371f
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Zaehner puts it.
Related to this is a characteristic which F.C. Happold adds
to the list: the conviction that the ego is not the true
self, but rather that the true self is something universal
and divine. Ke also refers to the sense of timelessness
involved in the experience, and the resolution of every
duality in an all-embracing oneness, including those
1 2between man and deity, and good and evil.
Those who demand something more of mysticism than the 
features outlined above turn out to be onesided in their 
emphasis; for example, Evelyn Underhill’s book may be 
general in theory, but in practice it concentrates on 
Christian mysticism. It will be seen that all these 
features are to be found in some degree in Hofmannsthal's 
mysticism.
2. Mystical characteristics in Hofmannsthal’s works
We have already seen that the concept of oneness is
fundamental throughout Hofmannsthal’s works and is insepar-
13able from his understanding of spiritual reality. He 
states :
Als junger Mensch sah ich die Einheit der Welt, das 
Religiëse, in ihrer Schënheit; die vielfâltige Schën- 
heit aller Wesen ergriff mich, die Kontraste, und dass 
alle doch auf einander Bezug hatten. Spâter war es 
das Sinzelne und die hinter der schënen Einheit wirk- 
samen Krâfte, das ich darzustellen mich gedrungen 
fühj^e, aber von dem Gefühl der Einheit liess ich nie
In his early years he writes of experiences such as, ’’Ich
11. Mysticism, sacred and profane, p.102
12. Mysticism, pp. 4-6-50
13. See for example pp.20, 31, 45, 48f and 52 above.
14. A, p.234
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fühle das Leben wieder sehr stark und die grosse Einheit
aller seienden Dinge, und auch die Einheit der Vergangen-
15heit mit der Gegenwart." Later statements are more 
theoretical in nature, for example, "Der Gottesgedanke hat 
sein tieferes Wesen darin, dass alle Mannigfaltigkeit und 
Gegensâtze der Welt in Ihm zur Einheit gelangen."^^
This emphasis is in tune with the ideas of the time,
and need not be interpreted in terms of mystical experience,
Many of Hofmannsthal’s early statements can be seen as
describing a unified totality of the purely material world,
such as was presented by Mach’s phenomenalism, and all
conform to the general synthetic and relativistic trend of
contemporary philosophy, as is illustrated by a passage
such as, "ich glaube, wir haben diese Unterscheidung
zwischen Aussen und Innen, zwischen Kern und Schale, von
uns abgetan, und sie mit anderen Dualismen bei den hinter
17uns liegenden Jahrhunderten liegenlassen." But 
Hofmannsthal’s rejection of antithetical thinking as out­
moded is never based primarily on an appeal to philo­
sophical ideas: his conviction is the product of his own 
inner experience. He writes to Andrian that, "mein inneres 
Leben macht aus Menschen, Empfindungen, Gedanken und 
Büchern eine wirre Einheit, ... und man spürt auf einmal,
dass die Scheidung von Geist und Sinnen, Geist und Herz,
18Denken und Tun eine âusserliche und willkürliche ist."
During the 1890s references to this essential unity of 
all that exists abound, not only in letters where
15. Karg BW, p.73 (1895) 17. A, p.330
16. PHI, p.378 (1916) 18. BI, p.94
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Hofmannsthal is seeking to convey to his friends the way in 
which he experiences the world, as in those to Karg and 
Andrian quoted above, but particularly in his poetic works.
I q pn[
In poems such as "Lebenslied" or "Gute Stunde" it is an
underlying conviction; in others it is more directly spelt
21out, as in the last three stanzas of "Manche freilich."
Claudio in Der Tor und der Tod speaks of his boyhood when
22he "meinte aufzuschweben in das All," and Death confirms 
that this experience is an element in "j eder wahrhaft 
grossen Stunde" of a human life, when "du, hingebend dich 
im grossen Reigen,/ Die Welt empfingest als dein eigen."^^ 
The youth in "Der Jüngling und die Spinne" sees himself 
reflected in everything around while in his initial intoxi­
cated state, but does not lose this sense of oneness on his 
awakening to the true nature of life. This indeed occurs
only because he participates in the suffering of the insect:
Vor meinen Augen tut sich die Gewalt,
Sie tut sich schmerzend mir im Herzen innen, _,
Sie hat an jeder meiner Fibern Halt." ^
This vision of unity is a recurring theme in Das kleine
Welttheater, and in "Ad me ipsum" Hofmannsthal sees the
line, "Sin-Wesen ists daran wir uns entzücken" as the key
to this work.^^
There is of course no direct evidence in these poetic 
works that the underlying conviction of a unified reality 
has its roots in mystical experience, though the letters of. 
the period make clear how much it was an essential part of 
Hofmannsthal’s personal perception of the world. He does.
19. GLD, p.l2f 23. KHA III, p.71
20. GLD, p.79 24. GLD, p.38
21. GLD, p.19 25. A, p.225
22. KHA III, p.69
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however, indicate in an.essay written in 1894 that he saw 
the creative process as the outcome of a mystical illumin­
ation: "dieser plëtzlichen blitzartigen Zrleuchtung, in der 
wir einen Augenblick lang den grossen Weitzusammenhang 
ahnen, schauernd die Gegenwart der Idee spüren, dieses 
ganzen mystischen Vorganges, der uns die Metapher leuchtend 
und real hinterlâsst." The word "mystisch" occurs in a
number of essays written at about this time, sometimes in a 
very loose sense which probably simply reflects contemp­
orary usage, as in "Gestalten mit einer fast mystischen
27
Traurigkeit in den sehnsüchtigen Augen". Sometimes,
however, as in the description above of the birth of the
metaphor, it indicates that a new perception has been givBn
of the nature of the totality of things: the "noetic
2 8quality" identified by William James. Even Swinburne's 
eroticism can open up a new understanding of life, for it 
is "so mystischer Eindringliclikeit, dass er im Bilde der 
Liebesrâtsel die ganzen Râtsel des Lebens aufzufassen 
scheint.
Such references reveal an acceptance of the validity 
and significance of mystical illumination and of its 
tendency to issue in artistic expression. The essays of 
the succeeding decade, however, seem to take over from the 
poetry of the early years as the medium through which 
Hofmannsthal's conviction of the unity of all things is> 
expressed, and the claim "dass wir und die Welt nichts 
verschiedenes sind"^^ is a recurring theme. In particular
26. PI, p.191 29. PI, p.119
27. PI, p.194 30. PII, p.105
28. See p.63 above
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four essays of this period give accounts of experiences 
tnat are clearly mystical in character, though in only one 
is the evocation of this the primary aim. In the case of 
the Ghandos letter, indeed, Hofmannsthal emphasises that 
his motivation in writing it was not the desire to communi­
cate his inner experience: "ich ... bekam Lust, etwas in 
diesem Sprechton ^des 16. JahrhundertT^ zu machen und der 
Gehalt, den ich, um nicht kalt zu wirken, einem eigenen
inneren Srlebnis, einer lebendigen Erfahrung entlehnen
31musste, kam dazu." The impact of the experience on the 
person concerned and the strength of the convictions about 
the nature of reality which flow from it nevertheless stand 
out very clearly in all these essays.
Ghandos writes of his earlier years, when he felt
himself to be identified with the whole of nature and all
opposites to be united in an all-embracing whole: "Mir
erschien damais in einer Art von andauernder Trunkenheit
das ganze Dasein als eine grosse Einheit: geistige und
kërperliche Welt schien mir keinen Gegensatz zu bilden,
ebensowenig hëfisches und tierisches Wesen, Kunst und
Unkunst, Einsamkeit und Gesellschaft; in allem fühlte ich
32Natur ... und in aller Natur fühlte ich mich selber."
The isolated moments of revelation of his subsequent ex­
perience still involve an awareness of a "mich und die
33ganze Welt durchwebende Harmonie" and of an overwhelming
34"Gegenwart des Unendlichen." His account of the rats in 
the cellar is a striking expression of the absorption of
31. 311, p.100 33. PII, p.18
32. PII, p.lOf 34. PII, p.17
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3 ^the self into another reality.  ^ The extent to which 
Ghandos is the passive recipient of a revelation which is 
quite outside his control also emerges very clearly as he 
describes himself riding through his estates, looking 
longingly for any humble object which might become the 
source of a fresh vision.
The theme of identification with animals also occurs 
in "Das Gesprâch über Gedichte", where, because of the 
essential oneness of humanity and the world, the man is 
able to identify with the animal he sacrifices and exper­
ience "dass sich sein Dasein, für die Dauer eines Atemzugs, 
in dem fremden Dasein aufgelëst hatte." The transience 
of the experience is stressed. Gabriel continues, "Das ist 
die Wurzel aller Poesie," and in this essay Hofmannsthal is 
concerned to show how "perfect poems" are born out of such 
moments, moments in which "was niemals da war, nie sich 
gab, jetzt ist es da, jetzt gibt es sich, ist Gegenwart, 
mehr als Gegenwart; was niemals zusammen war, jetzt ist es
zugleich, ist es beisammen, schmilzt ineinander die Glut,
37den Glanz und das Leben." Hofmannsthal clearly sees the
most powerful poetry as flowing out of experience of a
mystical nature, and implies the need for such a loss of
3 8
self through Goethe's injunction, "Stirb und werde.'"
The "Briefe des Zurückgekehrten" contain several 
descriptions of such momentary revelations, particularly 
the last two, where the visual impact of colour, in art or 
nature, becomes the vehicle through which "das Wortlose,
35. PII, p.l6f 37. PII, p.112
36. PII, p.104 38. PII, p.Ill
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das Swige, das Üngeheure sich hergibt."^^ Through Van 
Gogh’s pictures his awareness of disintegration in himself 
and society is replaced by a new sense of wholeness and 
purpose. The sudden inexpressible vision of unity is made 
more explicit in his account of watching a ship in the 
harbour: it is "Vergangenheit, Zukunft, aufschâumend in 
unerschOpflicher Gegenwart," and "dies heilige Geniessen 
meiner selbst und zugleich der Welt ... dies Doppelte, dies 
Verschlungene, dies Aussen und Innen, dies ineinander- 
schlagende Du."'^ *^  Both temporal and spatial divisions have 
been swallowed up in the all-embracing wholeness.
By far the fullest account of surch an experience is,
however, to be found in "Die Statuen", which describes
Hofmannsthal’s experience while looking at the statues of
the "Korai" in the Acropolis museum, during his visit to
Greece in 1908. Throughout the account there is a growing
conviction of oneness; with the statues: "Es war ein Ver-
wobensein mit diesen, ein gemeinsames Irgendwohinstrëmen";
with his surroundings: "1st denn nicht in der gleichen
Weise auch der Vorhang dort, der leise weht, ein wehender
Teil von mir?"^^; and finally with God himself: "wenn das
Unerreichliche sich speist aus meinem Innern und das Ewige
aus mir seine Ewigkeit sich aufbaut, was ist dann noch
/ o
zwischen der Gottheit und mir?" Hofmannsthal emphasises 
the timelessness of the experience: "Nichts von der 
Bedingtheiten der Zeit konnte anklingen in der Hingenommen- 
heit, an die ich mich verloren hatte; sie war dauerlos und
39. PII, p.355 42. PHI, p.39
40. PII, p.355 43. PHI, p.42
41. PHI, p37
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das, wovon sie erfüllt war, trug sich ausserhalb der Zeit 
Z U . "  Yet there is also an awareness that, "Ich sehe dies 
nicht zum erstenmal, auf irgendwelcher Weise, in irgend- 
welcher Welt bin ich vor diesen gestanden, habe ich mit 
diesen irgendwelche Gemeinschaft gepflogen," implying 
some kind of pre-existential union. At the same time the 
experience is essentially transient and outside his 
control: "Da verlischt schon dies in ihre versteinernden 
Gesichter hinein, es verlischt und ist fort."^°
In other aspects, too, the experience fulfils the
47pattern typical of mysticism. The loss of self leads 
ultimately to the discovery of the true inner self:
"Dieses Selbstvergessen ist ein seltsam deutliches
Geschehen ... Ungemessen mich abwerfend, auflësend, werde
48ich immer stârker: unzerstttrbar bin ich im Kern." 
Hofmannsthal also becomes aware of the true reality behind 
the superficial, phenomenal reality of the statues them­
selves: "Diese Oberflâche ist j a gar nicht da - sie 
entsteht durch ein bestândig'es Kommen zu ihr, au5 uner- 
schëpflichen Tiefen."^^ Like all such experiences, it is
beyond verbal expression, "ein namenloses Erschrecken"^^
51and "dieser unsagbare Aufschwung."
Some of these features have a special significance 
in Hofmannsthal's works, for instance the belief in pre­
existence, a concept which in western thought is found 
particularly in Neo-Platonism. The individual existence is
44. PHI, p.37 48. PHI, p.40f
45. PHI, p.36 49. PHI, p.41
46. PHI, p.37 50. PHI, p.36
47. See pp.63f above 51. PHI, p.37
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seen as emanating from some kind of universal life-force or 
spirit with which it was previously united. In achieving 
unity with the universal spirit, the mystic is simply 
returning to that from which he came and to which he ulti­
mately belongs. Hofmannsthal’s concept of pre-existence 
is original in that the state extends actually into the 
period of life on earth, which begins with a time of 
absorption in the "Sphâre der Totalitât"^^ before the 
individual becomes aware of his role in the sphere of 
social interaction. There are parallels here to 
Wordsworth’s ideas as expressed in the ’Ode on intimations
of Immortality’’, though for him the early experience ’’of
5 3splendour in the grass, of glory in the flower" is only 
rapidly fading memory of the reality known before birth.
a
54
Hofmannsthal also attaches great importance to the
discovery of a timeless realm, in which past, present and
future are one and the transience which characterises the
things of this world is overcome. Thus the problem of "die
Unbegreiflichkeit der Zeit: eigentliche Antinomie von Sein 
5 5und Werden" is resolved. Hofmannsthal describes Das 
Bergwerk zu Falun as an expression of the soul’s attempt, 
"der Zeit zu entfliehen in das Uberzeitliche", as it is 
drawn into "das Reich der Worte worin allés Gegenwart. 
Although this suggests that it is poetry which has the 
power to create this timeless realm, for Hofmannsthal this 
very power of poetic language is essentially something 
mystical. He writes in a note on Andreas of "das mystische
52. A, p.225 54. Ibid., p.
53. Poetical Works, Vol.IV, 55. A, p.217
p.284 56. A, p.241
281
A, p.217 
A, p.241
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Element der Poesie: die Uberwindung der Zeit."^^
The experiences Hofmannsthal describes, and which form 
the background to much of his early poetry, fall clearly 
into the category of "natural" mystical experience, involv­
ing union with the totality of nature rather than with a 
personal God or an impersonal absolute. In view, however, 
of the nature of Hofmannsthal’s concept of spiritual 
reality and of the divine, as explored in Chapter I, this 
does not prevent him from seeing his mysticism as something 
fundamentally religious. The core of his understanding of 
religion is after all the vision of all reality as one.
There is no reason why this should be made explicit in 
poems or essays which are in no way setting out to analyse 
the underlying experience. Lord Ghandos, of course, 
specifically rejects a religious interpretation of what has 
happened to him, but admits that this is part of the 
personal crisis he is undergoing, during which earthly as 
well as religious concepts have lost their m e a n i n g . T h e  
aim of this essay is to explore the style of the period; 
that of "Das Gesprâch über Gedichte" to say something about 
poetic creativity; and that of the "Briefe des Zurück­
gekehrten" to say something about contemporary European 
society, and the religious implications of mystical exper­
ience are therefore not appropriate or relevant. There are, 
however, hints of a spiritual dimension: the argument in 
"Das Gesprâch über Gedichte" hinges on the understanding of 
ritual sacrifice, and the "Zurückgekehrter" relates his 
experience to Rama Krishna’s awakening, "das Erlebnis, das
57. KHA XXX, p.Ill 58. PII, pp.Ilf
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ihn aus den Menschen aussonderte und einen Heiligen aus ihm 
59machte." In "Die Statuen", where Hofmannsthal is simply 
communicating his own experience of Greece and the under­
standing gained from it, the religious aspect is made very 
clear through his final identification with the divine 
reality.
3. Mysticism and involvement
Hofmannsthal's later writings are of course far less 
concerned with the direct expression of mystical experience 
and insights. He no longer focuses on the self either in 
isolation or as merging into the unified totality of 
existence, but rather on the sphere of social interaction 
and active involvement in life, through which the self 
discovers a new individual identity within the whole. 
Hofmannsthal's statement that in spite of his change of 
emphasis he never lost his sense of underlying oneness has, 
however, already been n o t e d , a n d  Chapter I has shown how 
this awareness, rooted in mysticism, does indeed run 
throughout all his works.
For Hofmannsthal there is no conflict between mystic­
ism and active involvement in the world: the "Zurück­
gekehrter", for instance, points out that his experiences of 
sudden illumination have brought him to the very place 
"wohin du auf dunklen Wegen immer gelangst, wenn du tâtig 
und leidend lebst unter den Lebenden."^^ This sharing of a 
common goal emerges very clearly from two passages in "Ad
59. PII, p.353 61. PII, p.357
60. A, p.234 (see p.64 above)
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me ipsum”. The first refers to ”Die Intro-version als Weg
in die Sxistenz. (Der mystische ¥eg).”^^ The second is
clearly presented as an alternative:
Der Weg zum Sozialen als Weg zum hëhern Selbst: der 
nicht-mystische Weg.
a) durch die Tat /q b) durch das Werk
c) durch das Kind
To understand how introversion can be a way into
"existence”, it is necessary to see this statement in the
context of the quotation from Silberer’s study of mysticism
which follows:
Wer sich der Introversion unterzieht ... gelangt an 
einen Punkt, wo sich zwei Wege trennen ... Die Gefahr 
wird augenfâllig, indem der Held zumeist einen schein- 
bar ganz kleinen Fehltritt tut und dann unerhërter 
Mühen bedarf, um diesen einzigen kleinen Fehler gut- 
zumachen. Noch ein unrechter Schritt, und allés wâre 
verloren gewesen. ^
Silberer postulates certain elementary psychic forces in 
man, which become redirected and sublimated as both the 
individual and humanity as a whole develop, normally a slow 
process. Mysticism is a short cut to the "farthest goal of 
sublimation”,^^ as is indicated by its symbolism. Many 
symbols, such as those drawn from the sexual sphere, clear­
ly reveal the original orientation of the impulses 
involved; for instance, the theme of incest with one's 
mother, which becomes in some mystical writings a picture 
of the desire for spiritual rebirth. Because the process 
has been so condensed, it is especially liable to remain 
incomplete or to become perverted.
The mystic by his introversion releases these
62. A, p.215 65. Problems of mysticism and
63. A, p.217 its symbolism, p.256
64. A, p.215
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fundamental powers within him, but he has entered into an 
ambivalent realm and may easily become trapped and 
enslaved by the forces which, properly directed, would 
carry him to his goal. The presence of such threatening 
forces is plainly to be felt in works such as Das Bergwerk 
zu Falun. Margaret Jacobs, in her essay on this play, has 
described it as expressing "the fascination and horror of a 
mind descending to a mysterious region of itself, to the 
mine or abyss of the self, where anonymous experience may 
prove to be divine or devilish.
All mystical writings warn of the danger of falling
victim to diabolic powers. Hofmannsthal himself quotes
Moritz Heimann's statement that, "Der Mystiker stellt die
Hingabe am hbchsten, gleichgültig ob ans Gute oder ans
Büse."^^ Silberer*s two ways also refer to the potential
positive or negative results of introversion. The negative
possibilities he sees as magic, involving the loss of the
self to one's passions which demand constant satisfaction,
and even schizophrenia. He explains that, "If the libido
remains suspended in the wonder realm of the inner world
the man has become but a shadow for the world above."
There is, however, a positive alternative:
If the libido succeeds however in tearing itself loose 
again and in pressing on to the world above, then a 
miracle is revealed; this subterranean journey has 
become a fountain of youth for it, and from its 
apparent death there arises a new productiveness.
In this way introversion can in theory become a "Weg in die
Exi stenz".
66. Norman (ed.). Hofmannsthal, Studies in Commemoration.
p.79
67. A, p.36 68. Op. cit., p.270
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It follows that in turning away from the introverted 
mysticism of his earlier works, Hofmannsthal is not calling 
in question the validity of mystical experience as such. 
Rather he is working out the practical implications of a 
growing awareness of the dangers inherent in such an 
exclusive attitude. He sees these dangers, as expressed by 
Silberer, reflected in the situation of many characters in 
his early works: Odip.us, Elektra, the Emperor in Der Kaiser 
und die Hexe, Elis Frôbom.^^ Above all he has realised, 
"dass das mystische Erlebnis zur Onanie erniedrigt werde, 
wofern nicht der strenge Bezug auf das Leben gesucht,"^^ 
that is, it becomes both self-centred and fruitless.
Hofmannsthal chose his motto for "Ad me ipsum" from the 
lengthy passage from Gregory of Nyssa’s Vita Mosis quoted 
by Konrad Burdach in his "Faust und M o s e s . T h i s  must 
indicate that he felt Moses' quest for the "TJrbild" to be 
relevant to the whole of his work. The passage, however, 
does not only describe the mystic way symbolised in Moses' 
ascent of the mountain, but places its main emphasis on his 
active life in the world, and so also presents a balance 
between these two aspects. The mystic's activity in the 
world is an expression of his sense of oneness with the 
hidden reality which underlies worldly events and is at 
work in them. Eckhart described this as "Wirkeinheit".
The truths intuited in mystical experience need to be 
realised in the external world, and the desire for this 
realisation is reflected in Hofmannsthal's later, more
69. A, p.215f 70. Dili, p.493
71. Sitzungsberichte der KQniglichen Preussischen Akademie 
der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1912, pp.397-401
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socially oriented works, with their emphasis on harmony and
synthesis. He wrote to Pannwitz of his desire to bring the
two spheres of the mystic's vision and everyday existence
together through the medium of comedy: "in ihr kann ich
meine Elemente zusammenfassen: das Einsame und das Soziale.
Das Mystische und das Dialektische, Spraohe nach innen und
72Sprache nach aussen." The reality thus presented is one 
which will be satisfying to the "whole man" on whom 
Hofmannsthal places such emphasis.
This aspect will be explored in more detail in Chapter 
III, when we consider Hofmannsthal's concern with the 
ethics of social action and involvement and discover the 
close connection between his moral values and his mystical 
view of the nature of reality.
4. Mysticism and eclecticism
Mysticism does not become a subject of Hofmannsthal's
essays until the pre-existential awareness of the "Sphâre
der Totalitât"^^ has been finally left behind, and with it 
74lyric poetry. In this situation, Hofmannsthal begins to 
follow up with interest other accounts of religious exper­
ience of a mystical type, by writers such as Lafcadio 
Hearn, William James, Konrad Burdach and Herbert Silberer.
He first mentions reading Hearn's Kokoro in a letter to
75Georg Franckenstein dated 27.7.1902, and according to 
Michael Hamburger his copy of The Varieties of Religious 
Experience is dated 1908.^° Ellen Ritter points out that
72. Mesa, no.5, Autumn 1955, 75. BIT, p.78
p,26f 76.'Hofmannsthals Bibliothek',
73. A, p.225 Euphorion 55, 19^1, p.29
74. See p.67 above
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Hofmannsthal's early notes in his copy of Kokoro show an 
interest in "den persbnlich erfahrbaren psychologischen 
^rkenntnissen", whereas the later ones are concerned more 
with."den allgemeinen, grundlegenden Einsichten."^^ This 
suggests that he is at first seeking parallels to his own 
experience and insights, but later feels a need to 
interpret both in a wider context. It also coincides with 
his growing interest in religion in general, and his 
increasingly positive attitude towards it.
The context within which he comes to present these 
insights is, however, very wide indeed, and clearly not 
that of a particular established religion or mystical 
philosophy. He refers to Paracelsus and EOhme, Hovalis 
and Blake; to oriental sacred writings and to psychological 
works. He makes use of them all as providing different 
symbolic expressions of the mystic's vision, in the same 
way as he elsewhere chooses, for instance, a historical 
setting because of the ideas and attitudes it symbolizes. 
(This eclecticism is also a reflection of his continuing 
interest in tracing the underlying connections between all 
ages and parts of the world.) He turns more often to the 
writings of contemporary psychologists than to the great 
mystics of the past, but it is of course precisely the 
traditional mystical writings that psychologists such as 
Silberer and James are trying to interpret. The point is 
that Hofmannsthal does not want an interpretation which is 
tied to traditional religious forms, but is seeking through 
the medium of modern psychology one that will be of
7 7. Germani sch-Romani sche Monatsschrift, 1972, p.198
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universal human application.
Many critics have explored the various elements 
assimilated by Hofmannsthal as he builds up a framework of 
understanding for the mystical view of reality he is 
seeking to express, though even when we know him to have 
read a particular author, it is often difficult to dis­
tinguish a conscious assimilation from a naturally similar 
pattern of thought. Miles, for example, in his study of 
Andreas, traces parallels between Hofmannsthal’s view of
memory and that of Bergson, Heidegger and in particular 
7 8Kierkegaard, and Lenz explores the influence of 
79Bachofen. Grete Schaeder has pointed out how
Hofmannsthal could find in Schopenhauer the same symbolism
of life as a dream, a play or a preestablished harmony
8 0which he also found in the Neo-Platonic tradition. Many 
others have compared his ideas with Neo-Platonism, pointing
78. Hofmannsthal’s Novel Andreas, pp.87-96. The common 
core is the concept of memory as the means by which the 
past becomes part of the reality of the present. In 
pointing to the parallels between Hofmannsthal’s devel­
opment and Kierkegaard’s scheme of three stages (the 
aesthetic, the ethical and the religious). Miles also 
stresses the link between the central role of memory in 
the ethical stage and Hofmannsthal’s concept of "Treue"
79. Hugo von Hofmannsthals mythologische Oner "Die âgyp- 
tische Helena", p.l7ff. This influence is seen partic­
ularly in Hofmannsthal’s view of Helena and Menelas as 
representing the polar opposites of East/West, matter/ 
spirit, amoral natural forces/human morality: however, 
in contrast to Bachofen, Hofmannsthal does not present 
the ethical and spiritual as a superior development, 
but depicts the union of both aspects in the marriage 
of Helena and Menelas.
80. ',Hugo von Hofmannsthal s Weg zur Tragôdie’, DVJS, 1949, 
p.312f. She sees Hofmannsthal as seeking to unite the 
religious and humanistic/psychological interpretations 
of these symbols.
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to such elements as the emphasis on the spiritual realm and 
the concept of pre-existence and anamnesis, and Breugelmans
has summed up the relationship in his "Hofmannsthal im
81Platonismus der Jahrhundertwende." Some have commented
on the possible influence of Nietzsche, which has been
82explored in detail by Meyer-Wendt. Others, such as
Heselhaus in "Calderon und Hofmannsthal"^^, have tried to 
define the attraction of Calderon's world-view for 
Hofmannsthal, as does also Ernst, for example in his 
Studien zum religiBsen Problem im "Salzburger Grossen Welt- 
theater" und in den "Turm"-Dichtungen Hugo von 
Hofmannsthals.
Ernst's particular concern is with Hofmannsthal's 
interest in eastern religion, and he shows clearly the 
inaccuracy of categorising the later works as Christian.
81. Hofmannsthal-Forschungen I, pp.16-35. He shows how 
Hofmannsthal is often closer to Plato than to later 
Platonic tradition, and how many of his related ideas 
in fact have their source in oriental philosophy or 
contemporary idealist thought in general.
82. Der frühe Hofmannsthal und die Gedankenwelt Nietzsches. 
He identifies many echoes of Nietzsche in Hofmannsthal's 
early poems and essays as well as direct references to 
his influence in letters and notes, though in seeking 
parallels he tends to emphasise Hofmannsthal's concern 
with the process of "Werden" at the expense of the 
complementary aspect of "Sein".
83. Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen, 191, pp.3- 
3C. He points to Calderon's concern with the theme of 
awakening to oneself and to spiritual truth through 
experience of the world, emphasising however the 
contrast between Calderon's world with its prescribed 
theological framework of interpretation and that of 
Hofmannsthal's figures.
84. p.2C4. The common element is seen not in any specific 
religious understanding but in the all-embracing nature 
of the perspective from which the world is viewed.
- 81 -
He himself, however, tends to view Hofmannsthal's ideas too 
exclusively from the perspective of oriental religion, 
particularly in his interpretation of Der Turm as an ex­
pression of Karma, basing this on an early note of
Q C
Hofmannsthal's. This concept of a Karma which entails 
that "die blosse Sxistenz des furchtbaren Geschehnisses 
'Sigismund' wie ein Pestherd auf das ganze Land Jwirkt^,"^^ 
is in fact far from identical with the oriental one, 
according to which Karma is rather the sum of the indivi­
dual's actions which, determine his own future incarnations. 
Freny Mistry is also concerned in several of his articles 
with Hofmannsthal's relationship to eastern religion, but 
avoids the temptation to oversimplify, stressing, for
example, that he is using oriental tradition to shed light
8 7on one aspect only of Sigismund's complex character.
Many of Hofmannsthal's concepts are, like that of
Karma, personal, related to but clearly diverging from a
variety of possible sources, for example, that of the pre-
8 8existence of the soul. As Ernst himself points out, this
idea is dubious from a Christian point of view, even in the
form in which it occurs in Das Salzburger Grosse ¥elt-
theater. The souls are not called into being by the Master,
but already exist, "ohne jedes Merkmal des Geschlechtes,
89des Alters oder der Person," before they are allotted 
their earthly bodies and roles; a picture corresponding to
85. See the above and also "Das Karma-Thema und der 'Turm'- 
Stoff bei Hugo von Hofmannsthal", W ,  1971, pp.14-24
86. Dili, p.426
87. "Towards Buddhahood: some remarks on the Sigismund . 
figure in Hofmannsthal's 'Turm' plays". Modern Language 
Review, 1974, p.337
88. Studien zum religiüsen Problem, p.27
89. KHA X, p.16
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the Platonist doctrine which was condemned by the church. 
Such a form of existence is expressly denied by Calderon's 
figures, who claim on entering that, "we have no soul, no 
sense, no mind, no potency" and exist purely as thoughts in 
the mind of God, until he gives them breath.
The pre-existence of Hofmannsthal's souls does not, 
however, in any way imply an eastern concept of reincarna­
tion or transmigration of souls. He denies that this is 
the explanation of the soul's inner knowledge, which comes 
rather from its participation in a greater spiritual 
reality, and writes:
1st aber mit dieser Seele allés gesagt? Hier liegt 
es: nicht Seelenwanderung - aber wir sind nur ein Teil
von etwas, das in uns lebt, aber nicht nur in uns -
wir sind wie einer in einer wandernden Schar - dies: 
"Cherub und grosser Herr ist unser Geist".
Of vital importance for the whole of life is "die innere
Landschaft, die die Seele aus ihrem Zustand vor der Geburt
92mit in die Welt bringt." The landscape is built up of
many elements, and in this idea of an aggregate
Hofmannsthal's concept of the soul is close to that of the
East, even though the elements are derived not from
previous existences but rather from that supra-individual
reality of which it is a part. In the "Ansprache gehalten
im Hause des Grafen Lanckoronscki", Hofmannsthal refers to
"die aufgesammelte Kraft der geheimnisvollen Ahnenreihe in
uns, die übereinandergetürmten Schichten der aufgestapelten
9 3überindividuellen Erinnerung." It is this which enables 
us to respond to the beauty around us, and here
90. Masterpieces of the Spanish Golden Age, p.372
91. A, p.261 93. PII, p.30
92. A, p.35
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Hofmannsthal seems to be clearly echoing Hearn, for whom
"the first deep sensation of beauty known to the individual
is not individual at all", but rather "something inherited
9 Lfrom innumerable ancestors," The various elements in the 
soul may also be in conflict and need to be reconciled, as 
will be seen in the discussion of Der Turm below.
Bollnow sees Hofmannsthal's mysticism as a variant of
the idea of an "allés durchwaltendes Gesamtleben", which
has been a characteristic of German thought since the time
of Herder, and which since the Romantic movement has often
9 5been linked with mysticism, an idea which regained promin­
ence at the end of the nineteenth century through writers 
such as Nietzsche and Dilthey. Bollnow is also able to 
show that the interpretation of mystical experience in an 
aesthetic rather than a religious framework is a develop­
ment within the stream of mystical thought, and the result 
of general cultural changes. By Hofmannsthal's time art, 
rather than an active existence, had come to be seen by 
many as the highest expression of human life. It was 
therefore art through which the meaning of life and the 
underlying life-force was to be revealed. William James 
wrote in 1902: "We are alive or dead to the eternal inner
message of the arts according as we have kept or lost this
9 6mystical susceptibility." We have already seen many
examples of how for Hofmannsthal mystical experience is
97linked with aesthetic experience and creativity, and also
94. Kokoro, p.59
95."Zum Lebensbegriff des jungen Hugo von Hofmannsthal", 
Archiv für Literatur und Volksdichtung, I, 1949, p.50
96. The Varieties of Religious Experience, p.374
97. See for example pp.67, 9^ and 72 above.
- 8 4“
the special role he attributes to the artist in revealing 
the divine reality.
Hofmannsthal also, of course, draws very widely on 
Christian teaching and symbolism, and clearly sees these as 
one source of illumination. Such Christian elements may be 
the basis of a whole work, as in Jedermann and Das 
Salzburger Grosse Welttheater; the means of adding a 
further dimension to a situation, as are the parallels 
suggested between Sigismund and Christ in Der Turm; or 
merely the evocative echo of a Biblical quotation in an 
e s s a y . A s  I have pointed out in my introduction,many 
critics have traced the Christian themes in Hofmannsthal's 
works, making comments such as R.A. Schrôder's on Die Frau 
ohne Schatten; "Sinn und Gehalt der transzendentalen Fuge, 
in der Hofmannsthal an den vier Personen seiner Mârchen- 
erzâhlung den Gedanken des Opfers und der Wandlung durch- 
führt, l^sinc^ vollkommen christlich."^^^ But in fact these 
themes: death and rebirth, sacrifice, the value of suffer­
ing, are in no way exclusively Christian. They deal with 
the kind of fundamental truths of human existence which are 
expressed in all the great religions, and are particularly 
emphasised in mysticism. There is nothing in 
Hofmannsthal's writings of the elements which are 
distinctive to Christianity: belief in Christ as the unique 
Son of God and Saviour, and in salvation and regeneration 
as the free gift of God through the Cross. This is of 
course to be expected in view of Hofmannsthal's concept of
98. See for example pp.26 and 50f above
99. e.g. PII, p.10 (quoted above, p.l7f); PIV, p.44 (above,
100.See p.9 above 101. 1929, II, p.588
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the relation of Christianity to other religions^^^ and his 
rejection of all fixed dogma.
He would, however, have been most familiar with these 
elements in the Christian embodiment which is part of 
European culture, and this was also the form in which they 
could be most easily communicated to fellow-Europeans. It 
does not necessarily follow, therefore, that the prevalence 
of Christian elements in his writings reflects the degree 
of importance he attached to them as an expression of 
spiritual truth. One must also avoid the trap of reading 
Christianity - or any other religion - into what are 
merely religious concepts in a general sense. It is mis­
leading to interpret any of his works from the standpoint 
of any one religion, philosophy or psychological theory.
Hofmannsthal's concern with the universal elements of
mystical experience inevitably means that he concentrates
on the mystic’s subjective experience rather than on the
"object" with which unity is achieved. This latter could
indeed only be identified within some specific religious or
at least philosophical context, whereas the subjective
state of mystical ecstasy appears to be very similar in all
ages and cultures. The conclusion reached by Ada Schmidt
in her examination of Hofmannsthal's mysticism is that for
him the mystic's vision reveals:
another dimension of the empirical world, a dimension 
which interrelates the elements of life so that 
reality forms a meaningful whole. This dimension is 
alluded to by such words as "the infinite" or "the 
beyond", words used for their valuative connotatijgs 
rather than any precisely restricted denotations.
102. See p.l5ff above
103. Neophilologus 50» 1966, p.443
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VJe have already noted Hofmannsthal's tendency to use such 
words to refer to the sphere of the d i v i n e . T h e y  are 
intended to conjure up the vision in the mind of the • 
reader, not to define it, but of course what they conjure 
up will depend very much on his personal associations. In 
order to give a concrete reality to that which he is 
seeking to communicate, Hofmannsthal turns not to the 
clearly defined terminology of a specific system of 
thought, but to the symbolic power of living form.
Knowledge which is obtained essentially through a
process of identification will inevitably present problems
of verbal communication, since the degree of distance
between the knower and the known is lacking which is
necessary for conscious recognition and expression. So
the world threatens to become "ein Reden des ünbegreif-
lichen zu unserer Seele, oder ein Reden unserer Seele mit 
105sich selbst." Hofmannsthal is of course well aware of
this problem. He acknowledges that that which has been 
identified with the self, and so become simply a reflection 
of the self, must also be recognised as a separate entity, 
a Thou with which a relationship can be established. This 
applies to the material world and to other people as much 
as to the divine reality. Only through such a process is 
true union possible, union with things as they really are. 
This gradual realisation of the independent existence of 
things and people, that "die Welt besitzt sich selber,"^^^ 
is an important element in Hofmannsthal's early writings.
104. See p.47 above lOb. OLD, p.38
105. Karg BW, p.82
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As has already been noted, the development of his
thought generally leads away from the inner world of the
self towards the world of "das Einzelne", of individuation
107and interaction. Introversion alone is not enough, even
where mystical experience itself is concerned, as he
explains in the fifth "Brief des Zurückgekehrten":
wenn ailes in mir war, warum konnte ich nicht die 
Augen schliessen und stumm und blind eines unnennbaren 
Gefühles meiner selbst geniessen, warum musste ich 
mich auf.Dgck erhalten und schauen, vor mich hin- 
schauen?
The mystical awareness arises out of the meeting of inner 
potential and external reality. But God himself appears to 
be left out of this development, remaining inseparable from 
the soul of man or from the world, through which he is 
known as the indwelling spiritual reality. He is not per­
ceived as having independent existence: Hofmannsthal is
content with the assertion that, "wir sind nur ein Teil von
109etwas, das in uns lebt, aber nicht nur in uns." "Das
Unendliche"; "das Wortlose"; "das Absolute"; the pronoun 
required is plainly not "du" but "es". The only kind of 
separation from God which does occur in Hofmannsthal’s 
works is that which in his later years is seen to be caused 
by society’s pre-occupation with materialism, so that 
contact with the spiritual dimension seems to be lost, a 
situation most clearly presented in Der Turm. But for 
those who have not cut themselves off in this way, know­
ledge of the divine is still a matter of mystical union.
Probably the most concrete definition that can be 
offered is that suggested by Bollnow, who claims that
107. See p. 74 above 109. A, p.26l
108. PII, p.355
Hofmannsthal’s mysticism, like that of his contemporaries,
has as its object union with "das Leben", a kind of
universal creative f o r c e . H o f m a n n s t h a l ’s Lord Chandos,
for example, describes the revelation he receives through
the objects of his surroundings as that of "einer über-
schwellenden Flut hôheren Lebens."^^^ This idea becomes
increasingly spiritualised as the emphasis of Hofmannsthal’s
works shifts from "die vielfâltige Schônheit aller 
112Wesen" to a concern with spiritual values, culminating
in his demand "dass der Geist Leben wird und Leben 
113Geist." But it is still no more clearly defined than
in the days when he could simply equate "sich selber", 
"Leben" and
Hofmannsthal is not in fact interested in considering 
what this spiritual or divine reality might be in itself, 
but only needs an awareness of its presence as a guarantee 
of the unity and meaningfulness of life. He affirms the 
existence of a spiritual element in man and a purpose 
within human existence, an outlook which is in .fact ulti­
mately anthropocentric. This is of course always a 
potential development of mysticism, with its merging of the 
human and the divine. Hederer, in his Mystik und Lyrik, 
points out that mystical thought has concerned German 
thinkers for centuries as a. philosophy "in dem die Frage
nach Sinn und Geltung Gottes zusammenfâllt mit der Frage
115nach Sinn und Geltung des Menschen," and William James, 
who sees all religion as mystical, even puts forward the
110. Archiv für Literatur und Volksdichtung I, 1949, pp.50-
111. PII, p.15 114. Karg BW, p.83: (62
112. A, p.234 see p.48 above
113. PIV, p.412 115. p.116
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claim that all religion is anthropoc ent ric .So  in 
Hofmannsthal’s exploration of mystical writings, the 
primary impulse is to understand man and his experience, 
not to learn about God. As already noted, even his "Das 
alte Spiel von Jedermann" argues, in defence of the con­
tinuing value of the play, not that it contains some
fundamental, non-dogmatic religious truth, but that it is
117"menschlich absolut", expressing the human need to 
strive after higher things.
The objective content of his mysticism seems ultimate­
ly to amount to a rejection of rationalism and materialism 
and an affirmation of some kind of spiritual dimension, in 
which the dualities and conflicts of the phenomenal world 
are resolved and its apparent chaos Is unified and given 
meaning. This mysticism which is unanchored to any con­
ceptually formulated understanding of the universe, whether 
religious, philosophical or scientific, is no isolated 
phenomenon but rather a typical product of current trends 
of thought. Francis Schaeffer, for instance, describing 
the effects of the contemporary reaction against an age of 
rigidly rationalistic thinking, shows how modern thought
has evolved a kind of mysticism which is a "mysticism with 
118nothing there." Here there is a clear echo of
Hofmannsthal’s description of Chandos as a "Mystiker ohne 
M y s t i k " , a  formula which Hoppe, for one, considers also 
sums up Hofmannsthal’s own mysticism.
Kern raises the question of whether Hofmannsthal’s
116. Op. cit., p.497
117. PHI, p.115
118. The God who is there, p.55
119. A, p.215
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emphasis on the irrational threatens the objective validity
of his view of reality, asking "wie weit der Durchbruch zur
Wirklichkeit und in die Sxistenz tatsâchlich in einer Form
vollzogen wurde, die nicht nur subjektiv, dass heisst für
das Subjekt Hofmannsthal, sondern allgemein verstândlich
120und verbindlich war." Hofmannsthal found a response to
his ideas in spite of this potential problem because in the 
atmosphere created by contemporary "Lebensphilosophie" this 
attitude was shared by many others. It may be, however, 
that his disinclination to formulate any systematic and 
coherent framework for his mysticism is one cause of his 
ultimate failure to find something solid enough to stand up 
to the challenge of the monolithic materialism whose 
threatening power is felt in Der Turm.
5. Mysticism and "Der Turm"
Hofmannsthal himself describes Der Turm as "mys- 
121tisch". Its effectiveness ultimately depends on the
communication of a view of reality which is essentially 
that of mysticism, and some of the implications of such a 
conception of reality emerge very clearly from the play.
One obviously mystical aspect of Sigismund’s exper­
ience is his sense of oneness with the universe: "Das Ganze
122bleibt bei mir immer und niemand wird mirs entwinden."
He identifies both with the external world and with the 
spiritual realm, and his relationship to each of them 
changes, both within the action of the play and between
120. Zur Gedankenwelt des soâten Hofmannsthal, p.26f
121. A, p.370 122. DIV, p.140
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Hofmannsthal’s two versions (of 1925 and 1927), but by the 
end of the play there is no doubt about which is primary. 
The dying Sigismund (of the first version) says: ’’Ein 
Mensch braucht keinen geringeren Raum als die ganze Welt, 
um in der Wahrheit da zu sein - aber ich habe zwanzig Jahre 
in einem hohien Stein gewohnt und ein Wort kannte ich 
nicht: Sehnsucht. Denn wo ich bin, da dringe ich ein und 
bin gegenwârtig und h e r r s c h e . I t  is the inner 
spiritual unity which is fundamental, and enables ’true 
existence’’ to be attained in any situation.
This emphasis on the spiritual has been inculcated
upon Sigismund by the teaching of Julian, who boasts: ’’Hab
ich dich nicht erzogen, will sagen: gezogen nach oben,
heraus gezogen aus der Tiernatur, ... und dein Angesicht
nach oben gerissen zum Gewôlb des Rimmels, dahinter Gott 
124wohnt?’  ^ He expresses this idea in terms of two of the 
symbolic motifs which recur throughout Der Turm and in 
Hofmannsthal’s work as a whole. The first is the picture 
evoked by the Renaissance Neo-Platonists of man situated 
midway between the animal and the divine, both of which are 
his own inner potentialities. The second is the implied 
reference in the phrase ’Gewblb des Himmels’ to the stars 
as symbols of the spiritual realm. As for another 
Renaissance thinker, Paracelsus, the stars symbolize funda­
mental powers of the human spirit, whose home is not on
this earth, ’’der nicht in uns wohnet und seinen Stuhl in
12 5die oberen Sterne setzt. ’ It is the sight of the stars,
in Hofmannsthal’s early notes for Das Leben ein Traum,
123. DIV, p.200 125. Quoted by Hofmannsthal,
124. DIV, p.92 A, p.120
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which first communicates to Sigismund the existence of 
spiritual reality, and gives him the desire "das Kônigreich 
zu erwerben, das über diesen Sternen ist ( ... sich ein 
mystisches KOnigreich in der EinOde schaffend), and the 
Sigismund of Der Turm clearly attaches a similar meaning to 
them. Right at the beginning he tells the doctor, "In mir 
drin ist ein Stern. Meine Seele ist heilig."^^^ To the 
doctor this is a sign that spiritual depths have been 
awakened within him.
But in spite of this awakening, it is not clear that
Julian’s boast is justified. When he makes this claim,
Sigismund is still in a state of confusion about his own
identity - the doctor explains that, "Die Grenze ist ver-
wirrt zwischen innen und aussen," so that "die ganze Welt 
128auf ihm liegt" - and about the distinction between 
animal and spirit. Having both these potentialities within 
him, he feels himself to be one with both, and has to ask, 
"Wo ist mein End und wo ist dem Tier sein End?"^^^ The 
result is confusion: "Ich brings nicht auseinander, mich 
mit dem [the crucified Christ] und aber mich mit dem Tier, 
das aufgehangen war an einem queren Holz
Like his counterpart in Das Leben ein Traum, alter­
nating between states of "Angst und Verkleinerung" and 
131"Mégalomanie", Sigismund has at the beginning of Der 
Turm no stable relationship with the external world: 
alternately dominated and dominating, he cannot understand 
its nature because he does not understand his own:
126. Dili, p.428 129. DIV, p.88
127. DIV, p.27 130. DIV, p.88
128. DIV, p.25 131. Dili, p.429
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Ss wâchst ailes mit mir zusammen. Unken und Asseln, 
Mauern und Turm. Ss ist ailes bald gross bald klein, 
dass mir schwindelt. Ein Strohhalm wie ein Balken 
legt sich auf meine Seel, zerquetscht sie. Einen 
Turm, einen Berg bias ich yor mir hin wie Staub, so - 
ist meine Seele so stark?
He has not yet understood Julian's teaching: indeed,
analogies are continually made which place him among the
animals whose nature he is supposed to have left behind.
He has still not learnt how to cope with this aspect of his
nature, as is seen in his own brutal killing of the
creatures in his cage.
The doctor sees that "nur Wiedergeburt heilt einen so 
133Zerrütteten." But before rebirth must come death, and
it is the drinking of the sleeping draught that gives
Sigismund this essential spiritual experience of death, not
only because he believes he is dying, but because he
accepts it in a spirit of complete self-surrender and in
affirmation of suffering as the glory of man, who has
"nicht zu viel Leiden und Schmerzen, sondern ihrer zu 
134wenig." It is this experience which enables him to
understand the nature of the world, as he himself tells
those around his deathbed: "Ihr sehet nicht wie die Welt
135ist. Nur ich, weil ich schon einmal tot war."
The experience produces an ecstatic state, in which 
Sigismund grasps by mystical intuition the answers' to all 
the problems that had previously troubled him. He is given 
a new understanding of his relationship to the world, which 
he can now accept as existing within him: "Hier innen sind 
die vier Enden der Welt; schneller als der Adler flieg ich
132. DIV, p.86 134. DIV, p.99
133. DIV, p.46 135. DIV, p.202
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von einem zum andern, und doch bin ich aus einem Stück und
dicht wie Ebenholz: das ist das Geheimnis. At the same
time, his inner spiritual self is now protected from all
invasion: "Es glaubt der Mensch, er tue übel an seines-
gleichen oder gut: aber wer berührt das Innere? Das ist 
137unberührbar." He is no longer worried about the iden­
tity of his father: "Mein Vater ist ja bei mir."^^^ He can 
now accept his father's presence as a spiritual reality in 
a way that he could not when asked to do so by his foster
mother, for then he was interested only in his "leiblicher 
139Vater." Before, he complained, "Mein Vater hat kein
Gesicht."^^^ Now he sees him "von Angesicht zu An- 
gesi cht.
Nevertheless, Sigismund's problems are not over, as is
shown by the scene that follows between him and the King:
his mystical intuition of his father's presence has not
equipped him to deal with his real father. Nor has
Julian's teaching enabled him to understand the nature of
the external world. Julian claims, "Einen gewaltigen
Magier habe ich aus dir gemacht, gleich Adam und Moses!
denn ich habe das Wunder der Sprache in deinen Mund 
142gelegt," but language is not enough where there is no
experience of the reality which it expresses. Sigismund
has only learnt the extent of his "Unkenntnis": "Ich kenne,
143was ich nicht sehe, weiss, was fern von mir ist."  ^ All 
the same, it is by essentially magical means that he tries 
to realize his aims, asserting his spiritual power against
136. DIV, p.98 140. DIV, p.83
137. DIV, p.98 141. DIV, p.99
138. DIV, p.98 142. DIV, p.93
139. DIV, p.87 143. DIV, p.92
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the debased form of power he finds in the King. The 
actions by which he attempts to control the situation are 
symbolic, not practical: the kiss of peace he demands at 
the beginning, the act of overpowering his father which he 
believes is sufficient in itself to establish him as king. 
He has to learn that a world which is governed solely by 
material force and materialist concerns will not respond 
to what is outside this sphere; that it is only involve­
ment, not magical action, which can speak to the world and 
actually achieve anything. (in the second version even 
this has become impossible.)
This experience teaches Sigismund that he cannot 
simply impose his values on the external world or expect it 
to correspond to his ideals, a lesson which is brought home 
above all by his father's failure. Basilius, both as King 
and as Sigismund's father, has become a symbol of God the 
Father, or at least his representative, the wielder of 
divine power on earth. The words of the peasant woman 
point to this,^^^ and Julian, in preparing Sigismund to 
meet the King, actually says, "Vater, Schttpfer Himmels und 
der Erdel Von Angesicht!", after first describing him 
simply as "das Hëhere".^^^ When Sigismund finds out the 
true nature of the King's power and its involvement with 
evil, the King becomes "Satan". He expected the world
order to correspond to the spiritual order of which Julian 
had taught him: it does not, and his first reaction is 
anger at the destruction of what he believed in.
144. DIV, p.88f 146. DIV, p.123
145. DIV, p .116
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Later he realizes that the divine is to be found
within himself. This was the implication of his words
while under the influence of the sleeping draught, but it
is only after his return to the tower that he is able to
understand his vision. He now tells Olivier, "Ich bin
mein eigener Vater und Sohn und lebe mit mir in Ein- 
147tracht." The mystic does not need parents to be
reborn: he is his own father because, as Silberer ex­
plains, "he creates a new man(himself) out of himself 
with a merely symbolic mother, therefore with peculiar 
self-mastery, without the co-operation of any parents. 
Christian mystics have reconciled this position with the 
idea of an external God by seeing rebirth as the act of 
the Holy Spirit, but there is no sign that Sigismund tries 
to do any such thing. Spiritual reality is to be found 
within - and is therefore unassailable, whatever may 
happen in the external world. By living on the level of 
this reality, Sigismund can be "Herr und KSnig auf immer 
in diesem festen Turm."^^^
It is the affirmation of this reality, the inner
reality of dream and vision, as against that of external
phenomena, that Sigismund has above all learnt from his
experience. He tells Olivier that the truth which alone
enables him to exist as a spiritual being is the knowledge
that, "Wir wissen von keinem Ding wie es ist, und nichts
ist, von dem wir sagen künnten, dass es anderer Natur sei
150als unsere Trâume." This does not make him essentially
147. DIV, p.151
148. Problems of mysticism and its symbolism, p.322
149. DIV, p.140
150. DIV, p.154
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different from those .who have remained on the level of
their lower nature, those with "Stiernacken" and "Zâhne 
151eines Hundes." The difference is one of understanding:
"Ich bin wie ihr seid. Aber ich weiss, und ihr seid ohne 
Wissen.
Other characters confirm this view of reality. The
Grand Almoner claims that the world cannot provide "eine
153Stunde wahrhaftigen Lebens." The doctor tells Julian
that his dreams are revelations of truth: "Die Stunde
zwischen Nacht und Tag ist es, wo die Gottheit, den Schein
von Wirklichkeit grâsslich scheidend, an uns heran-
tritt."^^^ Olivier rejects all vision and proclaims "ein
155niichterner Tag", but Sigismund tells him, in their
confrontation at the end of the second version, that he is
blind to true reality because his eyes are fixed on the
phenomenal: "Du vermagst nicht zu schauen, weil deine Augen
vermauert sind mit dem was nicht ist."^^^ In the first
157version he uses these same words to Julian, in response 
to Julian's accusation that he has turned out a total 
failure - which in worldly terms, at that moment, he is.
But despite all appearances, in the words of the doctor, 
"die Welt wird nicht vom Eisen regiert, sondern von dem 
Geist, der in ihm |sigismunc^ ist. Er ist ein gewaltiger
1 r o
Mensch." Through his visionary power, the spiritual
truth symbolised by the stars can be realised in him :'
Da ich gewaltiger Mensch eins bin mit den Sternen, so 
lehrtest du mich, darum warten sie wissend auf mein 
Tun. Aus meiner Brust gebâre ich ihnen die Welt, nach
151. DIV, p.151 155. DIV, p.458
152. DIV, p.154 156. DIV, p.445
153. DIV, p.65 157. DIV, p.158
154. DIV, p.43 158. DIV, p.459
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der sie zittern ... - ihresgleichen in Auserwâhlung 
ist eines trâumenden Menschen herrliche Brust, die aus 
sich selber dis Welt schafft, geniessend ihres inner- 
sten Selbst.
The stars, like his father, are no longer something above 
and beyond him: he is one with them, even to the extent 
that they depend on him.
Sigismund has gained a new spiritual strength, and a 
new understanding of the nature of the different forces at 
work in himself and in the world and of how to cope with 
them. In the second version, he finds that the only 
possibility left is to keep himself uncorrupted by the dark 
powers which have been let loose in the world. In the 
first version, it is precisely because Sigismund is aware 
of the existence of the spiritual dimension and its un- 
assailability that he is enabled to act within the world.
He can speak the language of the world because he lives 
"unter den Sternen auch am lichten Tage"^^^ and knows he is 
playing a part in an eternal conflict. His clearer under­
standing of the situation means that he can succeed where 
others fail.
Julian dies a failure, but Sigismund has progressed 
beyond him. He has a source of inner strength that Julian 
lacks, which he expresses in a symbol typical of mysticism: 
"Du quâlst dich, dass ein Ader in dir aufgehe, von der du 
trinken kbnntest. In mir aber fliesst es ohne stocken."^^^ 
And he has reached the point where, armed with this 
strength, the mystic is able to renounce his isolation and 
go out into the world in service.
159.DIV, p.139 loi. DIV, p.159
160.DIV, p.174
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Such action is an attempt to bridge the gap between 
two sharply divided orders of reality, or rather between 
reality and appearance. It is the division which 
Hofmannsthal saw expressed in the state of society around 
him, a society totally divorced from the spiritual dimen­
sion. In the play, one manifestation of this is the 
complete rift between the King and the Grand Almoner, the 
State and the Church. It is true that Sasilius seems to 
seek guidance from the Church, but he is only interested 
in it when it confirms and supports his own selfish aims. 
Ignatius' attitude is quite plain: "Fahr hin, Welt."^^^
He offers no message of reconciliation, but only judgement 
and rejection: "Nichts ist als das unerbittliche Gericht 
und die Sonderung der Spreu von dem Weizen."^^^ The figure 
of the King himself, supposedly the representative of God, 
reveals the extent of the division. In Das Leben ein Traum. 
the King is described as the point where "Gottes Welt an 
unsre grenzet.”^^^ Where the monarchy has become an empty 
show, the inference is that God's world is no longer in 
touch with ours. The world is under the control of "das 
Olivierische", in the hands of which material things are 
no longer a potential revelation of the Divine Ground, but 
have become the instruments of Satanic p o w e r . T h o s e  who 
stand for spiritual truth are isolated, cut off from the 
world, with which they can only be united through this lost 
divine element. The Sigismund of the second version is 
utterly isolated: "Ich bin allein und sehne mich verbunden 
zu sein."^^^ Even in the first version he needs to tell
162. DIV, p.67 165. DIV, p.180
163. DIV, p.69 166. DIV, p.l6l
164. Dili, p.415
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his followers, "Gebet Zeugnis: ich war da. Wenngleich mich 
niemand gekannt hat."^^^
They are to bear witness to the "Geist, der in ihm 
ist," the only form in which the divine can be known.
The Grand Almoner himself gives Basilius a definition of 
God which reduces him to an inner directing and judging 
voice:
Ich werde dich lehren, was das ist: Gotti ... Ein 
Etwas spricht mit meinem Mund, aber wie aus dir selbst 
heraus, auf dich selber zielend ... Es verzweifelt 
hinter deiner Verzweiflung, durchgraust dich hinter 
deinem Grausen, und entlâsst dich nicht dir selber, 
denn es/kennt dich und will dich strafen: Das ist 
Gott;
But Basilius can choose to ignore -this inner divine voice 
that is part of his true self - and "God" is then helpless. 
In a character such as Olivier the voice is no longer 
heard at all.
Everything therefore depends on man's awareness of the 
spiritual forces within him - and the goal of those who 
have this awareness is ultimately an earthly one, the 
regeneration of human society. Sigismund, the representa­
tive of the spiritual realm, is a "quinta essentia aus den
170httchsten irdischen Krâften," and according to the doctor,
the effect of the sleeping draught which produces
Sigismund's mystical vision is to reveal "die wahre Glorie
171der menschlichen Seele." The children at the end
proclaim, "Gewaltig ist die Erde und gewaltiger der
172Mensch. Es 1st sonst nichts dal" Sigismund himself has
167. DIV, p.207 170. DIV, p.33
168. DIV, p.459 171. DIV, p.53
169. DIV, p.75 172. DIV, p.205
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become a "Sternbild" there is no need for anything
more.
There are of course many references to God in the 
play (as is appropriate to the historical setting), but he 
has become a symbol for an inner potentiality of man.
Those who have realised this potentiality, Sigismund and 
the children, do not need to talk about an external God. 
Many allusions to biblical passages suggest an analogy 
between Sigismund and Christ, whereas Olivier, representing 
the opposite potentiality of human nature, is referred to 
as Satan. There is a, sharp division between those who 
fight "mit Gottes Hilfe" and those who fight "mit des 
Satans Beistand."^^^
The two sides each stand for a different concept of 
reality, since man's understanding of truth depends on the 
inner response he is able to make to it. The King, 
referring to the prophecy about Sigismund, asks, "1st es 
Gott Oder der Satan, der durch die Sterne redet?"^^^ - but 
both are within man, and those who cannot find the voice of 
God within themselves will not hear it through the stars. 
The prophecy is not a message sent from without: in the 
notes on Das Leben ein Traum Hofmannsthal describes it as 
"eine Art Catena magica des bSsen Gewissens nach aussen 
projiziert: er Qhe King] wusste, dass diese furchtbaren 
Dinge wahr waren - in der Idee wenigstens - weil sie aus 
dem Material seiner Versündigungen gemacht w a r e n . T o  
the King's question as to whether the stars can lie.
173. DIV, p.208 175. DIV, p.71
174. DIV, p.175 176. Dili, p.432
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Ignatius replies, "Wer sind wir, dass sie uns lügen 
111sollten?" The stars stand for truth, but the only
truth which, Basilius is capable of seeing is that of the 
evil in his own nature and its consequences: he cannot see 
beyond this because, like Olivier, his vision is obscured 
by the world of appearances. The Grand Almoner contrasts 
his restricted sight with that of the eye, "vor dem ist 
heute wie gestern und morgen wie heute. Darum kann die 
Zukunft erforscht werden und es steht die Sibylle neben
1 no
Salomo und der Sterndeuter neben dem Propheten." The
man who is able to grasp the full message of the stars 
becomes, like the prophets, the bearer of divine truth.
How can this sharp division between good and evil, 
between those on the side of "God" and of "Satan", be 
reconciled with Hofmannsthal's rejection of antithetical 
thinking and with his mystical belief in the unreality of 
dualities? Synthetic philosophy leads ultimately to 
relativism, yet this is something which Hofmannsthal firmly 
rejects and there is certainly nothing relativistic about 
Der Turm. He is able to accommodate the division by seeing 
it in terms of two spheres of reality, empirical and 
spiritual. The world of sense, as for the Platonists, is a 
shadow (in itself real or unreal, according to how you look 
at it). It becomes a barrier, instead of a means of 
revelation, to those who take it for the whole of reality 
and do not recognize its nature as a shadow - or a dream. 
They have become blind to the truth.
Good and evil have therefore become a question of
177. DIV, p.72 178. DIV, p.72
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different 'levels of existence: those of animal, man and 
spirit or, more directly, those of phenomenal and of 
ultimate spiritual reality. It is interesting to see how 
Jakob Laubach, discussing the conflict between good and 
evil as presented in La Vida es suen"o and Der Turm, auto­
matically changes his categories in turning his attention 
from Calderon to Hofmannsthal, and writes that "in der 
ersten Fassung hielt Hofmannsthal den Geist trotz innerster
Versuchung noch für stark genug, urn das Chaos zu über- 
179winden." Good and evil have become spirit and chaos.
The problem of good and evil in Hofmannsthal's works 
is discussed in the next chapter, but it must be considered 
here in so far as it relates to the mystical basis of Der 
Turm. The problem is that Hofmannsthal's mysticism con­
ceives the divine as immanent in the world, but that this 
view cannot accommodate a real vision of evil such as 
Olivier represents and such as Hofmannsthal saw in contemp­
orary society. It is no longer possible to speak in terms
i o n
of "Gott, der die Welt ist." "God" can only be saved by
divorcing him completely from the world - with the result
that he is effectively lost. This realisation is forced
upon Hofmannsthal in the second version. The doctor prays
181at the end, "Sine Wendung, alldurchdringender Gott.'" but 
nothing happens: God is no longer "alldurchdringend" and no 
longer active in the world, present at most in Sigismund 
and his few faithful friends. He depended on man, and man 
rejected him. The first version, however, seeks to escape 
the final consequences of this divorce through its
179. Hugo von Hofmannsthals Turm-Dichtungen, p.82
180. A, p.125 181. DIV, p.162
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exploration of Sigismund's relationship to the powers of 
"good" and "evil".
It is Julian himself, who has taught Sigismund to
divide the "Tiernatur, die auf die Erde starrt" and the
182"Gewftlb des Himmels," and who claims to have taught him 
the language which will make him a great magician, who then 
confesses in the conjuration scene, "Ich habe dich nicht 
die rechte Sprache gelehrt ... Die ich dich gelehrt habe,
reicht nur für die Anfânge ... Hier, wo ich wohne, ahne ich
erst die neue Sprache: die sagt -das Obere und Untere zu-
*] Q O
gleich." Sigismund replies that, "Sie kommt schon auf
181acht Füssen zu mir,"  ^but somehow it does not seem to 
arrive. It is not he who ushers in the new kingdom in 
which harmony between "das Obere" and "das Untere" is 
achieved, but the Children's King. Sigismund is only a 
"Zwischenkônig", unable to create on earth the new order 
of which he dreams, because he does not belong to the 
earth, a constellation outside the realm of time.
His acquaintance with the lower, "animal" level of 
existence is essentially one with evil forces, confirming 
the desire inculcated by Julian to reject everything in 
this sphere. The dark powers with which he becomes in­
volved in the conjuration scene are powers familiar to him 
from his early life: as he says, "Du kannst nichts aus 
deinem Schoss schütteln, schwarzer Engel, womit ich nicht 
auf du und du wâreJ"^^^ He embarks on his final conflict 
with these in language which is clearly the language of
182.DIV, p.92 185. DIV, p.206
183.DIV, p.186 186. DIV, p.182
184.DIV, p.186
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magic, the only way he can obtain the kind of certainty he 
wants: he must dominate them by his spiritual strength. He 
succeeds: but he is unable to go further, to the point 
where (in terms of Silberer's ideas) potential evil is 
transformed into a power for good and the way is open for a 
return to an enriched and integrated life. He has had no 
chance to learn to understand the part which such elements 
do have in his nature, and that of all men, and is there­
fore unable to establish the spirit which he affirms in an 
earthly kingdom, as the Children's King does. The desire 
for spiritual domination has become a barrier to the 
achievement of full humanity, and Sigismund is destroyed 
by the destructive forces which he conjures up. His world 
is essentially a world of conflict and he is equipped to 
cope' with this. - but not with peace.
It is true that he tells the gipsy, "Ich bin auch 
187mehr als einer:" he has limitless inner potentialities
which include powers of healing as well as of destruction.
When the latter have been overcome, the former can be
released, like the alcohol of which the doctor speaks, "im
Innern unserer Muskulatur auftretend im gleichen Augenblick
wo, vierundzwanzig Stunden nach dem Tod, Verwesung ihren
ersten Hauch tut. Aus dem Heillosen die Krâfte der
Heilung."^^^ But the healing is to be brought by the
189children, who describe themselves as "Heilkrâuter."
190"Das ist encheiresin naturae," the power of Nature to 
unite what is divided into a fruitful whole, and first 
Sigismund, and the sharp division into two realms for which
187. DIV, p.184 189. DIV, p.204
188. DIV, p.34f 190. DIV, p.35
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he stood, must die. He says of the Children's King, "Wer 
wohnt noch in mir, den ich nicht kenne?"^^^ - an inner 
potentiality, but one which he does not recognize until, 
for him personally, it is too late. He cannot realize it 
himself.
It is this which makes the ending of the first version 
ultimately unsatisfactory, in spite of its power. There is 
still the feeling that the Children's King, however much 
Sigismund's labours may have been necessary for the estab­
lishment of his kingdom, has simply arrived on the scene 
from outside, and this is surely inadmissible where there 
is no externally active Providence and all achievement 
depends on the ability of man to realize his spiritual 
potentialities. In terms of this play, it must depend on 
Sigismund, the representative of mankind in its suffering 
and glory.
It is, of course, theoretically quite possible that 
there should be other people, in another place, who have 
not lost touch with spiritual values and so are able to 
take over and continue Sigismund's work; but it is not 
dramatically possible. The Children's King appears from 
somewhere quite external to the action of the play, and so 
becomes himself a deus ex machina, dropped from another 
world.
Because of this, the solution he offers seems to be 
the product simply of a blind faith in the future. It is 
certainly irrational, and as such belongs to the realm of
191. DIV, p.205
-107-
"das Wortlose". The Children's King is not interested in 
what can be expressed in words: "Das was du nicht sagen 
kannst, das allein frage ich dich."^^^ His appearance 
communicates symbolically, but cannot be made sense of in 
any way that can be given rational verbal formulation. But 
how can a human society be founded on the ineffable alone?
- after all, "mit Reden kommen die Leut zusammen.
Sigismund himself places the highest value on speech
as communication: "Sitel ist allés ausser der Rede zwischen
194Geist und Geist." • This communication breaks down,
however, when he is faced with "das Unterste nach oben 
195gebracht:" Sigismund's and Julian's language cannot cope
with this situation. "Was zu sagen der Mühe wert wâre,
196dazu ist die Zunge zu dick." Julian sees that his hopes
197have been based on "das unrechte Wort", and despairs.
Sigismund, having risen above his teacher, still finds in
his beliefs a source of inner strength, but Julian does not
respond to "das Wort des Trostes in der Ode dieses Lebens"
198which he offers: it has become incommunicable.
Sigismund later succeeds in learning "die Sprache der 
Welt,"^^^ but the unified language, which is to express 
"das Obere und Untere zugleich", has not been created, and 
nor has it at the end of the play: we are left only with
the symbolic actions of the children. In the second 
version this is recognized, and the division between the 
two orders remains complete.
192. DIV, p.206 196. DIV, p.158
193. DIV, p.24 197. DIV, p.158
194. DIV, p.138 198. DIV, p.158
195. DIV, p.159 199. DIV, p.174
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Clemens Heselhaus, in his article on Calderon and 
Hofmannsthal, contrasts contemporary society with the 
"theologisch vollstândig durchinterpretierten Welt" of the 
Barock period.  ^ His particular reference here is to Das 
Salzburger Grosse Welttheater. but the process he is des­
cribing, that of drawing on past expressions of faith to 
restore a sense of meaning to the modern "de-theologised" 
world, is clearly also to be seen in Der Turm, particularly 
in the use of biblical allusions and even in the use of 
such traditional concepts as God and Satan. But what was 
once meant literally is now used symbolically, for its 
"valuative connotations", and is not anchored to any 
account of reality by which the world can, in spiritual 
terms, be "durchinterpretiert". The complete, systematic 
interpretation has been left to the materialists, with 
nothing comparable to set against it or complement it.
Modern thought divides the world into the mechanistic, 
empirical sphere (for some the sum total of reality, for 
others ultimately unreal) and the sphere of meaning, or 
spiritual and moral values: the bridge between the two has 
been lost. The consequences of this for Der Turm are per­
fectly summed up by R.T. Llewellyn, who takes as his 
starting point Hofmannsthal's note, "Das was in der Epoche
seit Kant an verândertem Weltgefühl lebt irgendwie gespie-
201
gelt im Sigismund:"
Sigismund seems to act according to Kant'& claim that 
words like God and soul are not objects of knowledge 
in the ordinary sense because they cover no distinct­
ive sense-content, but that we nevertheless possess a 
notion of God within us and we can therefore act
200. Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen, 191, p.21
201. A, p.233
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according to this "Ideal der reinen Vernunft" which 
forms the centre of our moral life. Thus in Der Turm 
Hofmannsthal presents (in part in the first version 
and totally in the second version) the situation of 
the believer in the Kantian world, the situation of 
the individual who acts in accordance with certain 
spiritual realities which he can hardly formulate in 
words. The second version could be described as a 
post-Kantian martyr-drama, as one enacted before an 
audience of unpredictable response by a martyr who is 
reluctant or unable to enlarge on the nature of his 
belief. And such a drama must inevitably promote a 
certain^proportion of incomprehension and bewilder­
ment.
Hofmannsthal is therefore operating within a framework of 
thought in which the gap between the spheres of science and 
belief cannot be bridged except by a mysticism dependent on 
a Kierkegaardian leap of faith. At the end of the second 
version there is nothing left to be said: only the exemp­
lary figure of Sigismund bears witness to spiritual values, 
isolated in the desert of materialism. Writing to 
Burckhardt, Hofmannsthal himself explains that the figures 
in the play express something which cannot be grasped by 
reason or expressed in any other, more direct way:
Es handelt sich in diesem Stück immer darum, dass ein 
Vorderes, Greifbares da sei ... und zugleich, dass 
hinter dieser sich ein Hbheres, Geistiges, Allgemeines, 
schwer Sagbares, gleichermassen von Schritt zu Schritt 
enthülle und beglaubige - auch dieses gestaltgt„ nicht 
rational wahrnehmbar, aber mit der Phantasie.
The symbolic figure may communicate the vision of 
reality for which he stands, or may arouse only "incompre­
hension and bewilderment". This, like the response to the 
message of the stars, will depend on the individual. There 
is justification both for a positive response, to the human 
values which the play affirms, and a negative response, 
since Hofmannsthal ultimately fails to find an answer to
202. "Hofmannsthal's Nihilism", MLR 61, 1966, p.258
203. Burckhardt BW, p.140
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the mechanistic threat, as is reflected in his continuing 
need to revise the play.
-Ill-
III. The Question of Moral Values
1. The search for permanence
Chapter II has shown how some difficulties connected
with Hofmannsthal's mystical world-view which emerge in the
two versions of Der Turm are in part the consequence of the
contemporary climate of thought in which everything had
become relativised. Hermann Broch has described the
situation in his Hofmannsthal und seine Zeit;
Im neunzehnten Jahrhundert hat das Dahinschwinden der 
alten europâischen Glaubenshaltungen begonnen, und mit 
dem Zusammenbruch dieses Zentralwertes hat die Auf- 
splitterung des umfassenden religiôsen Mertsystems in 
autonome Einzelsysteme (von denen eines das I'art pour 
I'art ist) eingesetzt; mit anderen Worten, es begann 
die AuflGsung der Allgemeingültigkeit der bis dahin in 
Kraft gestandenen ethischen Haltungen.
The process affected not only religious and philosophical
attitudes, but also the sphere of ethics, creating what
2
Broch calls a "Wert-Vakuum". The assortment of ideas with 
which people tried to fill the vacuum lacked coherence and 
solid foundation.
Within this context of ethical eclecticism and relat­
ivism, there is no doubt that Hofmannsthal attached great 
importance to moral questions. In 1894, when he was 
generally considered to be an aesthete, remote from the 
world of ordinary life, Hermann Bahr claimed that among his 
contemporaries he was "der Einzige, der immer von morali- 
schen Fragen handelt. Er sucht die Stellung des Menschen 
zur Welt, sucht Sinn und Bedeutung der Dinge, sucht Gewiss- 
heit für den Gang des Lebens. Er will Erweckung und
1. p.48 2. p.59
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3Erbauung." This is confirmed by Hofmannsthal's own early 
note, "Die Grundlage des Asthetischen ist Sittlichkeit,"  ^
and many critics have discussed the moral concern expressed 
in his early writings. At this stage, however, he is 
still very much raising questions, seeking, as emerges 
strongly from Bahr's description, and showing how not to 
live rather than offering something positive. These works 
are therefore of limited relevance to my theme. In his 
later writings the underlying concern with ethical quest­
ions becomes obvious and possible answers are offered and 
explored, but this continuing preoccupation is never a 
matter of wanting to lay down some kind of moral law;-he is 
concerned rather, as Bahr says, with the understanding of 
man in relationship to the world and to his fellows, and 
with finding a secure basis for this relationship. And 
such considerations do enter the moral sphere, because they 
belong to the sphere of values, which alone can give 
meaning to life and human relationships.
The most powerful challenge to the meaningfulness of 
human life is the fact of death, and Hofmannsthal's aware­
ness of this challenge is shown by the way the problems of 
death, change and transiency constantly recur in his works. 
To counterbalance most effectively the universal negation
3. Studien zur Kritik der Moderne, p.87
4. A, p.101
5. e.g.: Richard Alewyn in "Der Tod des Astheten" (included 
in Uber Hufo von Hofmannsthal) points to the moral 
element in Der Tor und der Tod, in contrast to other con­
temporary works: W.H. Rey in "Die Drohung der Zeit in 
Hofmannsthals Frühwerk" shows how the answer to this 
threat is to be found in the ethical: Andrew 0. Jaszi in 
"Die Idee des Lebens in Hofmannsthals Jugendwerk 1890- 
1900" traces the emergence of Hofmannsthal's awareness 
of the centrality of the ethical and its relation to the 
will and to action.
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of death, a system of values must be able to claim a 
universal and lasting validity, such that it will not 
become meaningless after the death of the individual or 
the decline of the culture which affirmed it. This need 
for moral values as a counterbalance to death emerges 
clearly from the many works of Hofmannsthal's in which 
death itself, "die eigentliche Lebensprobe",  ^acts as the 
awakener, making the characters aware of their need for 
something in their own lives to set against it. Obvious 
examples of this are Der Tor und der Tod, Jedermann, and 
Das Salzburger Grosse Welttheater, though a similar effect 
can also be achieved through the death of someone else, 
even of an animal.
Der Tor und der Tod, being entirely devoted to present­
ing this confrontation with death, should give a clear 
picture of the kind of awakening involved. Faced with the 
reality of death, Claudio for the first time becomes aware 
of the sphere of moral values as something with relevance 
to him: he wants his future life to be such, "dass Gut und 
Bttse über mich Gewalt/Soll haben."^ It is not that his 
life up till then could not be judged in such terms: Death 
himself passes judgement, calling Claudio "Du schlimmer
g
Tor." But Claudio himself was unaware of what was lacking 
in his life, which he now sees has been "ohne Kraft und
Q
Wert." His recognition of "Treue" as "der Halt von allem 
Leben"^^ shows his awareness of the need for something 
lasting. The values which he now learns to affirm -
6. PIV, p.311 9. KHA III, p.78
7. KHA III, p.73 10. KHA III, p.73
8. KHA III, p.73
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faithfulness, selflessness, love - are universal, and Death
himself contradicts any idea that Claudio had not till
then, in his state of isolation and remoteness from life,
had the opportunity to recognize them:
Was alien, ward auch dir gegeben,
Ein Erdenleben, irdisch es zu leben.
Im Innern quillt euch alien treu ein Geist,
Der diesem Chaos toter Sachen
Beziehung einzuhauchen heisst .... .
Weh dir, wenn ich dir das erst sagen mussJ
The permanence of these values emerges even from a
work such as Das Bergwerk zu Falun, belonging to a trans­
itional period and ending in a way which does not make 
clear whether the timeless world of the mountain queen or 
that of Dahljë's family is ultimately to be affirmed. The 
words of the father to his son offer something to set
against the transience of ordinary human life:
Es schwindet allés, ailes gleitet hin.
Dein Leib bleibt dir nicht treu, kaum bist dus noch, 
Doch dass du deine Lippe hast befleckt,
Das bleibt, und wâr die Lippe weggeschwunden.
Such values are something fundamental to human exist­
ence. It was these which must be sought, according to 
Hofmannsthal's "Aufzeichnungen zu Reden in Skandinavien", 
by those facing death and destruction in the form of war in 
1916, a time "in welcher so angstvoll diese Frage gestellt
werden musste nach dem Letzten, das bleibt, nach dem Blutig-
13Ernsten, nach dem sittlichen Fundament der Wirklichkeit." 
This question is also described as a demand for "der Bahn, 
dem Gesetz, dem Bleibenden" and for "dem Sein gegenüber dem 
W e r d e n . T h e  implication is that it is the moral element
11. KHA III, p.72 13. Pin, p.356
12. GLD, p.373 14. PHI, p.356
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in which something can be found which has lasting validity 
and is in fact the basis of all reality.
2. Traditional morality and Life
What, for Hofmannsthal, is the nature of these lasting 
values? On the surface they seem to correspond to tradi­
tional concepts of good and evil; this is true of those 
which we have seen to be advocated in Der Tor und der Tod, 
and these same qualities are affirmed throughout all the 
diversity of Hofmannsthal's work, whether in Jedermann, Der 
Turm, or on a lighter level in the comedies. Yet there are 
enormous differences between these works: can they in fact 
be fitted in to one system of values? The standards by 
which his characters are judged in the early works, in­
cluding Der Tor und der Tod, are often unclear: death seems 
a very harsh judgement on Claudio by normal standards, and 
in any case it is suddenly transformed at the end into an 
experience of mystical exaltation. Jedermann and Das 
Salzburger Crosse Welttheater are presented in a Christian 
framework, whereas Der Turm calls for new values and a new
order that is not concerned about the old church tower that
15may come to grief during its creation.
There is no doubt that Hofmannsthal does uphold these 
traditional values, but to find out what, for him, is of 
ultimate, absolute value a closer examination is necessary. 
I shall start by considering a work from a period of 
Hofmannsthal's life when he was conspicuously concerned 
with ethical matters, and in which the values affirmed are
15. DIV, p.197
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both of a traditional nature and such as recur throughout 
his work: the story Die Frau ohne Schatten, with its 
emphasis on love and self-sacrifice, marriage and the 
family.
The Empress in the story is seeking to attain full 
humanity. To achieve this she must learn self-sacrificing" 
love, which involves the full recognition of the other, its 
object, as a person and in his or her individual nature. 
This is a necessary condition of entering into a true 
relationship, and is something that all the characters need 
to learn. Both husbands are faced with the accusation that 
they have "den Knoten ihres ^their wife'^  Herzen nicht 
gelOst:"^^ for Barak and his wife we see that this is 
finally achieved in the moment in which they are able to 
recognize each other fully and commit themselves to each 
other, releasing the wife from her self-centredness and 
Barak from an attitude which saw her only as a means to an 
end, the establishment of a family.
For the Emperor the barrier to a true relationship is
the possessiveness of his love for the Empress, whom he
17sees as "die Beute aller Beuten," not as a person, and he 
shows the same attitude in his desire to possess the unborn 
children. They tell him that what is needed between them
18is not this kind of love but "die vollkommene Ehrfurcht."
The decisive moment of the story is expressed in the
19Empress's words, "Dir, Barak, bin ich mich schuldig," 
declaring a sense of moral obligation resulting from an
16. KHA XXVIII, pp.156 and 171 18. KHA XXVIII, p.152
17. Dili, p.155 19. KHA XXVIII, p.191
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inner response to his character, as it has been revealed in 
his dealings with his wife. This new awareness involves 
the recognition both of an ethical demand and of a relation­
ship, the mutual involvement inescapable in human existence 
The Empress admits, "Wir sind Diebe und Mttrder an ihnen
geworden und allés Blut aus unseren Adern ist zu wenig, um
2 Dgutzumachen, was wir an ihnen getan haben." It is in the
light of this discovery of human relationships and of the
reality of ethical obligation that the Empress must finally
make her choice whether to accept the shadow that has been
obtained by "theft and murder" or apparently to sacrifice
her beloved husband. She must take a conscious ethical
decision, which, we have been told, will be "unwiderruf-
lich", unlike the dyer's wife's passionate outbursts
21against her husband and children.
At least, that is what we expect. But at the actual
moment of decision we find the Empress torn between the two
alternatives, not knowing what to do. Then "aus ihrer
eigenen diamantenen Tiefe stiegen Worte in ihr auf, deut-
lich, so als würden sie gesungen in grosser Feme; sie
22hatte sie nur nachzusprechen:" the vital words which
acknowledge her debt to Barak. There is no conscious 
choice between right and wrong: the answer comes from some 
unconscious inner principle.
The key to this scene is to be found in the conversa­
tion between the fisherman and his wife, whose words, 
though directly referring to Barak's wife,- are equally
20. KHA XXVIII, p.179 22. KHA XXVIII, p.191
21. KHA XXVIII, p.186
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applicable to the Empress, who enters the cave expecting 
judgement and is confronted instead with the golden Water 
of Life. The wife asks, "Wer wird zu Gericht sitzen über 
dieser da?" and the reply is, "Das Wasser des Lebens."
"*Ja, kann es denn sprechen und ein Urteil verkünden?'
'Nein, aber es verwandelt und das ist mehrl'"^^ The 
characters and their actions are to be judged not by any 
moral code but by life itself, and the important thing is 
not that a judgement of right or wrong should be expressed 
but that the renewing, transforming process which 
Hofmannsthal calls ."Verwandlung" should take place.
The significance of the family is also to be seen in 
this light, as an expression of this continuing, renewing 
process of life. The ultimate purpose of all these events 
is after all that the Empress should become a mother, which, 
even if it is not to be interpreted quite literally, 
clearly has symbolic value. It is true that a desire for 
the continuity of life through the human family is not 
enough in itself: Barak's wish for children is not enough 
to fit him for fatherhood. But this is because life works 
through relationships, through the relationship of full 
commitment to and union with another which is possible only 
on the basis of full recognition. Nothing can be achieved 
in selfish isolation, nor can the advantage of some be won 
at the expense of others.
This scheme of interrelation in fact .goes far beyond 
the context of the two human families presented here. The 
wider context is depicted in the marvellous carpet woven by
23. KHA XXVIII, p.182
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one of the Emperor's children, in whose pattern "die
Sicheln des Mondes, die Gestirne, die Ranken und Blumen,
die Menschen und Tiere ineinander übergingen" and in which
at the end the thread had to be "zurückgeschlungen ... in
2 /
den Faden des Anfangs." The girl explains that when 
weaving, "ich sehe nicht, was ist, und nicht, was nicht
25 ■
ist, sondern was immer ist, und danach webe ich." It is 
this pattern, then, or rather the continuing, interrelating 
and renewing process of life which is expressed in it, 
which has permanence.
It has been made clear that this has a close connec­
tion with the realisation of love and selflessness in human 
relationships, but these are not in themselves of ultimate 
value. They have a part to play in a greater purpose, 
summed up at the end of the story when the unborn children 
sing their song of reassurance and the curse on the 
Empress's talisman is transformed into "Zeichen und Verse,
die das ewige Geheimnis der Verkettung allés Irdischen
.26priesen."
It would seem, then, that life itself is the ultimate 
value by which Hofmannsthal's whole system of values is 
determined, and this is borne out by a consideration of 
other works. If we return to Der Tor und der Tod, we find 
that Death does not reproach Claudio with his self­
centredness, but says that he should have learnt "Beziehung 
einzuhauchen" and that,
ich will dich lehren,
Das Leben, eh du's endest, einmal ehren.
24. KHA XXVIII, p.146
25. KHA XXVIII, p.147
26. KHA XXVIII, p.196
27. KHA III, p.73
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Claudio’s lack of concern for others is ultimately a sin 
against life. And although it is too late for Claudio to 
put things right by a new commitment to human relation­
ships, he is apparently able to find the new life he longs 
for by surrendering himself to death itself and attaining 
instead a kind of mystical participation.
A work which again ends on a mystical note in a sphere
far removed from ordinary human existence, but which is
much closer in date and theme to Die Frau ohne Schatten, is
Ariadne auf Naxos. The central concern of the opera is the
mystery of "Verwandlung", and Hofmannsthal attempts to
clarify the nature of this in the "Ariadne-Brief". The
transformation by which Ariadne is released from "Erstarren 
28und Tod" into a new life is indeed the work of love, but
love is important precisely because it has this releasing
power. And the "Verwandlung" achieved by this means "ist
Leben des Lebens, ist das eigentliche Mysterium der schbp- 
29fenden Natur." Again, a high value is put on love 
because of its role in the service of life.
Hofmannsthal was well aware of the way traditional
values have become problematic in the modern age, and
observed, "So ist auch in dem System von Wertsetzungen,
das den modernen Menschen ausmacht, ein neuer Wert - das
30Leben selbst - aufgetaucht." This does indeed seem to
be the basis for "Wertsetzung" in his own works. As 
Patricia Howe has commented, "There emerges from the works 
a concept of guilt as sin against life, as clinging to
28. PHI, p.138 30. A, p.204
29. PHI, p.138
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what is dead or never had life, and a concept of salvation,
whose means of redemption are living people, living
31relationships, a living purpose."
It seems surprising that a concept such as "life", 
which in itself is highly ambivalent, should be taken as a 
basis for moral values. Life is what Hofmannsthal’s early 
heroes, who find themselves standing outside it in isola­
tion, are seeking, but though they have to find the way
into life, "Verknüpfung mit dem Leben" is inevitably
32associated with "Verschuldung". Life can also be seen as
the motive force in the Greek plays, Odious with its theme
of murder and incest, and Elektra with its emphasis on
blood and vengeance. Yet Elektra is itself linked by
Hofmannsthal, in the "Reden in Skandinavien", with the
search for permanent values, the "Suchen eines Gesetzes
Oder einer Bahn über dem Persttnlichen", and he claims that
"in Elektra ist das Gesetz, das primitivste, strengste,
schon da: der Inhalt ist Hingabe an das Gesetz mit bewuss-
3 3ter Aufopferung der Person." The use of the word 
"primitive" shows that he is aware that his present under­
standing of "Gesetz" is something very different, but 
Elektra’s thirst for vengeance is clearly intended to be 
understood not in terms of dark, frustrated passions, but 
as a defence of an order essentially moral in nature, which 
has been threatened by the unpunished crime of Klytâmnestra 
and Aegisth.
The ambivalence remains, however, and is increased by
31. The theme of death in the works of Hugo von Hofmannsthal, 
p.84
32. A, pp.214 and 220 33. PHI, p.355
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the all-embracing nature of the concept "life". Partici­
pation in the processes of life, acceptance of one's fate 
within that process, must involve the incurring of guilt. 
Two notes from Hofmannsthal's "Ad me ipsum" convey how 
inevitably the two are linked, suggesting that entering 
into life is equivalent to entering into guilt: he refers 
to both the "Ambivalenter Zustand zwischen Prae-existenz
3 /
und Verschuldung" and "der ambivalente Zustand zwischen
3 5Prae-existenz und L e b e n . T h i s  need not be the spectac­
ular guilt of an Odipus: even the pure and spiritual 
Sigismund cannot avoid it when in the first version of Der 
Turm he agrees to leave the security of his isolated tower 
and involve himself in the active service of others.
3. The symbolism of the devil figure
So if life is to be the absolute positive value, the 
negative value which opposes it cannot be moral evil as 
normally conceived, even where this is obviously condemned. 
Evil must presumably be that which obstructs the process of 
life or refuses participation. At the same time it is not 
clear how this all-embracing concept can be related to the 
duality of good and evil implied in any system of moral 
values.
It is often hard to find any such sharp division 
between good and evil in Hofmannsthal's works, but there is 
one work where it is clearly present, as we have seen: Der 
Turm. Here we find two opposing worlds, the positive, 
spiritual one of Sigismund and the negative, materialistic
34. A, p.215 35. A, p.216
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one of Olivier, and the contrast between them is expressed 
with the aid of religious terminology traditionally associ­
ated with good and evil, Olivier in particular being 
described as "Satan".
Der Turm is not, however, the only work of
Hofmannsthal's in which a devil figure makes his appearance,
and an examination of such figures and what they stand for
is helpful in trying to define more adequately
Hofmannsthal's concept of evil. In J edermann we find a
Devil who appeals to "Recht und Gerechtigkeit", to a
legal right to Jedermann's soul based on the facts of his
life: he has been a "Schwelger" and "Verführer", "unglâu-
37
big", and an "Unterdrücker". But Faith tells the Devil:
Vor dem Gericht, vor das er tritt,
Bestehen deine Rechte nit.
Die sind auf Schein und Trug gestellt,
Auf Hie und Nun und diese Welt,
Die ist gefangen in der Zeit gg
Und bleibt in solchen Schranken stocken.
The Devil is trapped within the bounds of "this world",
that is, the material, temporal sphere, and is unable to
understand that which transcends it - including the miracle
of rebirth and renewal, that in Christ even Jedermann can
39become "in einem Augenzwinkern neu." This renewing power 
is what is set against the rigid legal system which is not 
only the Devil's but also the normal earthly concept of 
justice, to which Jedermann himself appeals when he answers 
the debtor's plea for mercy by reference to "Vertrâg und 
Rechte".Jedermann is quite within his rights, yet one
36. Dili, p.89 39. Dili, p.89
37. Dili, p.88f 40. Dili, p.21
38. Dili, p.90
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feels that he is in the wrong, that the situation should 
be met not by the rigid application of law but by the 
redeeming power of love, such as ultimately, in Christ's 
"Opfertod”, overcomes the Devil's case.
This idea is further developed in the figure of the
Adversary in Das Salzburger Grosse Welttheater. Again, his
first concern is with rights: his first action is to defend
/ 2
World when she is reproved by the prophet, he protests
against the unjust way the roles in the play are distri- 
Z.3
buted, he appeals for "natürliche Gleichheit des Schick-
sals",^^ and tells the Beggar to claim that "Watur gibt mir
und euch das gleiche Recht."^^ -He is also a doctor of
logic^^ and asks philosophical questions about freedom and
LIpredestination.^ His outlook is essentially rational­
istic.
Like the Devil in the earlier play, he is bound by the
logic and understanding of this world: he cannot understand
the potentialities of the Beggar's role, or his conversion,
which he tries to explain away by physical causes - but at
the same time throwing his books away in disgust. Again,
as in Jedermann, his outlook is reflected in the initial
attitude of the central human figure: the Beggar himself
/ 8
says, "Hier sohrei ich um mein Reoht!" But at the end 
the Beggar has a new concept of what is right, along with 
a new concept of freedom, as something not to be grasped at 
and "irdisch nicht ,zu benennen."^^
4.1. Dili, p.89 4.6. KHA X, p.12
42. KHA X, p.12 47. KHA X, p.13
43. KHA X, p.20 48. KHA X, p.33
44. KHA X, p.19 49. KHA X, p.51
45. KHA X, p.34
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How far is this picture of the Devil to be found in 
Olivier, ”der rote Satan"? There is the same emphasis on 
rights and on cold facts, and the same inability to see 
beyond the surface appearance of life, "weil deine Augen 
vermauert sind mit dem was nicht ist."^^ Like his two 
predecessors, he lives in an enclosed material world. His 
violence and brutality are something new: but this aspect 
is foreshadowed in Das Salzburger Grosse Welttheater in the 
Adversary’s attempts to spur the Beggar on to his act of 
destruction. Now this destructiveness is no longer hidden 
behind a veil of hypocrisy.
There are two aspects in which Olivier is contrasted 
with Sigismund: his violence and his commitment to the 
material sphere. In respect of both he is a barrier to the 
working out of life’s purpose, by actual force, and by 
shutting out the dimension of reality through which the 
world participates in a higher order. Throughout, the 
Devil figure stands for the principle of opposition to 
life: that which ties down to rigid, static systems, and 
which sees only a superficial reality and so is unable to 
grasp the true meaning of life.
But there is also a development in Hofmannsthal’s 
treatment of the figure: he shows an increasing awareness 
of social evil, and the whole concept becomes increasingly 
problematic. The Devil in Jedermann is a figure of fun.
In Das Salzburger Grosse Welttheater he disappears at the 
end, for he has no further role to play once the action has 
left the earthly sphere, but a question has been left
50. DIV, p.445
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unanswered. The injustice inherent in the social structure, 
remains untouched, as the Adversary points out to the 
Beggar;
Und Unrecht, wie’s nur eh und je sich sonnte.
In frechem Licht schlâgt wiederum sein Rad, c-,
Und du im Walde wandelst TrâumerpfadI ^
In the recognition that the more important revolution is
that which happens within, the problem has been shelved,
but in Per Turm the evil of society can no longer be put on
one side in this way. Instead of a Devil who can disappear
from the scene when his role is finished and who can be
seen as simply part of the religious apparatus, evil is now
embodied in a human figure. And there is no heaven in
which even the Rich Man can be accommodated: Olivier must
be overcome before the new kingdom of fulfilment and
harmony can be established, and he is not to be got rid of
so easily. Indeed in the second version he cannot be got
rid of at all. Evil has become more powerful and more
problematic, but in its nature it remains that which
opposes life by obstructing its purposes and obscuring its
meaning.
4. The inner law
In the "Reden in Skandinavien", in which Hofmannsthal 
is very much concerned with the question of moral order, we 
find again this concept of an evil which is seen in terms 
of a materialistic and animal nature, bound to this world 
and its laws, and which must be overcome. Hofmannsthal 
calls for "eine ITberwindung des Kausalreiches" and of "das
51. KHA X, p.49
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materiegefesselte tierische niedere, noch schlummernde Ich, 
das noch in der Natur steckt und das einzige Erlebnis der 
Materialisten ist. Aber wo das Ich Persënlichkeit wird, 
wird es selbst Gesetz und unterliegt nicht mehr dem 
Schrecken des Seins und der mechanischen Unfreiheit."
This victory involves "Gesetz", yet we have seen that
the idea of a fixed system of laws is something that
belongs to Satan’s "Weltanschauung" and is firmly rejected
by Hofmannsthal. These "Aufzeichnungen" are largely
devoted to showing how the call to seek after "dem Gesetz, 
53dem Bleibenden" can be reconciled with this rejection of 
all rigid systems. Hofmannsthal explains that "Gesetz- 
lichkeit, j a Heiligkeit sind keine absoluten, von einem 
überweltlichen Gott ein für allemal aufgestellten Eor- 
derungen an das übernatürliche Ich, sondern es sind die 
Formen, in denen der Mensch seine eigene naturgegebene Idee 
auswirken muss: ihre Verletzung ist nicht Sünde im christ- 
lichen Sinn und zieht nicht Strafe nach sich, sondern ist 
selbst schon Strafe, Verhângnis, L e i d e n . T h e  law is not 
lasting because it has been set up for all time by a power 
outside the world of change, but because it is the natural 
law of human development.
Understanding of such an inner law can never be based
on an abstract definition, but can only come out of living
experience. In "Ad me ipsum" Hofmannsthal explains the
55passage from Der Tor und der Tod quoted above: "eine
solche Stelle wie: ’Ich fUg mich so, dass Gut und Bbse über
52. PIII, p.365 54. PHI, p.364
53. PIII, p.356 55. p.114
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mich Gewalt ...* heisst: Gut und BSse hat keine Gewalt; ich 
glaube sie nicht, weil ich sie nicht vom vitalen Urgrund 
des Erlebnisses her empfangen habe."^^ Good and evil are 
themselves meaningless apart from involvement in life. Yet 
the implication is also that all such involvement is in 
itself good, as the only way to life and growth.
In his essay on D ’Annunzio, Hofmannsthal writes, "Ins
Leben kommt ein Mensch dadurch, dass er etwas tut," and
57such action is "das einzige Gute," in spite of the fact
that by entering into life D ’Annunzio can now become
"schuldig und unschuldig." If action is intrinsically
good even though it involves guilt, a redefinition of guilt
seems to be called for, as the refusal to act and take the
risk of stepping out into the sphere of life. There is
59indeed a risk involved, for "Tun ist sich aufgeben;" the 
self has emerged from its protective shell and become 
vulnerable. But action is also one aspect of "der Weg zum 
Sozialen als Weg zum hbheren S e l b s t . T h r o u g h  inter­
action with the world, the self reaches this higher level 
by developing its inner potential to the full: "Der Mensch 
wird in der Welt nur das gewahr, was schon in ihm liegt; 
aber er braucht die Welt, um gewahr zu werden, was in ihm 
liegt; dazu aber sind Tâtigkeit und Leiden nOtig."^^
The law that is to be sought is therefore that of
J
self-fulfilment, attained through involvement in life 
regardless of the apparent guilt incurred. Each individual
56. A, p.24-1 59. A, p. 217
57. PI, p.274 60. A, p.217
58. PI, p.273 61. A, p.9
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must find "das Schicksalsgesetz seiner persënlichen Sen- 
dung." There is in fact "ein einziges Hauptziel" for 
both individuals and the nation: "zu uns selber zu kom- 
men."  ^ Such a desire for self-fulfilment is not, of 
course, to be equated with selfishness: Hofmannsthal points 
out the difference between "lebe dir selbst" and "lebe dich 
s e l b s t , t h a t  is, with one’s true capabilities developed 
to their highest potential. In "Ad me ipsum" he equates 
"das Zu-sich-selber-kommen" with the attainment of "der
65hëheren Existenz." Furthermore, there is another side to 
the coin, for self-fulfilment is to be found in submission 
to the law, in fact in ultimate identification with it.
The aim is "schliesslich Hineinnehmen des Individuums ins 
Gesetz, des Gesetzes ins Individuum, ohne Bezug auf die 
anderen, die Gesellschaft, ohne contrat social, sich eines 
wissen mit Gottes Gesetz.
This oneness with the law is essentially an individual 
thing, involving the recognition "dass die Gesetze selbst 
bis zu einem vorher nicht gekannten Grad individuell sind," 
and that they are not arbitrary impositions because they 
are the laws of our natural growth, "teilhaft jeder zartes- 
ten Bewegung der Seele und des Leibes, vom Zufall nicht 
durch Starre und von der Willkür nicht durch Enge unter- 
schieden, sondern durch ihre Deutbarkeit aus einer gemein- 
samen Mitte."^^ This is clearly not the usual concept of 
law: there are no universal criteria of judgement, no
62. PIII, p.365 65. A, p.216
63. PIV, p.150 66. PIII, p.358
64. PIII, p.351 67. PIII, p.362f
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standards which are prescribed for everyone. The question 
of how one is to find one’s own law of self-fulfilment 
therefore remains open.
It has become clear that, in spite of the importance of 
love and human relationships in Hofmannsthal’s scheme of 
values, consideration of these does not provide the ulti­
mate criterion of behaviour. The importance of love lies 
in the role it plays in the inner development of the indiv­
idual; ’Wenn Liebe einen ’Zweck’ hat, transzendent 
gesprochen, so müsste es der sein, dass in ihrer Glut der 
bestândig in innerste Teile auseinanderfallende Mensch zu 
einer Einheit zusammengeschmolzen wird.’’^ ^ We also know 
that the law is to be fulfilled, as quoted above, ’ohne 
Bezug auf die anderen.’ The suggestion is almost that of a 
world of windowless monads, existing in a pre-established 
harmony which does not depend on them (even though their 
co-operation is voluntary) but on some undefined central, 
uniting principle, corresponding to what I have elsewhere 
called ’life’.
In spite of all Hofmannsthal’s emphasis on ’die Tat’, 
it is clear that the final criterion is some kind of inner 
identity with this principle rather than the measuring up 
of one’s actions to any normal ethical standard. In the 
Buch der Freunde Hofmannsthal writes, ’Nicht der Tâter wird
 ^ 69
unrein durch die Tat; nur die Tat durch den Tâter’ and, 
’’Wer âlter wird, erkennt, dass man bestânding schuldig 
bleibt, durch alle Lebensverhâltnisse und Verkettungen hin;
68. A, p.48 69. A, p.13
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doch wohnt auch in jedem Menschen seine Art von Unschuld."^^ 
In terms of "das Schicksalsgesetz seiner persënlichen 
Sendung", therefore, a man can maintain an inner innocence 
in spite of all apparent guilt, and it is this personal 
mission which it is his duty to fulfil.
The importance of inner attitude rather than outward 
deeds is confirmed by, for example, the end of J edermann.
The primary emphasis throughout the play has been on the 
ethical demands which Jedermann has failed to meet, but the 
question of his ultimate salvation or damnation is decided 
not on the basis of his works, on the evidence of which his 
condemnation would be inevitable, but by an inner trans­
formation, expressed in the voice of Faith speaking "aus
71der Tiefe seines Herzens." Again, in Die Frau ohne. 
Schatten the central concern is not with "Gericht" but with 
"Verwandlung" and the decisive factor is the words that 
arise from the "diamantenen Tiefe" of the Empress’s heart. 
From a strictly legal point of view, the Empress has indeed 
already won a shadow, that of the dyer’s wife, but the 
outcome depends not on legal rights but on the inner atti­
tude of both parties involved. What is so important about
this kind of transformation is, as the fisherman explains,
72that "das goldene Wasser verwandelt das Unsichtbare."
The Empress’s action, like the Beggar's in Das Salzburger 
Grosse Welttheater, is visible only in its consequences.
This stress on .inwardness is found above all in Der 
Turm. It is true that the Doctor says, "Es steht
70. A, p.l3f 72. KHA XXVIII, p.182
71. PIII, p.131
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geschrieben; an ihren Werken werdet ihr sie erkennen. Denn
das Werk ist die Frucht die wir bringen,"^^ but the value
of works, as in the biblical passage to which he is 
74referring, is that .they enable the recognition of the
inner governing principle which has produced them, like the
fruit of a tree which is produced as a natural result of
the kind of tree that it is. The mystical insight that is
granted to Sigismund after he has taken the sleeping
draught is that, "Es glaubt der Mensch, er tue übel an
seinesgleichen oder gut: aber wer berührt das Innere? Das
75ist unberührbar." External events do not affect that
which is essential, a belief which Sigismund continually
affirms in later conversations with Julian and Olivier.
And in spite of the great contrast between Sigismund and
Olivier, Sigismund tells him that there is no essential
difference between them, but rather a distinction of inner
76insight and attitude.
5. Evil as misunderstanding
Sigismund describes this decisive factor as "Wissen", 
and throughout Der Turm evil is explained as resulting from 
an ignorance of the true nature of things. Basilius,
Julian and Olivier are all told at different times that
they are unable to see the truth because their vision is
)
obscured by the world of appearances. Like "das materie- 
gefesselte tierische niedere, noch schlummernde Ich" of the 
"Reden in Skandinavien", their eyes need to be opened.
73. DIV, p.48 76. DIV, p.154 (See p.98
74. Matthew Ch.7, v.16-20 above;
75. DIV, p.98
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They are the victims of illusion, deception; even if it is 
self-deception.
This association of evil with illusion, with blindness
to the reality which transcends the empirical world, has
already been shown to be a feature not only of Der Turm but
also of J edermann and Das Salzburger Grosse Welttheater,
and in fact recurs throughout Hofmannsthal’s works. In the
early lyrical drama Der Kaiser und die Hexe we find another
devil figure: not the devil himself, but the ’’Teufels- 
77buhle’, the witch, who also tempts by means of a world of
deception. As the Emperor tries to escape her clutches, he
finds that his life has become a web of lies in which the
78’Klang der Wahrheit’’ is nowhere to be found. At this 
period in Hofmannsthal’s life the illusion is of a differ­
ent sort: the Emperor’s failing consists in ’ein Verwischen
79der Grenze zwischen Phantasie und Wirklichkeit also Lüge.’
But evil still depends on a failure to understand reality.
As early as 1891, in the poem ’’Sünde des Lebens’, amid much
general doubt as to the nature of good and evil, the same
view is expressed as to the source of the latter:
Ich sah die Fluten der Sünden branden.
Die wir ahnungslos begehen,
Weil wir andere nicht verstanden,gQ 
Weil uns andere nicht verstehen.
This idea is echoed more than thirty years later in the
Buch der Freunde: ’Die Ich-Sucht vergeht sich nicht so sehr
durch Taten, als durch Ni cht -Ve rst ehe n.I n view of
Hofmannsthal’s belief in the inadequacy of reason, this is
clearly not a lack just of intellectual understanding, but
77. KHA III, p.205 80. GLD, p.482
78. KHA III, p.187 81. p.21
79. A, p.231
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rather a failure of the whole approach to life because of a 
blindness to its true nature.
The theme of illusion occurs again in another note for 
the "Reden in Skandinavien", based on a passage from 
Lafcadio Hearn. Our aim should be a process of purifica­
tion,
durch welchen Teile der seelischen Zusammensetzung 
(Tendenzen, Impulse, Wâhne, Illusionen, Zwangskom- 
plexe) abgetan werden sollen. , Und doch sind alle 
diese Elemente ererbte Bestandteile der Seele, des 
wahren Selbst, deren Tod gewünscht wird. Unser Hoffen 
geht darauf, dass die besten Elemente unseres Selbst 
immer hôhere Verbindungen eingehen - bis zum Gewahr- 
werden der^- und Einswerden mit der absoluten 
Realitât.
Illusions are something to be overcome during the process 
of self-fulfilment which is ultimately to be achieved in 
union with "absolute reality". Yet apparently they are 
themselves elements of the "true self", the aggregate of
Q Q
elements which constitutes the soul, a statement remin­
iscent of the way in Der Turm both good and evil, the 
spiritual and the animal, often appear to be an inner 
potentiality of man which can be developed in either 
direction. In this idea could lie the explanation of how 
Sigismund can deny the existence of a fundamental dis­
tinction between himself and Olivier.
These undesirable elements, however, even though they
are part of the "true self", must be shed before union with
)
"der absoluten Realitât" can be achieved, and can that 
which has no part in absolute reality be said to be real? 
The attempt to cope with the problem of the nature and
82. Quoted in Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift. NF XXII, 
1972, p.199 83. cf. p.83f above
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reality of evil by confining it to some lower, ultimately 
illusory level of existence provides no final solution,
6. The values of "Das Salzburger Grosse Welttheater"
In the passage from which the above quotation was 
taken, Hofmannsthal maintains that this process is not 
confined to eastern religion but is also the aim of "das 
christliche Bewusstsein." It is interesting to consider 
how his system of values, as it has emerged so far, corres­
ponds to the Christian framework of Das Salzburger Grosse 
Welttheater, and how far the play remains faithful to 
values that have been traditionally held to be Christian.
At the beginning the angel explains that "Kern und
Sinn" of the play about to be performed is expressed in the 
biblical text, "Du sollst deinen Nâchsten lieben wie dich 
selbst, und aber deinen Gott, den sollst du lieben über
ailes," and that this is the meaning of the title of the
8 Lplay, "Tuet RechtJ Gott über euch!" The angel is answer­
ing Impertinence’s protest that they to not know what the 
action of the play is to be: there is an obvious contrast 
here between this answer and the answer given to the same 
question in Calderon’s play, that Law will be the promp­
ter. This does betray a difference in attitude to the
idea of moral law, but it should be remembered that this
)
verse was in fact used by Christ to sum up the meaning of 
86the Law. Hofmannsthal is in tune with Christian teaching 
in considering that to do right is not to conform one’s
84. KHA X, p.16
85. Masterpieces of the Spanish Golden Age, p.375
86. Matthew Ch.22, v.37-40
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actions to an external code of regulations but to let them 
flow from an internal principle, namely love.
The importance of selflessness and love is also
brought out in Hofmannsthal’s description of the character
of Wisdom in the ’Dritter Brief aus Wien’ : she unites
everything, ’’was wir an Hohem, Unselbstischem, Gott-
8 7Gleichem in uns tragen,’’ and emphasis is placed on the 
fact that she prays in the moment of danger not for her own 
salvation but for the Beggar’s. She is the only character 
in the play willing to give alms to the Beggar, which she 
offers spontaneously, and to those who do not need material 
aid she gladly gives spiritual advice. Yet a closer 
analysis of the figures of both Wisdom and the Beggar, as 
the two characters whose lives are given the highest 
approval at the end, shows that the ethic of love and self­
lessness has no more absolute value here than in other 
works we have examined, but is there to serve a higher 
purpose.
Wisdom reaches out in love to those with whom she
comes into contact, but she would prefer to avoid this
contact altogether: ’Mich ziehts, wo ich allein: in Ein-
8 8samkeit zu beten.”’ The King asks her to remain with him 
as a guide, but Wisdom replies that that would mean 
remaining ’inmitten dieser Welt./Ich habe mich aus ihr in
-N 8 Q
Ewigkeit gestellt.’’ The Beggar at the end expresses the 
same desire, wanting only to go off into the depths of the 
forest, ’’Dort liegen und in Lust/Mich ganz zu Gott zu
87. A, p.297 89. KHA X, p.26
88. KHA X, p.25
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90
regen j " In so doing he is, in Wisdom’s words, ’zum
91grossen Ziel gekommen’: he has achieved the highest aim
of human life, to be found apparently in a passive state of 
union with God.
Great importance is of course attached from the 
beginning to action: the angel tells the Beggar’s soul,
’Die Tat allein ist Schbpfung über der Schbpfung’’ and 
proclaims after he has renounced his act of vengeance, 
’Statt Untat ist jetzt Tat getanl’^^ By this ’’action’ the 
threat of universal destruction, ’die Drohung des Chaos an 
die geordnete Welt,’’^ ^ is averted. The difference between 
the Beggar’s deed and the normal concept of ethical activ­
ity lies not so much in the fact that it is really a 
decision not to act, for this decision does after all have 
a very real effect on the world around, but rather in that 
concern for this world and its inhabitants is not of 
primary importance. What matters is the Beggar’s inner
submission to the demands of his role, as expressed in the
9 5angel’s command, ’Nimm auf dichI Schmiege dichi’’ By so
doing he helps to preserve order: but this order is, after
all, in many ways very corrupt. When the Beggar says, ’Was
schiert mich, was Ihr habt? Ich bin so voiler Freuden/Und 
96will in Wald,’’ he seems to have lost his earlier burning
concern for his fellow have-nots. His soul cried out at
the beginning, ’’Und wâr ich Jakob. Es darf nicht gehandelt
97werden wie an Esau. Ich leid es nicht.’ Now he is no 
longer troubled about the injustice and oppression
90. KHA X, p.49 94. A, p.296
91. KHA X, p.49 95. KHA X, p.22
92. KHA X, p.21 96. KHA X, p.49
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inflicted on his brothers.
Earlier he told the Rich Man, "der Weltstand muss 
dahin, neu werden muss die Welt."^^ He repeats this again 
after his experience of illumination, but in renouncing 
the "Blut und Feuer" with which he earlier hoped to achieve 
it he seems to have renounced as well all practical 
attempts to work for it. Even if the religious context 
precludes action on a purely social level, his own exper­
ience shows how a change of heart and a new understanding 
of the meaning of life can be brought about through the 
love and witness of another, as it was for him by Wisdom's 
prayer. Could he not try to pass on this new insight? If 
he had offered his friendship and encouragement to the Rich 
Man a little sooner, perhaps the latter would not at the
end of the play be fit only to kneel "tiefer unten, im 
99Dunkel." Indeed we have already seen how a practical 
concern for others is traditionally seen as the highest 
fulfilment of the mystic's c a l l i n g . N o r  is it possible 
to argue that the Beggar is simply fulfilling a personal 
vocation which should not be judged by general criteria of 
human behaviour. Hofmannsthal, in writing to Strauss, 
makes clear that he is an "Everyman" figure and should not 
be expected to develop as an individual character.
Yet the Beggar is given the highest honour in heaven, 
a clear indication that concern for the world, though shown 
by those who are in harmony with the Divine, is not of 
first importance. Wisdom, too, does not point to her
98. KHA X, p.36 100. See p.59f above
99. KHA X, p.66 101. Strauss BW, p.470
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actions, or to the love she has shown, in her life, when she
is dying, but prays "Verklâr mich ohne jegliches Ver- 
102
dienst." This is a good Christian sentiment; but
(unlike Jedermann) she does not need to make the Christian’s 
appeal to the blood of Christ to compensate for her 
undeserving state. Her expectation of transfiguration 
presumably proceeds from a sense of her inner harmony with 
the Divine.
The Divine in Das Salzburger Crosse Welttheater is 
obviously presented in terms of the Judaeo-Christian con­
cept, but that it is nevertheless not so far removed from 
the power which appears in other works of Hofmannsthal’s is 
evident from the fact that Wisdom can address God as ’Leben 
über allem Leben’^^^ and ’’Du, der du ailes bist",^^^ and 
also from his desire to see ’ein lebendes, geheimes freies 
Wirken.’^^^ Through him the characters are bound together 
by an invisible ’’Verkettung’ as in Die Frau ohne Schatten: 
they are described by the angel as ’’verbunden . . . durch 
goldne Gnadenkette.
As part of this chain of human life, even the Rich Man
is not ultimately rejected. How can this be reconciled
with the fact that the characters have been told to ’do
right’ and to love both one another and God, since in all
these respects he has failed? The ’Master’’ states at the
beginning, ’’Wahl ist ihnen gegeben zwischen Gut und Bbse,
das ist ihre Kreaturschaft, in die ich sie gestellt 
1 D 7habe." Man is therefore called upon to choose between
102. KHA X, p.59 105. KHA X, p.11
103. KHA X, p.47 106. KHA X, p.65
104. KHA X, p.58 107. KHA X, p.13
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good and evil, but at the same time the implication is
there that this is something restricted to the realm of
earthly life and "Kreaturschaft" and that the Master and
Creator himself is above these categories. Sense can be
made of the ambivalent attitude expressed in the play
towards questions of social evil only if it is seen that
the values and concerns of the whole material world are in
the ultimate unreal and that earthly events happen only
108"gleichnisweise .... und nicht für wirklich." The Beggar
109is "auf eine andere Ebene gekommen" and so is able to
see this. As Arnold Bergstraesser has expressed it in his
article, "The social drama is not ended by a solution
inherent in itself, but by the Beggar’s action which makes
the values of the sphere of semblance visible as deceptive
in the light of the sphere of t r u t h . G o d ’s plan is
worked out on a different level of existence, so that in
earthly affairs he can be content with "ein ungeheueres
Gewâhrenlassen. Suffering may even be necessary on
the level of appearance: when the Beggar cries out in his
112anguish "Warum?", Wisdom replies, "Es hat sein müssen."
113But those who have discovered "die inner Himmelsfülle" 
are untouched by external evils, for they have accepted and 
so overcome suffering. For them the Adversary’s protest 
that injustice continues to flourish while they are dream­
ing in the forest requires no answer.
It follows that when the Master says, "Damit sie sich 
entscheide, dazu hab ich der httchsten Freiheit einen Funken
108. KHA X, p.15 111. KHA X, p.46
109. A, p.298 112. KHA X, p.32
110. Germanic Review, 20, 113. KHA X, p.49
1945, p.273
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in die Kreatur gelegt,"^^^ this freedom must in fact mean
something rather more than the simple choice between moral
alternatives implied by his earlier words quoted above. It
is freedom that the Beggar has discovered at the moment of
his conversion. His declared aim in retiring to the forest
is to understand it more fully: "Ich will in wilden Wald,
115sie vbllig zu erkennen," whereas if it were a question 
of freedom to choose between violence and non-violence, 
justice and injustice, one would expect him rather to 
explorent through involvement in society. On the new 
level he has reached, he is released from such polar oppo­
sites which are inherent in the created world, and his 
freedom, like Sigismund’s, is freedom from all conditioning 
by external circumstances. He is therefore no longer con­
cerned about the evils he has experienced. Kobel explains 
the nature of the choice he has made as follows: "Die Wahl 
zwischen Gut und Bbse, die dem Menschen gegeben ist, kann 
ein Ja oder ein Nein zur Wahl sein, die ihm gewâhlt hat.
Das Gut, das Rechte, das der Mensch tun kann, ist, dass er 
in gottgewollter Selbstwahl sich selbst wâhlt."^^^ In this
way the Adversary’s antithesis between free will and pre-
117destination is also destroyed. The role, with all its 
"predestined" sufferings, is accepted by a free choice, 
which has seen it as only the means to a higher end.
Within the religious framework of Das Salzburger 
Grosse Welttheater the evils of this world can be overcome 
in the next, and a foretaste of the joy to come can be
114. KHA X, p.13 116. Hugo von Hofmannsthal, p.236
115. KHA X, p.51 117. KHA X, p.13
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obtained even in this life by those who withdraw from "the 
world". When this framework is lacking, however, such 
evils cannot so easily be dismissed. Hofmannsthal himself 
faces up to the questions raised by the Adversary’s protest 
in Der Turm. Sigismund, like the Beggar, finds peace and 
security in an inner spiritual realm which enables him to 
accept suffering as something which cannot affect his 
essential being. But he does not therefore conclude that 
the evil state of the world which causes such suffering can 
be ignored: even in the second version he feels a desire to 
help the oppressed masses who appeal to him for aid in 
their struggle. And in the earlier version he is prepared 
to make use "even of the "Blut und Feuer" of the Beggar’s 
vision, in a situation which, according to the Doctor’s 
diagnosis at the beginning, can only be healed by iron and
f i r e . ^ 8
As has already been noted, Hofmannsthal described the
answer given in Das Salzburger Grosse Welttheater to the
chaos which threatened contemporary society as "nicht opti-
mistisch, aber auch nicht pessimistisch, sondern dichte-
119risch oder religibs," that is, not on the level of 
practical considerations, but belonging to another realm. 
Because in Der Turm he was trying to find an answer which, 
even if dependent on a spiritual dimension, would come to 
terms with the evils of society, he had to make the choice 
between optimism and pessimism, as reflected in the endings 
of the two versions. He could not solve the problem of the 
nature of good and evil by removing the characters to a
118. DIV, p.30 119. A, p.297
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realm where all such conflict was resolved in harmony. The
tragedy of the second version is that Sigismund 'cannot take
the Beggar’s way out. As Nehring has commented, "Innerlich
ist er nicht weniger Tâter als in der ersten Fassung des
Dramas ... Aber erstmalig erscheint die Macht der Gegenwelt
so stark, dass einem Menschen von aussen die fruchtbare
12 0Selbstverwirklichung unmbglich gemacht wird.’’
7. The ideal of harmony
Olivier, the representative of evil in Der Turm, is 
associated with the realm of ’die Leiber und die Sachen’’, 
but this material realm is not evil in itself: the Utopian 
ending of the first version clearly takes place within this 
sphere. It is evil only when it is viewed as an autonomous 
mechanical world, indeed as the only world, and so obscures 
the spiritual dimension to which it is supposed, ’gleich­
nisweise’, to correspond. The ideal put forward at the end 
of the first version is of a material world sustained by a 
spiritual order: the two apparent opposites are to be recon­
ciled in a situation which seems to fulfil Hofmannsthal’s
demand in the ’Münchener Rede’, ’das der Geist Leben wird
121und Leben Geist.’ ’Leben’’ here is not used quite in the
sense in which I have used it to indicate Hofmannsthal’s 
highest value, which corresponds rather to this proposed 
synthesis of ’’Geist’ and ’Leben’, at least in his later 
works. But even in the Greek plays the life force which is 
affirmed is not without a spiritual dimension. We have 
seen how Elektra’s vengeance upholds a higher ord-er which
120. Die Tat bei Hofmannsthal, p.136
121. PIV, p.412
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has been threatened by the murder of Agamemnon, and 
Hofmannsthal himself shows how 0dipus’s story can be 
related to such concepts by the Hôlderlin quotation with 
which he prefaces the play: "Des Herzens Woge schâumte 
nicht so schttn empor und würde Geist, wenn nicht der alte
1 29
stumme Fels, das Schicksal, ihr entgegenstünde."
Many of Hofmannsthal’s works present this synthesis of
spiritual and material elements as something to be sought
after. Writing about Die Frau ohne Schatten, Hofmannsthal
points out that at the beginning the human element is
missing from the Empress’s character: the point of the play
is that in the third act, "die tierhaft-geisterhaften
Elemente werden dann in einem hbheren Medium zu einer neuen
12 3Wesenheit verschmolzen erscheinen." In Andreas the hero
124has to learn "dass Geist u. Kbrper eines sind," and 
Maria and Mariquita must become one person again.
The clearest expression of this ideal is found in the 
notes for Semiramis and Die beiden Gbtter, where there is a 
plea for a synthesis of a more all-embracing kind than that 
simply of spirit and matter. We are told that Ninyas is 
"Geist und Liebe"^^^ while Semiramis stands for "das 
Ungeistige, der Zwang, das Bestehende"^^^ and for "Ge­
w a l t " . S h e  is "Tun" and he is "Nicht-tun". Their 
conflict can only be ended by their union: "Wenn die Mutter
und der Sohn in einem Haus wohnen, so wird der Anfang einer
12 8, neuen Zeit sein," and "Nicht-tun und Tun auf
122. DII, p.271 126. Dili, p.456
123. Strauss BW, p.253 127. Dili, p.453
124. KHA XXX, p.116 128. Dili, p.458
125. Dili, p.456
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geheimnisvolle Weise vereinigt, darin liegt es (Laotse)."^^^
The ideal is a monarch who rules, but is able to do so
"ohne Tun, d.h.: ohne Verbote, Zwang - also rein sittlich 
130
zu wirken." The product of this synthesis, then, is seen
as something essentially moral, and this morality would be, 
as always for Hofmannsthal, the result not of outward com­
pulsion but inward impulse, in a world where "alle Anstal- 
ten und Massregeln zur Herstellung von Sitte und Ordnung
überflüssig würden und jeder von selbst sich einem reinen
131und gerechten Leben zuwendete."
These notes are of particular interest in relation to
Der Turm. Hofmannsthal himself points out the close
parallels between the figures of Ninyas and Sigismund, and
the Sigismund of the first version seems to be aiming at
the kind of synthesis which is suggested here, and which is
finally realised under the rule of the Children’s King.
But the complementary figures, Olivier and Semiramis,
cannot be equated in the same way, in spite of Semiramis’
violent and "unspiritual" nature. For she is "immer in
Angst, von Ninyas verschlungen zu werden, aufgehoben zu 
132werden:" she recognizes in him her other self, and the 
fact that they are complementary. Olivier does not recog­
nize the existence of a spiritual realm: in Der Turm the 
split is total, and he must be destroyed before the new age 
can begin. The synthesis is not complete: something has 
been rejected.
Yet even in Die beiden Gbtter the relation of the new
129. Dili, p.471 131. Dili, p.471f
130. Dili, p.471 132. Dili, p.457
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age to the union of mother and son is problematic: as des­
cribed above it seems to have much more of Ninyas in it 
than of Semiramis. The problem arises with the attempt to 
make the synthesis produce something morally good, some­
thing "rein und gerecht" and related to "Sitte und Ordnung", 
since morality is meaningless if it does not approve some 
things and reject others. In addition, the attempt to 
account for the evils of this world by dividing it into two 
spheres, a phenomenal, material dimension and a spiritual 
one in which the conflicts of the other are resolved, does 
not make it any easier for Hofmannsthal to give a convinc­
ing picture of such a synthesis, for the spiritual realm 
inevitably acquires priority over the other. The ultimate 
invincibility of spirit is strongly emphasised in Der Turm,
and in the Buch der Freunde Hofmannsthal writes, "Der Geist
133besiegt die Materie," in spite of having claimed in
134Andreas that "Geist und Kbrper eines sind." In this way
Hofmannsthal reflects the Platonic tendency to see the soul 
as more important than the body.
It has already been noted that in Hofmannsthal’s works
the human often merges with the divine, the spiritual or 
13 5the animal. Humanity apparently partakes in its essence
of the realm of the eternal and infinite: we find refer­
ences to "sein Ewiges, sein Rein-Menschliches, sein
Hnbedingtes"^^^ and to "unserer kosmisch bewegten, Zeiten
137und Râume umspannenden Menschennatur." Yet this realm
is usually presented as that of the spiritual. In the
133. A, p.40 136. PII, p.381
134. KHA XXX., p.116 137. PIV, p. 459
135. e.g. pp.49 and 92ff above
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threefold system of material/animal, human, and spiritual/ 
divine, priority is sometimes given to the spiritual and 
sometimes to the human (as in the passage about Die Frau 
ohne Schatten above). In the latter case the human element 
appears not as one element among three but as a synthesis 
of the other two. Such a synthesis, however, raises a . 
moral problem. How is it, for example, that Sigismund, the 
defender of the spiritual realm who defeats "der rote 
Satan" Olivier, can also say in the grip of his mystical 
vision, "Engel und Teufel sind eins"^^^ and tell Olivier 
himself, "Was arg und was nicht arg ist, wer entscheidet 
das?"^39
Hofmannsthal is of course aware of the paradoxical 
nature of his position, for instance in a note in which he 
describes the re-integrated Maria and Mariquita, the whole 
woman who gives herself to Andreas, as "ohne Sünde sündi- 
gend - schon .1 enseits."^^^ But " j enseits" seems to 
indicate that this paradoxical situation is possible 
because a state has been reached beyond sin and sinless­
ness, '.a state of harmony in which these opposites are 
reconciled. In another note on Andreas, Hofmannsthal 
quotes from Novalis: "Allés übel und Bbse ist isoliert und 
isolierend, es ist das Prinzip der Trennung."^^^ From this, 
evil appears as a flaw in the unity of the harmonious whole, 
rather than anything in the separated elements: as such it 
is something purely negative, and inevitably disappears 
when re-integration is achieved. It follows that, although
138. DIV, p.98 140. KHA XXX, p.22
139. DIV, p.152 141. KHA XXX, p.150
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one of two such complementary elements as spirit and body 
may be seen as evil if it comes to deny the other and so 
becomes a cause of separation, this evil will only have 
reality as long as separation is maintained.
The nature of such a complementary relationship is
expressed probably as clearly as it can be in the note
about Andreas’ discovery of the unity of body and spirit:
’(er hat an den Dualismus fortwâlirend gelitten ...) nun
lernt er hinter dem einen das andere - immer das eine als
142Trâger des anderen fühlen.’’ But just as in the novel
the idea of such a relationship was to find expression in 
the figure of Maria/Mariquita, so in many other works 
Hofmannsthal expresses it not by an abstract formulation 
but in a pair of complementary figures. ’’Auch dort wo 
Kontraste dargestellt sind ..., wie die heroische Slektra 
und die nur weibliche Chrysothemis, oder der starke Pierre 
und der schwache Jaffier, kam es mir immer darauf an, dass 
sie mitsammen eine Einheit bildeten, recht eigentlich eins 
waren."^^^ In a letter to Strauss he sees it as the part­
icular quality of his work ’dass ich es auf Kontraste, und 
über die Kontraste auf Harmonie des Ganzen anzulegen 
weiss.
But both characters in such a pair must be accepted on 
equal terms: neither is to be condemned, only the fact that 
they are divided, and neither approved at the expense of 
the other. Hofmannsthal himself makes this point in the 
’Reden in Skandinavien’ when referring to Goethe: ’’In der
142. KHA XXX, p.116 144. Strauss BW, p.l25f
143. A, p.234
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Gegenüberstellung Tasso und Antonio liegt seine Gerechtig- 
keit, - nicht auf seiten eines der beiden."^^^ The idea of 
"Gerechtigkeit” recurs throughout his works, but on the 
basis of this it does not correspond to the normal concept 
of justice, which, though of course involving the full 
consideration of all opposing parties or viewpoints, also 
involves a final decision for one of them. The concept 
here is of a justice without judgement.
In this context it is helpful to consider 
Hofmannsthal's early prose piece entitled "Gerechtigkeit", 
although no explanation is given there of what it is to be 
"gerecht" according to the angel’s demand. But we do know 
what it is not: the angel is scornful of the narrator’s 
profession of an all-embracing love for, and sense of 
oneness with the world that surrounds him. If "justice” 
is not to be found in such an experience of mystical part­
icipation, it follows that it belongs to the realm of 
separation and individuation, and that recognition of this 
realm is necessary to attain it. Without recognition of 
the individual elements of which it is composed, harmony 
itself cannot be fully understood. This "justice", though, 
is to be contrasted not only with an outlook which sees all 
distinctions as blurred, but also with the blindness of 
selfishness. We have seen, for instance, how in Die Frau 
ohne Schatten the characters have to learn to recognize 
and respect each other in their full individuality before 
they can play their true part in the pattern of life.
In this work a whole group of figures is involved, but 
1U5. PHI. p.361
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whether a pair or a group is concerned, the characters
represent "kontrapunktische Notwendigkeiten, each a
necessary part of the whole, and this can present problems.
In a letter to R.A. Schrbder Hofmannsthal recognizes that
"bei meiner Art, die Uelt zu sehen" it is difficult for him
to see conflict, though he expects to overcome this problem
117where drama is concerned. But without an awareness of
conflict not only drama but also any kind of moral attitude 
threatens to collapse, since there is no real antithesis 
between good and evil. In the "Reden in Skandinavien" 
Hofmannsthal has been seen to reject the concept of law 
which lays down one thing as right and another as wrong in 
favour of a law of natural development and self-fulfilment. 
He there states that, "Die Gesetze sind in den Menschen,
die Welt 1st ihre in menschlichen Gestalten und Begeben-
118heiten rnanifestierte Ordnung," and the problem emerges 
particularly clearly in this statement: such an order must 
surely embrace all that is normally held to be evil in the 
world. Strength is added to this conclusion by the way 
Hofmannsthal in these speeches sees the war itself as a 
necessary phase in the development of European culture 
towards the ideal. He may be well aware of all the partic­
ular evils involved in war, as is shown by his portrayal of 
it in Der Turm, but as part of "dern notwendigen Gange des 
Ganzen"^^^ it must be affirmed. The attempt to discover a 
positive role for violence and suffering can indeed be
1 ^ P
found as early as the poem "Der Jüngling und die Spinne", 
where the youth is seeking to come to terms with a "Life"
146. PII, p.44 149. PHI, p.361
147. 311, p.67f 150. GLD, pp.37-39
148. PHI, p.363
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of which these things are an integral part.
Hofmannsthal finds the meaning of human existence in 
its participation in the activity of the universal force 
earlier described as "life", a force which unites the whole 
of reality into a harmony. The purpose of life for the 
individual is to find his own place within this harmony: 
for society it is to realize it in the social order, so 
that both dimensions of reality, the physical world and the 
world beyond, correspond. The artist has a role to play in 
this, one often attributed to him in German thought. 
Nietzsche, for example, in Die Geburt der Tragbdie, des­
cribes his aim as, "die Betrachtung der Individuation als 
des Urgrundes des Ubels, die Kunst als die freudige 
Hoffnung, dass der Bann der Individuation zu zerbrechen 
sei, als die Ahnung einer wiederhergestellten Einheit."^^^ 
This ideal of harmony and unity represents for Hofmannsthal 
the highest value, and counteracts the threat of death most 
effectively by absorbing it into its own all-embracing 
pattern.
Death, suffering, and what is normally seen as guilt 
are all to be accepted as part of life, and guilt becomes 
redefined as sin against life itself, anything which inter­
feres with the pattern and development of the whole. 
Selfishness, hatred and distrust are all causes of division 
and so fall into this category: thus far the values depend­
ent on this ideal coincide with traditional ones. But even 
these negative things can be affirmed, by someone who
151. Werke, Bd.III.l, p.69
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shares this view of life, as complementary elements in the
balance of the whole; as Rudolf Kassner does, for instance,
pointing out that "Der Glaube treibt in’s Unendliche, die
Liebe lâsst ineinanderfliessen, Zweifel und Hass begrenzen"
and that both aspects are necessary, for "j ede Harmonie
152beruht auf den grossen Gegensâtzen von Ja und Nein."
S. "Mystical morality"
Hofmannsthal’s yalues depend ultimately on what is 
really a mystical conception of reality, and the result is, 
as Patricia Howe points out, that "although Hofmannsthal 
repeatedly endows his heroes with moral obligations, the
153underlying purpose of his morality seems to be mystical."
The spheres of mysticism and morality are generally seen as 
providing a contrast in Hofmannsthal’s works, his charac­
ters often being called back from the world of mystical 
participation to that of individuation and ethical activity. 
But the two spheres are interrelated, two dimensions of the 
same reality, the one borne up by the other. liestermann 
indeed states categorically, "Die Antitliese Mystisch- 
Sthisch gibt es bei Hofmannsthal nicht.
Probably the clearest contrast between the two realms 
is that in Das Berzwerk zu Falun, where both are presented 
as a reality in the hero’s experience. Yet even here we 
find that the Grandmother, the upholder of the values of 
family life, herself sees life in terms of a process of 
"Verkettung" of which she becomes aware through a kind of
152. Die Mystik. die Künstler und das Leben, p.229
153. The theme of death, p.279 
151. Das mystische Element, p.11
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mystical participation: although blind, she is
drum nicht minder ganz: im Innern drângt 
Sich ein Gewinde, ein Gewühl empor, -,
Verbunden allés wie in Slumenketten.
Slis, in his final choice, stands for a mysticism practised
in a realm of selfishness and isolation: what is set
against it also has its basis in mystical insights.
Hofmannsthal clearly attaches the greates importance 
to the traditional values of love and selflessness, but 
with the difference that these are not to be practised 
primarily for the sake of the people concerned but because 
of their role in the realisation of the universal harmony. 
As Patricia Howe puts it, "the ultimate purpose to which 
one must cling is something much greater than the small 
aims of any of these individual lives," and "this greater 
purpose is life i t s e l f . T h i s  idea of a greater purpose 
is of course basic to any religious outlook, but where 
values are dependent on an impersonal life-force rather 
than on the will of a personal deity, the individual in­
evitably seems to forfeit any ultimate importance.
Hofmannsthal sees the mystic's vision of universal 
harmony and the oneness of all reality as a vision of the 
good, so that value judgements are made on the basis of how 
far an action or attitude is in tune with it. But we have 
seen that this is something to which normal concepts of 
good and evil have no relevance, so the question arises as 
to whether values based on such a standard are in any sense 
moral. To derive moral criteria from one's understanding 
of the nature of reality - whether that understanding is
155. GLD, p.377 156. Op. cit., p.86
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religious or scientific - is to fall into the "naturalistic 
fallacy" (the attempted deduction of what ought to be from 
what is) which has been discredited by recent moral philos­
ophy.
There is much argument about the real basis and scope
of moral values, but Warnock makes the point that, simply
as a consequence of what the word "moral" means, "certain
standards ... though they do not have to be accepted at
all, must be accepted the claim to be evaluating morally
157is seriously made." Such standards must haye reference
to what is beneficial to people, in the world in which 
their actions and experiences take place (whatever one’s 
idea of "beneficial" may be). Bertrand Russell distin­
guishes two kinds of good: "There is a lower mundane kind 
of good and evil, which divides the world of appearance 
into what seem to be conflicting parts; but there is also a 
higher, mystical kind of good, which belongs to Reality and 
is not opposed by any correlative kind of evil," a good
158which "belongs to the whole world as it is in reality."
But such a "higher good" has no relation to normal moral 
concepts: it is simply the whole of reality viewed subject­
ively as something positive. It is not a moral but a 
metaphysical good, and man who sins against it does not 
suffer from moral guilt but from the metaphysical limita­
tions inherent in his finite nature. Through his 
experience of union with the whole of reality, the mystic 
transcends these limitations.
157. Contemporary Moral Philosophy, p.68
158. Mysticism and Logic, p.27
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For Hofmannsthal the highest good of human existence 
lies in man’s full participation in "life", a concept which 
surely belongs to the metaphysical rather than to the moral 
sphere. There is, however, no doubt as to his continuing 
concern with the ethics of human actions and relationships 
within the everyday world, or his awareness of the evil 
pervading human society. Because he cares deeply about 
moral issues, he needs to find a vision of reality which 
will somehow account for the existence of evil and provide 
a basis for his belief in love and selflessness. In his 
works he explores different aspects of the problem and its 
possible solutions.
There may be a logical incompatibility between a 
belief in a universal harmony in which good and evil are 
swallowed up and a concern with practical everyday morality, 
but in practice the two often co-exist. Eastern religions 
freely combine pantheistic mysticism with high moral 
teaching. Neither mystical nor poetic understanding can be 
fitted into a logical scheme.
The co-existence of these two elements does, however, 
sometimes create tensions within Hofmannsthal’s works, most 
notably in Der Turm. The evil represented by Olivier 
cannot be assimilated into a harmonious whole. Even in the 
first version the Children’s King, who ushers in the new 
order of harmony and peace, says "Mir geziemt nicht, das 
Ubel zu s e h e n , a n d  in the second version all reconcil­
iation has become impossible. The reality of evil
159. DIV, p.203
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experienced in the actual wprld has for the moment obscured 
the vision of unity.
The belief in the unity of the whole is, however, 
firmly rooted in Hofmannsthal’s mysticism, and the predom­
inant concept is therefore inevitably that of a metaphys­
ical good such as Russell describes, with evil explained 
away as a misunderstanding or a temporary flaw in the 
pattern. Because Hofmannsthal sees reality not as a static 
harmony but as the continuous flow of "life", human love 
and faithfulness do have a vital part to play since they 
are involved in. the working out of life’s purpose.
-157-
Conclusion
In the preceding chapters of this thesis I have sought 
to show how, in spite of the undefined nature of the faith 
which Hofmannsthal affirms, there is underlying all his 
works a picture of reality of which the spiritual dimension 
is an essential element. It i=s this dimension which unites 
all things into a meaningful whole and transcends duality, 
material causality and time. It is revealed to those who 
have grasped the symbolic nature of the physical world, 
although only through a process of deep involvement with it; 
the symbols of art, religion and mythology point to the 
same hidden realm. In making use of religious language and 
imagery, Hofmannsthal is seeking both to express this 
understanding of reality and to suggest answers to the 
moral questions which concern him, such as the need to 
establish lasting values in the face of death, and the 
problem of the existence of evil.
His early understanding of such things is intuitive 
and empathetic, and is generally expressed without the 
direct use of religious language and symbolism. Such 
language and symbolism is, however, found to play an 
increasing role in his later works, as he seeks to clarify 
the insights gained, to explore moral issues more deeply, 
and in particular to discover means of communicating an 
awareness of spiritual reality. The terminology of 
religion is used essentially for its evocative and associa­
tive power,, for Hofmannsthal believes that the kind of 
communication he is seeking can never be achieved through 
the abstractions of theology. For him all abstract
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definition, whether theological, philosophical or psycho­
logical, is lifeless and restrictive. The vision of 
spiritual truth can therefore only be shared through the 
power of living symbols, from whatever sphere these may be 
drawn. In this way the religious function which 
Hofmannsthal attributes to all "higher" literary works^ 
can be fulfilled, and his own growing desire to communi­
cate this understanding realised.
His actual picture of reality, however, rooted as it 
is in mystical experience, does not change, and the vision 
of a realm of complete unity and timelessness remains 
constant as his emphasis shifts from inner experience to 
involvement in the processes of life, and as the directly 
religious element in his writings increases. It is 
because this vision remains unchanged that tensions emerge 
between the underlying concept of spiritual truth and some 
of the traditional words and images used to express it. It 
is therefore important to keep in mind Hofmannsthal’s 
insistence that any religious or mythological material of 
which he makes use is chosen not for the sake of its 
specific emphasis or teaching, but because it has the 
symbolic power to evoke the "other reality" and in this 
respect has a universal significance. This reality has no 
name, "God" being only one possible way of referring to it, 
and cannot be known as an independent entity. It is its 
immanent presence, however, that imparts harmony and 
meaning to the chaos of human existence.
1. See for example p.36 above.
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There is therefore no sharp division to be made in 
Hofmannsthal’s works between the introverted mystical ex­
perience of his early writings and the social concerns of 
the later ones. The later works are in fact exploring how 
the mystic’s intuition of harmony and meaning can be real­
ised in practice in the world of everyday experience, both 
on a personal level, as in for exanple Die Frau ohne 
Schatten, and within the whole of a society under threat, 
as in Das Salzburger Grosse Welttheater and Der Turm. His 
concern with moral issues, although clearly present in such 
early works as Der Tor und der Tod, becomes an increasingly 
dominant theme as the war and the events which follow 
increasingly focus his attention on the destructive forces 
present in contemporary society.
A further tension then emerges in the ethical sphere 
between the fundamental mystical conviction of the oneness 
of all things and Hofmannsthal’s acute awareness of the 
conflict between good and evil. This tension is resolved 
as far as is possible in the context of an all-embracing 
flow of "life"; within this all the individual actions to 
which such moral categories apply are absorbed into the 
harmony of the overall pattern. Svil becomes either a flaw 
in this pattern, or that which threatens to obstruct or 
obscure the onward movement of life; good is then the full 
oarticipation in life’s processes, in which not only love 
and faithfulness, but also death, suffering and guilt have 
a part to play as well. Such participation is in itself an 
entering into the realm of the mystic’s vision.
The religious element in Hofmannsthal’s works,
—16 0 -
therefore, whille individual in the sense that it does not
belong to any one particular doctrinal or philosophical
tradition, is nevertheless in tune with many attitudes of
his day. For example, parallels have been traced in
contemporary currents of thought such as "Lebensphilo-
sophie" to his emphasis on irrationalism and rejection of
antithetical thinking, his concept of the universal,
creative and unifying power of "Life", and the mysticism
that he presents without any interpretative theoretical 
2
framework.
* His treatment of religious elements also belongs to the
tradition of Austrian writing, where the influence of the
Baroque is still to be found. Its typical themes have been
summed up by Donald Daviau as, "Tod, Verwandlung, Zeit,
Vergânglichkeit, d(as) Leben als Traum, d(ie) Welt als
Bühne und vor allem d(ie) Weltanschauung, besonders d(ie)
3
Ideen von harmonia mundi und coincidentia oppositorum."
When making direct use of Baroque material, Hofmannsthal 
does of course give it his own original stamp, as has been 
seen in the case of Das Salzburger Grosse Welttheater and 
Der Turm: a transformation which reflects the contrast 
between his own understanding of reality and the all- 
embracing Christian world view of his sources. The central 
images and themes of the Baroque are however all clearly 
recognisable in his works. Death, transformation and the 
overcoming of time all play an important role in his* 
exploration of spiritual issues; the images of life as a 
dream and the world as a stage are both used by him to
2. See for example pp. 12f, 84 and 90f above.
3. ’Das junge und das jüngste Wien’, p.82
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express the relationship between physical and metaphysical 
reality; and the idea of universal harmony and unity is 
central to his whole religious outlook.
The conviction about the nature of reality and of true 
values that underlies Hofmannsthal’s works is thus 
closely related both to the Austrian tradition of many 
generations and to widespread currents of thought in his 
own day. He was therefore able to see it as not merely a 
personal attitude but as something of universal validity, 
and in his later years as potentially able to provide the 
spiritual direction needed by a disintegrating European 
society.
-162-
Bibliograohv
1• Works and correspondence of Hugo von Hofmannsthal
Gesamaelte Werke in Einzelaus.^aben, edited by H. Steiner 
(E rank furt/Main)
Dramen I (1953) Gedichte und Lyrische
Dramen II (1954) Dramen (1952)
Dramen III (1957) Erzâhlungen (1949)
Dramen IV (1958) Prosa I (1950)
Lustspiele I (1947) Prosa II (1951)
Lustspiele II (1948) Prosa III (1952)
Lustspiele III (1956) Prosa IV (1955)
Lustspiele IV (1956) Aufzeichnungen (1959)
Sâiatliche Werke, Kritische Ausgabe, edited by R. Hirscli,
C. Kbttelwesch, H. Rblleke, E. Zinn (Frankfurt/Main)
Band III. Dramen 1 (1982)
VIII. Dramen 6 (1983)
X. Dramen 8 (1977)
XIV. Dramen 12 (1975)
XXVI. Operndichtungen 4 (1976)
XXVIII. Erzâhlungen 1 (1975)
XXIX. Erzâhlungen 2 (1978)
XXX. Roman (1982)
Silvia im "Stern", edited by Martin Stern (Bern, 1959) 
Briefe 1890-1901 (Berlin, 1935)
Briefe 1900-1909 (Wien, 1937)
Hugo von Hofmannsthal - Leopold von Andrian, Briefwechsel, 
edited by W.H. Perl (Frankfurt/Main, 1968)
Hugo von Hofmannsthal - Eberliard von Bodenhausen, Briefe 
der Freundschaft, edited by Dora Freifrau von 
Bodenhausen (Berlin, 1953)
Hugo von Hofmannsthal - Rudolf Borchardt, Briefwechsel, 
edited by M.L. Borchardt and H. Steiner (Frankfurt/ 
Main, 1954)
-163-
Hugo von Hofmannsthal - Carl J. Burckhardt, Briefwechsel, 
edited by C.J. Burckhardt (Frankfurt/Main, 1966)
Der Briefwechsel zwischen George und Hofmannsthal, edited 
by R. Boehringer (München & Düsseldorf, 1953, 2nd 
edition)
Hugo von Hofmannsthal - Edgar Karg von Bebenburg, Brief­
wechsel , edited by M.E. Gilbert (Frankfurt/Main, 1966) 
Hugo von Hofmannsthal - Harry Graf Kessler, Briefwechsel
1898-1929, edited by H . Burger (Frankfurt/Main, 1968) 
Hugo von Hofmannsthal - Max Mell, Briefwechsel. edited by 
M. Dietrich and H. Kindermann (Heidelberg, 1982)
"Aus Hofmannsthals Briefen an Rudolf Pannwitz" , edited by R.
Pannwitz, Mesa, 5 (1955), pp.20-42 
Hugo von Hofmannsthal - Arthur Schnitzler, Briefwechsel,
edited by T. Nickl and H. Schnitzler (Frankfurt/Main,
1964)
Richard Strauss - Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Briefwechsel,
edited by F. and A. Strauss, revised by ¥. Schuh, 3rd 
edition (Zürich, 1954)
Hugo von Hofmannsthal - Anton Wildgans, Briefwechsel, edited 
by N. Altenhofer (Heidelberg, 1971)
"Hugo von Hofmannsthal und Paul Zifferer, Einführung in den 
Briefwechsel", edited by H. Burger, Literatur und 
Kritik. 171/172 (1983), pp.26-55
2. Secondary literature
Adolf, Helen, "From ’Everyman’ and ’Elckerlijc’ to
Hofmannsthal and Kafka", Comparative Literature, 9 
(1957), pp.204-214
-164-
Alewyn, Richard, ITber Hugo von Hofmannsthal 2nd edition, 
(Gbttingen, I96O)
3ahr, Hermann, Studien zur Kritik der Modeme (Frankfurt/ 
Main, 1894)
Bergstraesser, Arnold, "The Holy Beggar: Religion and 
Society in Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s ’Great World 
Theatre of Salzburg'", Germanic Review, 20 (1945),
pp.261-286
Bollnow, Otto F., "Zum Lebensbegriff des jungen Hugo von
Hofmannsthal", Archiv für Literatur und Volksdichtung.
1 (1949), pp.50-62
Borchardt, Rudolf, Gesammelte Werke in Einzelbânden: Reden 
(Stuttgart, - ); Prosa I (Stuttgart, 1957)
Brecht, Erika, Srinnerungen an Hugo von Hofmannsthal 
(Innsbruck, 1946)
Brecht, Walther, "Grundlinien im Werke Hugo von
Hofmannsthals", Euphorion, Ergânzungsband 16 (1923), 
pp.164-179
" "Die Vorlâufer von Hofmannsthals 'Jedermann’",
Osterreichische Rundschau, 20 (1924), pp.271-287 
" "Hugo von Hofmannsthals Ad me ipsum und seine Bedeu- 
tung", Jahrbuch des freien deutschen Hochstifts, 1930,
pp.319-353
Breugelmans, Rene, "Hofmannsthal im Platonismus der Jahr-
hundertwende", in Hofmannsthal-Forschungen I, Referate 
der 2. Tagung der Hugo von Hofmannsthal-Gesellschaft 
(Basel, 1971), pp.16-35 
Broch, Hermann, Hofmannsthal und seine Zeit: Sine Studie 
(Zürich, 1955)
-165-
Burckhardt, Carl J., Erinnerungen an Hofnannsthal und
Briefe des Dichters. 2nd edition (Klosterberg, 194-4)
" "Begegnungen ait Hugo von Hofmannsthal", Die neue 
Rundschau, 1954, pp.341-357 
Coghlan, Brian, Hofmannsthal's Festival Drainas (Cambridge 
and Melbourne, 1964)
Cohn, Hilde D., "'Loris' - Die frühen Essays des jungen 
Hofmannsthal", Publications of the Modem Language 
Association of America. 63 (1948), pp.1294-1313 
Curtius, Ernst R., "George, Hofmannsthal und Calderon", in 
Kritische Essays zur europfiischen Literatur (Berne, 
1950), pp.172-201 
David, Claude, "Hofmannsthals letztes Drama", W ,  9 (1959),
pp.206-216
Dill, Heinz J.,"Hofmannsthal and Keats", Germanie Review,
55/4 (1980), pp.156-161
Erken, Günther, Hofmannsthals dramatischer Stil: ünter- 
suchungen zur Symbolik und Dramaturgie (Tübingen,
1967)
Ernst, Erhard, Studien zum religiüsen Problem ±m
"Salzburger Grossen Welttheater" und in den "Turm"- 
Dichtungen Hugo von Hofmannsthals, Dissertation, Kiel 
(1962)
" "Hugo von Hofmannsthal und der 'Begriff Asien'", M ,
l6 (1966), pp.266-273
" "Das Karma-Thema und der 'Turm'-Stoff bei Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal", W¥, 21 (1971), pp.14-24 
Esselborn, Karl G., Hofmannsthal und der antike Mythes 
(München, 1969)
-I60-
Exner, Richard, "Hofmannsthals Nachruhs", Ensemble, 4 
(1973), pp.302-315 
" "Zur Essayistik Hugo von Hofmannsthals", Sehwelzer 
Monatshefte. 41 (1961/62), pp.132-198 
Faucard, Genevieve, "Une expérience privilégiée du moi et 
sa fonction dans le lyrisme de Hofmannsthal", Etudes 
Germaniques, 27/3 (1972), pp.383-406 
Feise, Ernst, "Philosophische Motive im Werk des jungen 
Hofmannsthal", Monatshefte, 37 (1945), pp.31-39 
Fiechtner, H.A. (editor), Hugo von Hofmannsthal; Per 
Dichter im Sniegel der Freunde (Wien, 1949; 2nd 
edition 1964)
Gerstinger, Heinz, "Calderon und das christliche Theater 
der Gegenwart", in Theater und Religion heute (Wien, 
1972), pp.143-149 
Haltmeier, Roland, "Zu Hofmannsthals Rede 'Pas Schrifttum 
als geistiger Raum., der Nation'", î^, 17/18 (1977), 
pp.298-310
Hamburger, Michael L.P., "Hofmannsthals Eibliothek", 
Suphorion, 55 (1961), pp.15-76 
Hederer, Edgar, Hugo von Hofmannsthal (Frankfurt/Main, I960) 
" "ïïber die Aufzeichnungen Hofmannsthals zu einem 
'Xenodoxus ' " , M ,  65 (1954), pp.424-436 
Heselhaus, Clemens, "Calderon und Hofmannsthal : Sinn und
Form des theologischen Dramas", Archiv für das Studium 
der neueren Sprachen, 191, Jg.l06 (1954), pp.3-30 
Hestermann, Ottheinrich, Das mystische Element im Werke 
Hugo von Hofmannsthals, Dissertation, Freiburg im 
Breisgau (1956)
-167-
Hoppe, Manfred, Literatentun, Magie und Hystik im Frühwerk 
Hugo von Hofmannsthals (Berlin, 1968)
Howe, Patricia A., The Theme of Death in the Works of Hugo 
VO 11 Hofmannsthal. Dissertation, London (1971)
Jaszi, Andrew 0., "Die Idee des Lebens in Hofmannsthals 
Jugendwerk 1890-1900", Germanic Review, 24 (1949), 
pp.81-107
Jenkinson, D.E., "The Poetry of Transition: some aspects of 
the interpretation of Hofmannsthal's lyrics", German 
Life and Letters. 27 (1974), pp.294-302 
Jens, Walter, Hofmannsthal und die Griechen (Tübingen, 1955) 
Eerenyi, Karl, "Auf Spuren des Mythos", in Werke in Binzel- 
ausgaben 11 (München und Wien, 1967)
Kern, Peter C. , Zur Gedankenwelt des spèLten Hofmannsthal:
Die-Idee einer schbpferischen Restauration (Heidelberg, 
1969)
Kobel, E., Hugo von Hofmannsthal (Berlin, 1970)
Koch, Franz, "Hofmannsthals Lebens- und Weltgefühl",
Jahrbuch des freien deutschen Hochstifts, 1930, pp.257 
-318
Kovach, Thomas A., "'Acheronta Movebo': a new light on the 
figure of the Physician in Hofmannsthal's 'Turm'", in 
E. Nielson (editor). Focus on Vienna 1900 (Müchen, 
1982), pp.77-83
Kruschelnyzkyi, Iwan, "Gesprâche mit Hofmannsthal", aus dem 
ukrainischen übersetzt von R.D. Keil, 17/18 (1977),
pp.251-273
Kuhn, Ortwin, Mythos - Neuplatonismus - Mystik: Studien zur 
Gestaltung des Alkestis-Stoffes bei Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal, T.S. Eliot und Thornton Wilder (Mün chen, 
1972)
-168-
Laubach, Jakob, "Hofmannsthals Weg von der Magie zur
Mystik: Zu seiner dramatischen Nachlese", WW, 1 (1950), 
pp.238-245
" "Hofmannsthals Turm der Selbstbewahrung", l[W, 4 (1953)., 
pp.257-268
" Hugo von Hofmannsthals Turm-Dichtungen, Dissertation, 
Freiburg in der Schweiz (1954)
Lenz, Sva-Maria, Hugo von Hofmannsthals mythologische Oner 
"Die âgyptische Helena" (Tübingen, 1972)
Lewis, Hanna 3.., "Hofmannsthal, Shelley and Keats", German 
Life and Letters, 27 (1974), pp.220-234 
Llewellyn, R.T., "Hofmannsthal's Nihilism", Modern Language 
Review, 6l (1966), pp.250-259 
Mâhl, Hans-Joachim, "Die Mystik der Worte: Zum Sprachproblem 
in der modernen deutschen Dichtung", ¥W, 13 (1963), 
pp.289-303
Metzeler, Werner, Ursprung und Krise von Hofmannsthals 
Mystik (München, 1956)
Meyer-Wendt, H.J.., Der frühe Hofmannsthal und die Gedanken­
welt Nietzsches (Heidelberg, 1973)
Miles, David H., Hofmannsthal's Novel Andreas: Memory and 
self (Princeton, 1972)
Mistry, Freny, "'Die beiden Gbtter': Observations on the 
politico-philosophical Aspects of Hofmannsthal's 
Fragment of 1917/18", Modern Austrian Literature, 9/1 
(1976), pp.1-12 
" "Towards Buddhahood: some remarks on the Sigismund 
figure in Hofmannsthal's 'Turm' plays". Modern 
Language Review, 69/2 (1974), pp.337-347
-169-
Mistry, Freny, "The Concept of Asia in Hofmannsthal's Prose 
’Writings", Seminar, 13 (1977), pp.227-256 
Nailer, Josef, "Hofmannsthal und das Sozialproblem", i^, 40 
(1929), pp.647-654
Naef, Karl J., Hugo von Hofmannsthals ivesen und Werk 
(Zürich, 1933)
Naumann, Walter, "Hofmannsthal und das 17. Jahrhundert", in 
H o fin ann s t hal-Forsc hun g en I (Basel, 1971), pp.135-145 
Nehring, Wolfgang, Die Tat bei Hofmannsthal: Sine Unter- 
suchung zu Hofmannsthals grossen Dramen (Stuttgart, 
1966)
Norman, F. (editor), Hofmannsthal; Studies in Commemoration 
(London, 1963)
Parker, John J., The development of the Everyman drama from 
Elkerlyc to Hofmannsthal's Jedermann (Doetinchem, 1970) 
Paulsen, W. (editor), Dsterreichische Gegenwart: Die
moderne Literatur und ilir Verh&ltnis zur Tradition 
(Bern und München, 1980)
Peschken, Bernd, "Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte von
Hofmannsthals' "Turm", mit ideologiekritischer Absicht", 
Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift, Neue Folge 19 
(1969), pp.152-178 
Requadt, P., "Sprachverleugnung und Mantelsyiiibolik im Werke 
Hofmannsthals", DVJS, 29 (1955), pp.255-283 
Resch, Margit, Das Symbol als Prozess bei Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal (KSnigstein/Ts, 1980)
Rey, William H., "Tragik und Verklârung des Geistes in 
Hofmannsthals 'Der Turm'", Suphorion, 47 (1953), 
pp.161-172
-170-
Rey, William H., "Die Drohung der Zeit in Hofmannsthals 
Frühwerk", Suphorion. 4-8 (1954), pp.230-310 
" "Dichter und Abenteurer bèi Hugo von Hofmannsthal", 
Suphorion, 49 (1955), pp.56-59 
" "Selbstopfer des Geistes: Fluch und Verheissung in 
Hofmannsthals 'Der Turm' und Thomas Manns 'Doktor 
Faustus'", Monatshefte. 52 (I960), pp.145-157 
" Weltentzweiung und Weltversbhnung in Hofmannsthals 
griechischen Dramen (Philadelphia, 1962)
Ritter, Sllen,"ïïber den Begriff der Praeexistenz bei Hugo
von Hofmannsthal", Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift, 
Neue Folge 22 (1972), pp.197-200 
Rbsch, Swald, Kombdien Hofmannsthals: die Entfaltung ihrer 
Sinnstruktur aus dem Thema der Daseinsstufen (Marburg,
. 1963)
Schaeder, Grete, Hugo von Hofmannsthal. I. Die Gestalten 
(Berlin, 1933)
" Hugo von Hofmannsthal und Goethe (Hameln, 1947)
" "Hugo von Hofmannsthals Weg zur Tragbdie: Die drei
Stufen der Turm-Dichtung", DVJS, 23 (1949), pp.306-350 
Schaeder, Hans-Heinrich, "Bemerkungen zu Hofmannsthals 
'Turm'", NR, 1928, pp.84-87 
Schiller, Inge, Art und Bedeutung des Religibsen im Prosa- 
werk Hugo von Hofmannsthals, unter besonderer Berück- 
sichtigung der beiden Erzâhlungen "Das Mârchen der 
672. Nacht" und "Die Frau ohne Schatten", Dissertation 
(Würzburg, 1961)
Schmidt, Ada, "Mystic vision and life: their interrelation 
in the writings of Hugo von Hofmannsthal",
Neophilologus, 50 (1966), pp.433-446
-171-
Scnrôder, Rudolf A., "In meznoriam Hugo von Hofmanns thaï ",
NR, 1929, pp.577-595 
" "Zeit und Gerechtigkeit: Gedanken zun Werk Hugo von 
Hofmannsthals zur 25. Wiederkehr seines Todestages am 
15. Juli", Merkur. 3 (1954), pp.603-617 
Schulz, H. Stefan, "Hofmannsthal and Bacon: the sources of
the Chandos letter". Comparative Literature, 13 (1961), 
pp.1-15
Schwarz, Egon, Hofmannsthal und Calderon (•s-Gravenhage, 
1962)
Sofer, Johann, Die Welttheater Hugo von Hofmannsthals und 
ihre Voraussetzungen bei Heraklit und Calderon (Wien,
1934)
Sondrup, Steven P., "The Contexts and Concepts of 'Leben' 
in the Poetry of Hugo von Hofmannsthal", Colloquia 
Germanica, 2 (1978), pp.289-297 
Steffen, Hans, "Das sich selbst erlebende Ich: Hugo von
Hofmannsthals 'Ein Traum von grosser Magie'", Jahrbuch 
der deutschen Schillergesellschaft, 18 (1974), pp.506- 
520
Stenberg, Peter, "Hofmannsthal and Sigismund: the move from 
the Tower", Monatshefte, 67 (1975), pp.21-36 
Stern, Martin, "Hofmannsthals Wirklichkeit", Hofmannsthal- 
Forschungen , II (1974), pp.7-21 
Sulger-Gebing, Emil, Hugo von Hofmannsthal: Eine litera- 
rische Studie (Leipzig, 1905)
Tarot, Rolf, Hugo von Hofmannsthal: Daseinsformen und 
dichterische Struktur (Tübingen, 1970)
Volke, Werner, Hugo von Hofmannsthal in Selbstzeugnissen 
und Bilddokumenten (Reinbeck, bei Hamburg, 1967)
-172-
\’Jalk, Cynthia, Hofmannsthals "Grosses Welttheater" ; Drama 
und Theater (Heidelberg, 1980)
Warnach, W ., "Hugo von Hofmannsthal: Sein Weg von Mythos 
und Magie zur Wirklichkeit der Geschichte", Wort und 
Wahrheit, 9 (1954), pp.360-377 
Weber, Horst, Hugo von Hofmannsthal Bibliografie (Berlin, 
1972)
Weiss, Winfried F., "Ruskin, Pater und Hofmannsthal", 
Colloquia Germanica, 1973, pp.162-170 
Wentzlaff-Sggebert, F.W., "Hofmannsthals ’Jedermann' als 
allegorisches Spiel für die 'lebendige Bühne'",
Hofmannsthal-Blatter, 6 (1971), pp.461-471 
Wiese, Benno von, "Hofmannsthal: Das kleine Welttheater", 
in Das deutsche Drama, Bd. II (Düsseldorf, I960), 
pp.229-243
Wieser, Theodor, "Der Malteser in Hofmannsthals 'Andreas'", 
Suphorion. 51 (1957), pp.397-421 
Wittman, Lothar, Sprachthematik und dramatische Form im 
Werke Hofmannsthals (Stuttgart, 1966)
Wocke, Helmut, "Hugo von Hofmannsthals 'Salzburger Grosses 
Welttheater'", WW, 1950, pp.264-272 
Wunberg, Gotthard, Der frühe Hofmannsthal: Schizophrénie 
als dichterische Struktur (Stuttgart, 1965)
Wyss, Hugo, Die Frau in der Dichtung Hofmannsthals: Fine 
Studie zum dionysischen Welterlebnis (Zürich, 1954) 
Yuill, W.E., and P.Howe (editors), Hugo von Hofmannsthal 
(1874-1929): Commemorative Essays (London, 1981) 
Zelinsky, Hartmut, "Hugo von Hofmannsthal und Asien", in 
Fin de Siecle, edited by R. Bauer et al. (Frankfurt/ 
Main-, 1977), pp.508-566
-173-
Ziolkowski, Theodore, "James Joyces Epiphanie und die TJber- 
windung der empirischen Welt in der modernen deutschen 
Prosa", DVJS. 33 (1961), pp.594-616
3. Mysticism, Religion, Ethics, Philosophy
Berger, Peter L., A Rumour of Angels(Haraondsworth. 1971) 
Bbckman, Paul, "Die Bedeutung Nietzsches für die Situation 
der modernen Literatur", DVJS, 27 (1953), pp.77-101 
Broch, Hermann, "Das Bbse in Wertsystem der Kunst", in
Gesammelte Werke; Essays Bd. I (Zürich, 1955), pp.311- 
350
" "Der Zerfall der Werte", in Gesammelte Werke: Essays 
3d.II (Zürich, 1955), pp.5-43 
Burdach, Konrad, "Faust und Moses", Sitzungsberichte der
Kbniglichen Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 
Berlin, 1912, pp.358-403, 627-659, 736-789 
Calderon de la Barca, P., The Great Theatre of the World, 
in Masterpieces of the Spanish Golden Age, edited by 
A. Flores (New York, 1968), pp.363-395 
Clark, James M., The Great Mystics: Eckhart, Tauler and 
Suser (Oxford, 1949)
Copleston, Frederick, History of Philosophy, Vol. Ill:
Ockham to Suarez (London, 1953)
Eliot, T.S., The Idea of a Christian Society (London, 1939)
" "Religion and Literature", in Selected Essays (London, 
1963), pp.388-401 
Ellul, Jacques, Hope in Time of Abandonment, translated by 
C.E. Hopkin (New York, 1973)
Hamburger, Michael, From Prophecy to Exorcism: The premisses 
of modern German Literature (London, 1965)
-174-
Hâppold,,F.C., Mysticism: A Study and an Anthology 
(Harnondsworth, 1970)
Hearn, Lafcadio, Kokoro (London and New York, 1898)
Hederer, Edgar, Mystik und Lyrik (München und Berlin, 194-1) 
James, William, The Varieties of Religious Experience: a 
Study in Human Nature (New York, 1936)
Jung, Carl G., Psychology of the Unconscious: A Study of 
the Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido, 
translated by B.M. Hinkle (London, 1919)
Jung, C.G., and C. Kerenyi, Introduction to a Science of 
Mythology, translated by R.F.C. Hull (London, 1951) 
Kassner, Rudolf, Die Mystik, die Künstler und das Leben 
(Leipzig, 1900)
Kessler, Harry Graf,”Kunst und Religion: Die Kunst und die 
religiüse Menge”, Pan, 1899, pp.163-176 
Lévi-Strauss, Claude, Myth and Meaning (London, 1978) 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Die Geburt der Tragbdie aus dem
Geiste der Musik, in Werke; Kritische Gesamtausgabe, 
edited by G. Colli and M. Montinari, Vol.III.1 (Berlin,
1972)
Russell, Bertrand, ’Mysticism and Logic”, in Mysticism and 
Logic and other Essays (London, 1918)
Schaeffer, Francis, The God who is there (London, 1970) 
Seyppel, J. , ’Mystik als Grenzphânomen und Existential: Ein 
Beitrag zur Uberwindung ihrer Definitionen”, DVJS, 35 
(1961), pp.153-183 
Silberer, Herbert, Problems of Mysticism and its Symbolism, 
translated by S.E. Jelliffe (New York, 1917)
-175-
S5119, Dorothee, Realisation: Studien zum Verhâltnis von
Theologie und Diclitung nacli der Aufklârung (Darmstadt,
1973)
Stern, J.P., ”The Dear Purchase", German Quarterly, 4-1 
(1968), pp.317-337 
Underhill, Evelyn, Mysticism: A Study in the nature and
development of man’s spiritual consciousness (London, 
1912)
Warnock, G.J., Contemporary Moral Philosophy (London, 1967) 
Wentzlaff-Eggebert, Friedrich-Wilhelm, Deutsche Mystik
zwischen Mittelalter und Neuzeit: Einheit und Wandlung 
ihrer Erscheinungsformen (Berlin, 194-7)
Wordsworth, William, The Poetical Works of William 
Wordsworth, edited by S. de Selincourt and li. 
Darbishire (Oxford, 194-7)
Zaehner, R.C., Mysticism, sacred and profane: An inquiry 
into some varieties of praeternatural experience 
(London, 1957)
-176-
